



# PLAIN TOW TALK



## **SITUATION :**

### **TOW MISSILES UNFUNDED IN THE U.S. ARMY BUDGET FOR FY 94 AND BEYOND**

## **ISSUES :**

### **COMBAT READINESS, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT MISSION, NATIONAL SECURITY, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL BASE**

#### **TOW EMPLOYMENT**

##### **TOW MISSILES PROVIDE HEAVY ASSAULT CAPABILITY.**

*TOW missiles provide combat forces with a "Heavy Assault Capability"; In the past, TOWs have been employed effectively against bunkers and a variety of other hard targets, not just tanks and armored vehicles.*

##### **TOW IS THE INFANTRY COMMANDER'S PRIMARY HEAVY ASSAULT WEAPON.**

*For infantry, TOW is the Commander's primary heavy assault weapon; Without it, he must rely on other Service Arms or Combat Branches for that support.*

#### **TOW INVENTORY**

##### **THE U.S. ARMY HAS CHOSEN TOW 2A AND TOW 2B**

*The U.S. Army has determined that only the TOW 2A and TOW 2B missiles are operationally suited for combat. Because of their limited utility against current threats, BASIC TOW, ITOW and TOW 2 missiles have been relegated to training status.*

##### **INVENTORIES TO SUPPORT FORCE PACKAGE 1 WILL BE AT CRITICAL LEVELS.**

*At the end of production and assuming a replacement system in FY 2010, there will hardly be enough TOW's to support Force Package 1 (selected active Army units including a couple of NG RO Brigades) operating in a totally non-combat environment from 1995-2010.*



## **REPLENISHMENT OF EXPENDED MISSILES WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT CONTINUED PRODUCTION.**

*While the inventory of war fighting TOW's (assuming no Desert Storm attrition) is marginally sufficient to sustain two simultaneous Desert Storm size conflicts with minimal reserve, replenishment of expended TOW's will be impossible without continued TOW production.*

### **REQUIREMENTS FAR EXCEED PLANNED TOW 2B MISSILE INVENTORIES.**

*In addition to falling short of the Army's own projected TOW missile requirements, the mix of TOW missile types is not what the Army desires or needs. More TOW 2B top attack missiles are required in the inventory than will exist at the end of FY 93 production*

### **ADVERSE IMPACT ON WAR FIGHTING TOW RESOURCES.**

*TOW stockpile assessment assumes a debatable extended 22 year missile shelf life and does not take into account depletion caused by testing, training and damage. Shelf life depletion will start having a significant impact on the stockpile of war fighting TOWs within 10 years.*

### **25,000 TOW 2A'S WERE EXPOSED TO SEVERE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.**

*Many TOW missiles in SW Asia during DS/DS were exposed to abnormally harsh environmental conditions well in excess of the reliability specifications. Affected are some 25,000 TOW 2As now counted as part of the war fighting inventory.*

## **IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL GUARD**

### **A LIMITED SUPPLY OF TOW 2A AND TOW 2B MISSILES**

*The limited supply of TOW 2A and TOW 2B war fighting missiles stock piled as a consequence of stopping TOW production will have a negative impact on the combat readiness of TOW dependent National Guard Infantry, Armor, and Aviation organizations.*

### **FEW IF ANY WAR FIGHTING TOWS AVAILABLE FOR NATIONAL GUARD**

*According to current Army planning, almost all National Guard units will be in late deployable categories; therefore, based on projected TOW inventory levels few, if any, war fighting TOWs will be available to those organizations upon deployment.*

### **HIGHLY IMPROBABLE NATIONAL GUARD WILL TRAIN WITH TOW 2B**

*Based on planned inventory levels, it is highly improbable that National Guard units, or for that matter most active Army units will ever get to train with the TOW 2B missile.*

### **LIMITED NATIONAL GUARD TOW 2A TRAINING**

*Based on planned inventory levels, it is likely that few National Guard Units will get to train with TOW 2As.*

### **LIKELY NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING MISSILE WILL BE BASIC TOWS**

*Just like the past, it is probable that few TOWs will be allocated to National Guard units for annual training and those missiles that are allocated, will likely be **BASIC TOWS** or perhaps **ITOWS***



## **IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL GUARD**

### **NO TOW MISSILES FOR NATIONAL GUARD TO DEFEND COUNTRY**

*In the event National Guard Infantry units are called on to defend the interests of the United States somewhere in the world, they might find themselves equipped with ITOW missiles, or no TOW missiles at all. Or, given the present planned inventory level of war fighting TOWs, they may quite possibly go to war without an adequate heavy assault (anti-tank) capability or alternatively be declared non deployable because of a lack of Class V (TOW missile) support.*

## **TOW PRODUCTION**

### **TERMINATING TOW WILL SEVERELY LIMIT COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS**

*Prematurely terminating TOW production will affect the readiness and combat effectiveness of the total force, impact our industrial base and deny access of TOW to our allies.*

#### **PRODUCTION SKILLS LOST**

*Ceasing TOW production totally will force many key TOW subcontract suppliers to discontinue operations altogether, making it impossible to purchase TOW components for future needs..*

#### **DESIGN SKILLS LOST**

*The design and manufacturing skills that are critical to support TOW production will be lost and may never be duplicated.*

### **IF STOPPED, PROGRAM IMPOSSIBLE TO RESTART**

*Once the program stops, it will be, in a practical sense, impossible to restart.*

## **TOW REPLACEMENT**

### **TOW REPLACEMENT MUST START NOW**

*Under normal conditions a TOW replacement, even if started immediately would not likely be fielded until the year 2010.*

### **A START-UP PROGRAM COULD COST BILLIONS**

*Even if successful, a new weapon program of this type would incur development and implementation costs in the billions of dollars.*

### **REPLACEMENTS TO EXCEED \$100K**

*TOW replacement missile cost in 1993 dollars could exceed \$100,000 each.*



### **AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY LIMITED**

*Available technology that would be employed in any kind of TOW replacement design now would be immature and therefore, pose a great deal of risk to schedule, cost and achievement. These risks make fielding highly unlikely before 2010.*

### **CESSATION OF PROGRAM COULD CAUSE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES**

*Premature cessation of TOW production and the subsequent shortfall in heavy assault capability could result in a major thrust to develop the TOW replacement on an accelerated schedule "at any cost" thereby repeating the disastrous Dragon/Rattler experiences of the past.*

## **A COST EFFECTIVE RISK FREE SOLUTION**

### **LET TOW EVOLVE**

*Evolve TOW over time via the process of mature "technology insertion" to a faster, (shorter time of flight) longer range, more lethal version of TOW to meet future needs.*

### **CONTINUE TO PRODUCE TOW**

*Continue to produce TOWs in amounts appropriate to cope with existing and projected threats while replenishing and updating missiles in the war fighting stockpile. This course of action would provide improvements to TOW that would meet existing and projected requirements while maintaining a warm production line at a fraction of the cost of developing a TOW replacement.*

## **REMEDY**

### **CONGRESS SHOULD QUESTION THE RISK OF ENDING TOW**

*It is reasonable and appropriate in light of unsettled post cold war world conditions to ask members of Congress to question the very real risk being taken by the US Army in ending TOW production after FY 93. TOW is a combat proven, highly reliable and cost effective weapon system. It has demonstrated its effectiveness in the medium intensity conventional war of the type in which the United States may find itself in the future. There is no current viable replacement and none forthcoming.*

### **TOW NEEDS YOUR SUPPORT**

*In line with the above and in order to diminish the precipitous course of action presently in effect, Congress should fund the production of war fighting TOWs (TOW 2As and TOW 2Bs) in FY 94 and further direct the Army to continue TOW procurement until such time that a replacement for the TOW missile is fielded. In this regard, National Guard support in urging Congress to action is solicited and appreciated.*

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

HMSC CUSTOMER RELATIONS - (818) 702-5100  
HMSC MARKETING - (818) 702-1983  
TOW PROGRAM OFFICE - (602) 794-8346



1993

# *Army National Guard*

## Essential Readiness Issue

### **Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided Missile Procurement**

The battle tested and proven Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missile is the premium heavy anti-tank and anti-armor missile for the Army, Marine Corps and the armed forces of 39 other countries. The Army National Guard has in its arsenal TOW systems that will need a continuing upgraded inventory of TOW missiles to provide war fighting capability and readiness. The current plans to reduce TOW procurement in FY 1994 and end procurement thereafter will significantly affect the inventory of TOW missiles in the Army National Guard. The inventory of TOW missiles will progressively reach the end of their shelf life, thereby, diminishing the available war fighting inventory of TOWs to a critical level well before the most optimistic projection of the fielding of a replacement to the TOW.

Stopping TOW production will not only degrade the readiness and combat effectiveness of the Total Army but will adversely affect our defense industrial base. This will cause the loss of critical design and manufacturing skills which may never be recovered, and will generate significant costs to restart production should TOW missile again be manufactured.

*The NGAUS urges the congress to reexamine the risk being incurred by reducing TOW procurement in FY 1994 and terminating the program thereafter, to fully fund TOW procurement in FY 1994 and to sustain TOW procurement in FY 1995 and beyond.*



## **CRITICAL NEED TO CONTINUE TOW MISSILE PRODUCTION**

The US Army TOW (Tube launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided) missile has justifiably been called "the most successful program in the history of tactical missiles." Since entering service in 1969, TOW has been the premier heavy anti-armor missile for the US Army and 34 other allied armies.

With the decline of the defense budget, the Army has recently decided to end TOW production after the Fiscal Year 93 buy. At the end of production, the Army will have an insufficient inventory of war fighting TOW 2A and 2B missiles for the most current Army mission objective. In addition to falling short of the US Army's own projected requirements, the mix of missile types is not what the US Army desires. There should be more TOW 2B top attack type missiles in the inventory than will exist at the end of FY 93 production. The current level of war fighting TOW missiles is only sufficient to fully accommodate "Force Package 1," leaving some active forces and most of the Army National Guard with virtually no missiles for their TOW launch platforms in the event of a serious conflict.

Approximately 25,000 TOW 2A missiles deployed in Desert Storm were subjected to improper handling and storage potentially resulting in further depletion of the inventory if these missiles are found to be damaged or degraded.

The replacement for the TOW missile has not yet been funded for development. As the inventory of TOW missiles progressively reaches the end of its shelf life, we believe a critical shortfall of heavy anti-armor missiles will be further exacerbated. Even with the substantial shelf life that TOW has, the war fighting inventory will start dipping even lower between the 1990's and the early 2000's. Optimistically, by the time a TOW replacement could deliver its first production lot in 2005 to 2010, the TOW inventory will be at slightly more than 1/2 of the level attained at the end of production. The likelihood of the TOW replacement being fielded before 2010 is very low.

In this uncertain environment, we have serious concern about allowing a shortfall of TOW missiles to worsen before a replacement missile successfully completes development and enters production. Continuing TOW production would eliminate this shortfall. Further, sustained TOW production relieves the schedule risk attendant with development of any TOW replacement, since TOW production could be economically extended if the span of development/production of the replacement missile slips.

One of the most viable and economical methods for providing a new heavy anti-armor weapon to replace TOW is through a product improvement program for the current TOW missile that would utilize the same factory and supplier base. New technology such as that being developed on TACAWS can be economically inserted into an on-going program such as TOW, therefore allowing early and cost effective introduction of improved missiles into the inventory. In addition to sustaining the inventory at higher levels, more capable missiles would be made available to our fighting forces. This was accomplished successfully on TOW throughout the years; as the armor threat has evolved, so has TOW, resulting in the TOW 2A and TOW 2B missiles which are capable of defeating any current threats. This same on-going process for upgrading can be used successfully to evolve to the future heavy anti-armor missile system.

Terminating TOW production after FY 93 will not only degrade the readiness and combat effectiveness of the US Army's active and reserve forces but will adversely affect our defense industrial base and deny access to this important weapon system to our allies who want the TOW system in their inventories. Once the program stops it will be, in a practical sense, impossible to restart. Three of our key suppliers whose production facilities are dedicated to TOW will be driven to discontinue operations. The design and manufacturing skills that are critical to support the TOW production activity will be lost and may never be duplicated.

We believe it is appropriate for members of Congress to question the risk being taken by the US Army in ending production after FY 93. TOW is a combat proven, highly capable, and cost effective weapon system. It has demonstrated its effectiveness in the medium intensity conventional war of the type in which the United States may find itself in the future. Tow production should continue at a rate that will obtain the mission objective or, at a minimum, at a low rate that maintains the industrial base until a replacement system is in hand. There is no current viable replacement and none on the horizon!

March 1, 1993



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. A

RELATING TO THE END STRENGTH LEVEL AND FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE  
NATIONAL GUARD

WHEREAS, The wisdom and success of the Total Force Policy were proven by the military actions of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm; and

WHEREAS, The Total Force Policy has shown its flexibility by spanning two decades of changing military requirements, responding to expanded and contracted budget resources, while preserving wartime capability, as well as generating public support; and

WHEREAS, The significant investment of resources in this Policy over the past 20 years has created a quality Total Force; and

WHEREAS, The National Guard, when integrated as a full partner in the Total Force, executed the programmed pre-mobilization and post-mobilization training requirements according to plan, provided ready and capable units in response to mobilization and deployment orders and performed its assigned missions admirably; and

WHEREAS, Optimally, force structure is developed from the threat assessment and the corresponding national defense strategy, but realistically, force structure is tailored by the availability of dollars to build and sustain the force; and

WHEREAS, The Total Force Policy was designed to provide the most force capability for the least cost and in a cost effecting manner, and proposed; and

WHEREAS, The current steep reduction ramp for the end strength and force structure of the National Guard appears to ignore the following facts:

— The threat to national security is far less defined than during the Cold War, and

— The Active Components will be forcing quality trained personnel from their careers and there will be no opportunity to preserve that military experience and skill in the National Guard and Reserve, and

— There is insufficient lift available to move all of the Active contingency force immediately; and

— The National Guard and Reserve are a cost effective force multiplier which can complete required post-mobilization training and be ready for deployment by the time airlift and sealift are available, and

— Unlike the Active Components, National Guard and Reserve forces lack the ability to expand quickly once units are inactivated and community ties severed; and

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WHEREAS, This Association is firmly convinced that if airlift and sealift are not available to transport a unit before a Guard and Reserve unit can be made available and/or a unit is required in the structure but is not required for immediate deployment, that force structure should be placed in the National Guard and Reserve; and

WHEREAS, The Base Force strategy fails to consider the value-added benefits to our nation, our states and our communities through the non-federal role of the National Guard; and

WHEREAS, These benefits are becoming increasingly valuable as a cost effective method of helping to solve many of our nation's ills without creating an even greater deficit; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States, in order to maintain the maximum force structure at the minimum cost, to suspend the reduction of National Guard end strength and force structure until the near- and long-term defense requirements of our nation are more clearly defined and both the federal and state roles and missions for the National Guard of the 1990s are fully developed and identified.



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. B

RELATING TO FULL-TIME SUPPORT MANNING

WHEREAS, The National Guard role under the Total Force Policy is substantial and requires high levels of readiness; and

WHEREAS, The capability of National Guard units and personnel to mobilize, deploy, integrate and operate was amply demonstrated during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM; and

WHEREAS, The National Guard will continue to play its essential and constitutional role in our Nation's defense for the foreseeable future; and

WHEREAS, The level of full-time support manning has a direct and demonstrated influence on readiness capability and is dictated by mission and equipment levels rather than end strength; and

WHEREAS, Full-time support manning is the pivotal element in day-to-day unit operations in the functions of administration, personnel supply and training preparation and in enhancing the quality of training by making inactive duty training periods and annual training more efficient and effective; and

WHEREAS, The relationship between the Active Component and the National Guard dictates the levels of communication, understanding, interoperability, and reliance; and

WHEREAS, Strong relationships have developed between the Air National Guard and the Air Force based on day-to-day operations, training exercises, and combat deployment; and

WHEREAS, The recent mobilization and deployment for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM demonstrated several weaknesses in the relationship between the Army National Guard and the Army and a lack of confidence by the Army leadership in their readiness rating system and the capability of Army National Guard combat units; and

WHEREAS, Congress has recognized this problem and in an effort to build a higher level of understanding, confidence and communication between the service elements, has directed an Active Army advisor program to augment the full-time support manning force in Army National Guard units; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States to authorize and fund the full-time support personnel needed to meet the readiness requirements of current units of the Army and Air National Guard and to provide adequate resources for new units or missions transferred to the National Guard.

FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED, That the NGAUS strongly supports a significant increase in Active Army advisors to enhance Army National Guard combat training and readiness and the Active Army leadership's knowledge and confidence in National Guard capability.

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115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. C

RELATING TO NATIONAL GUARD SUPPORT FOR COUNTERDRUG MISSIONS AND  
DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAMS

WHEREAS, The world and the United States have been plagued by the scourge of illicit drug trafficking for the past century; and

WHEREAS, The drug problem is considered by many to be the greatest domestic threat to national security confronting this country to be currently; and

WHEREAS, The impact of illicit drugs on the population of the United States has caused more than 80,000 crack babies to be born annually with resultant medical costs of approximately \$800 million per year; and

WHEREAS, The President's National Drug Control Strategy dated February 1991, states "Federal spending on drug control programs has increased by 700 percent since 1981..." to fight the War on Drugs; and

WHEREAS, The National Guard represents the principle Defense Department support conduit to law enforcement agencies for counterdrug missions; and

WHEREAS, Section 1004 of the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act, calls for the "establishment of command, control, communications, and computer (C4) networks for improved integration of law enforcement, active military, and National Guard activities"; and

WHEREAS, Drug interdiction and border surveillance operations are essential to the mission and require a low profile for success; and

WHEREAS, Most existing military reconnaissance systems are too complex, expensive and manpower intensive for the drug interdiction and border surveillance missions; and

WHEREAS, The National Guard requires a tailored surveillance system configured on existing air platforms to provide around-the-clock surveillance and command and control capability to operating agencies; and

WHEREAS, The mission requirements for surveillance and target acquisition systems for low intensity conflict and counterdrug missions are nearly identical, therefore, acquisition by the Army National Guard of a modern, in-production, fully supportable Multi-Sensor Surveillance Aircraft would improve significantly the National Guard's ability to perform its overall Army reconnaissance and target acquisition responsibilities for wartime while simultaneously performing the peacetime counterdrug mission; and

WHEREAS, Army National Guard aircraft are an essential component in the National Guard role in the Department of Defense drug interdiction mission; and

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WHEREAS, The current inventory of Army National Guard aircraft capable of providing the surveillance essential for successful interdiction is limited in quantity, is rapidly becoming non-supportable logistically, is scheduled to be retired from the Army National Guard inventory; and

WHEREAS, The ability of light wheeled vehicles to provide a cost effective, agile, protected, and mobile tactical fighting vehicle with the necessary operational range and firepower to support special and contingency force operations has been demonstrated in various branches of the Armed Forces; and

WHEREAS, The peacetime mission for the Army National Guard, specifically drug interdiction, provides an appropriate training opportunity for urban and built-up area wartime environment; and

WHEREAS, The ultimate solution to the drug crisis is demand reduction and more specifically prevention and education; and

WHEREAS, Current in-place demand-reduction initiatives and those in the planning stages sponsored by various National Guard entities have been readily accepted and praised within the nation's school systems; and

WHEREAS, The expansion of National Guard and Reserve demand reduction involvement is a cost effective expenditure of Defense funds; and

WHEREAS, A coordinated effort in support of demand reduction is essential to success in confronting drug abuse; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States and the Department of Defense to support long-term National Guard funding for the sustainment of the personnel and C4 networks required for counterdrug operational missions and procurement and upgrade of equipment uniquely suited to support counterdrug interdiction and surveillance operations.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the NGAUS urges the Congress of the United States to support long-term funding of National Guard initiatives for demand reduction as a critical element in the effort to reverse the national drug problem.

January 25, 1993

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115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. D

RELATING TO ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

WHEREAS, The backlog of unfunded construction has grown to more than \$3 billion for the Army National Guard and approximately \$1.5 billion for the Air National Guard; and

WHEREAS, Over the last three years increases in funding provided by Congress have averaged \$179 million for the Army National Guard and \$91.4 million for the Air National Guard; and

WHEREAS, The available funding is not keeping pace with the essential facility modernization, unit conversions or facilities replacement which are necessary to support the training, personnel and mission equipment requirements of the Army and Air National Guard; and

WHEREAS, Training and equipment maintenance, both major factors in manpower retention and unit readiness capability, are hampered by the inadequate facilities that many units must use; and

WHEREAS, Adequate and functional training and mission support facilities are required, if National Guard units are to attain and maintain high levels of mission readiness; and

WHEREAS, Each additional project adds to the economic health of the community and state in which it is located, and increases the readiness of the units housed therein; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to support acceleration of the National Guard military construction programs to a level that will fund all new mission requirements plus a minimum for each Guard component of \$150 million each year to apply against the current mission backlog in the Army and Air National Guard.

January 25, 1993

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115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. E

RELATING TO ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE, FUNDING, AND MISSION EMPHASIS  
FOR THE ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD

WHEREAS, Environmental issues, compliance, and cleanup are major factors affecting all levels of government and all communities of the United States and will be a significant concern into the next century; and

WHEREAS, Federal agencies, including National Guard operations, are subject to provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and over a hundred other topical federal laws; and

WHEREAS, The Chief, National Guard Bureau, has identified environmental cleanup and protection as a high priority for the National Guard; and

WHEREAS, The National Guard in its traditional role as the militia and its members as citizen-soldiers need to be in the forefront of national environmental protection and cleanup; and

WHEREAS, The changing world situation is generating a reevaluation of operational missions and training of the National Guard in terms of defense needs and other national goals; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States, the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, and the National Guard Bureau to authorize and provide appropriate funding and manpower within the National Guard Bureau and the states to accomplish required environmental analyses for current and future National Guard operations, to include providing appropriate funding for environmental compliance, retrofit, and cleanup.

January 25, 1993

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115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. F

RELATING TO BURIAL RIGHTS OF GUARD MEMBERS IN NATIONAL CEMETERIES

WHEREAS, Current law requires that a military member must have served a minimum of 24 consecutive months of Active Duty in order to receive burial benefits and be buried in a national cemetery; and

WHEREAS, Current law prohibits the burial in a national cemetery of a National Guard veteran who does not meet the federal active service requirements; and

WHEREAS, State veterans' cemeteries that are built and/or maintained with funding from the Department of Veterans' Affairs are required to use the federal criteria for burial eligibility and, therefore, also must exclude National Guard veterans; and

WHEREAS, Many members of the National Guard have served honorably and faithfully for a period of 20 or more years; and

WHEREAS, It would be fair and equitable to provide those National Guard members who have met all the requirements for military retirement the right to be buried in a national cemetery; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to establish entitlement to military burial benefits for National Guard members who have completed 20 or more years of honorable and faithful service in the National Guard.

January 25, 1993

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115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. G

RELATING TO USE OF NON-TRADITIONAL AND STATE-OF-THE-ART TRAINING  
TECHNOLOGY

WHEREAS, The world political situation is changing rapidly and national security considerations are adjusting to the evolving conditions, such that major reductions are expected in the defense budget; and

WHEREAS, The National Guard Bureau has great difficulty providing funds for mandays and travel necessary to send thousands of National Guard members to various technical training courses throughout the country for initial training and for retraining to keep up with rapidly advancing technology; and

WHEREAS, Many capable, experienced National Guard personnel are at a point in their careers in civilian employment where it is difficult or impossible for them to get away for long periods of resident training which has now been made mandatory in the National Guard, and is forcing many to leave the National Guard; and

WHEREAS, State-of-the-art technology exists which can take the knowledge now being taught in our military technical training centers and put it into various media from computers to video cassette recordings and compact disc (read only memory) to video teleconferencing which can be accessed from almost anywhere in the United States; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States and the Administration to direct the Department of Defense and the Services to use current technology to provide training opportunities for National Guard personnel which they can use to get necessary training without taking leave from their civilian employment to attend resident courses and which would enable these members to access meaningful and effective training from their home computers or from their unit's computers.

January 25, 1993



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. H

RELATING TO MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD

WHEREAS, The Army and Air National Guard continue to experience shortages in mission required equipment that affect day-to-day operations, training and wartime readiness; adversely; and

WHEREAS, The National Guard ability to attain a high level of readiness, is limited by the fact that equipment-on-hand levels for some units are lower than authorized or required because the units have shortages in a limited number of items which are fundamental to the performance of the primary mission; and

WHEREAS, Much of the equipment needed is low cost and does not represent major procurement line items, but existing shortages have a direct impact on the combat capability and survivability of many early mobilizing units; and

WHEREAS, Congress has provided miscellaneous equipment funds for the National Guard and Reserve in the separate Guard and Reserve Equipment Account consistently over the past ten years in an effort to alleviate the day-to-day shortages of high priority and combat essential equipment, to provide units with the most military capability for the dollar, and to allow the Chiefs of the National Guard and Reserve to procure items based on their evaluation of readiness requirements; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to continue to improve equipment readiness levels by providing miscellaneous equipment funding in FY, within the Guard and Reserve Equipment Account, of \$70 million for the Army National Guard and \$30 million for the Air National Guard.

January 25, 1993

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115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. I

RELATING TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT OF TRAINING  
SIMULATORS AND DEVICES FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

WHEREAS, Reduced Defense budgets will require more cost-effective training methods to achieve and maintain readiness; and

WHEREAS, Training simulators and devices offer a cost-effective and efficient training alternative and take advantage of state-of-the-art technology; and

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard is expected to achieve levels of training equal to that of the Active Army; and

WHEREAS, The training environment for the Army National Guard is made more difficult than that of the Active Army by reason of shortages of time, place (e.g., ranges and outdoor training areas in close proximity to home station armories), facilities and equipment; and

WHEREAS, Training simulators and devices help to alleviate the more difficult training environment for the Army National Guard; and

WHEREAS, The Congress of the United States added \$13 million for research and development of training simulators and devices suitable for armory or local training areas use, and \$100 million for the procurement of training simulators and devices for the Army National Guard to the 1986-1988 Defense Budgets; and

WHEREAS, During FY 1989 and FY 1990 there was no development or procurement funding dedicated for training simulators and devices; and

WHEREAS, Congress in FY 93 provided \$20 million for an advanced simulation project and \$10 million for an Army National Guard armor simulation center; and

WHEREAS, While the Congress expressed increasing support for the development and procurement of training simulators and devices in FY 1992 and FY 1993; and

WHEREAS, There remains a need to restore Guard/Reserve unique training simulators and devices program by providing \$5.0 million for research and development funding, \$25.0 million for procurement funding and \$2.5 million for O&M support in the defense budget; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to provide funds in the FY 1995 Defense Budget for research and development, procurement, and operations and maintenance support of training simulators, including mobile systems, and devices for the Army National Guard.

January 25, 1993

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115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. J

RELATING TO ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLE FLEET

WHEREAS, Extreme shortages in the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet continue to be a major problem in Army National Guard modernization; and

WHEREAS, The tactical wheeled vehicle fleet supporting Army National Guard operations and training does not meet current requirements; and

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard's current shortage of 5-ton trucks is especially critical, affecting National Guard operations, training, mobilization and readiness efforts adversely; and

WHEREAS, To further compound shortages, a large percentage of the Army National Guard inventory of 2-1/2 and 5-ton trucks are older gasoline powered models that are gasoline powered in many cases and the vast majority are no longer supportable with repair parts; and

WHEREAS, Continued operation of 1/4 ton Jeeps, which have been completely removed from the active forces, causes both a costly logistical burden to the Army National Guard and an interoperability problem upon mobilization; and

WHEREAS, The National Guard will continue to have a shortfall of HMMWVs; and

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard cannot effectively perform its heavy haul responsibility without the heavy equipment transporter (HET) system consisting of the M1070 tractor and the M1000 semitrailer; and

WHEREAS, The National Guard Bureau is considering a limited Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) designed to remanufacture current assets as funds become available; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to support a combination of accelerated procurement of modern tactical wheeled vehicles and a Service Life Extension Program to modernize the Army National Guard wheeled vehicle fleet.

FURTHER, BE IT RESOLVED, That NGAUS urges the Department of the Army and the Congress of the United States to provide funding in FY 1995 to continue procurement of HET Systems for the Army National Guard.

January 25, 1993

AR 93-02

A



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. K

RELATING TO UPGRADE OF THE M113 FAMILY OF VEHICLES

WHEREAS, A full complement of armored personnel carriers and related vehicles are essential to successful combat operations; and

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard tank fleet is being modernized with M-1 tanks; and

WHEREAS, The Total Army will equip its units with a mix of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M113 FOV for the foreseeable future; and

WHEREAS, The operations in the Persian Gulf demonstrated limited capability of the M113 FOV A2 to keep up with and maneuver with the M-1 series tank; and

WHEREAS, The M113 FOV, when upgraded to A3, provides the Total Army with the speed/maneuverability to complement the M-1 series tank in a combat environment; and

WHEREAS, The Fire Support Team Vehicle (FISTV), as a variant of the M113 FOV, will be upgraded to the A3 chassis, and in addition, the FISTV should have an upgrade to the targeting station to meet the artillery support requirements in a combat environment; and

WHEREAS, Upon completion of the FISTV upgrade, the Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV) should receive upgrading of the weapon station and chassis to A3; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, strongly urges the continued modernization of the entire M113 Family of Vehicles until all M113 vehicles in the Army National Guard, to include Fire Support Team Vehicle; have been upgraded from the A2 model to the A3 model.

January 25, 1993

AR93-03



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. L

RELATING TO PROCUREMENT OF BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE (BFV)

WHEREAS, Armored mobility is the key to land combat operations; and

WHEREAS, Operation Desert Storm clearly demonstrated that the synergism of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Abrams M1 Tank team permits the Army to execute the Air-Land Battle doctrine; and

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard tank fleet is being modernized with M-1 tanks; and

WHEREAS, Bradley Fighting Vehicles provide the speed, maneuverability, fire power, and armor protection necessary to support the M-1 tank, optimizing the capabilities of both weapons systems; and

WHEREAS, There is a projected shortfall of 800 to 1000 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to satisfy Army National Guard requirements; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, strongly urges the continued procurement of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle until all Army National Guard requirements for that fighting vehicle have been met.

January 25, 1993

AF 93-04

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115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. M

RELATING TO MODERNIZATION OF ARTILLERY UNITS

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard has 50 percent of the artillery battalions in the Total Force, which will increase as a result of Active Army drawdowns; and

WHEREAS, The Active Army has fielded digital fire support systems throughout their structure; and

WHEREAS, The recent performance of forces in Operation Desert Storm validated the essentiality of complete digitalization of Field Artillery Fire Support Automation systems for C3 in a joint and allied force environment and the capability of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) to influence the battlefield; and

WHEREAS, The divisions of the Active Army have added the MLRS to their division artillery and are adding additional corps MLRS battalions; and

WHEREAS, The division and corps artillery units of the Army National Guard have wartime commitments requiring equal artillery firepower; and

WHEREAS, Command and Control and automated fire planning is an urgently needed force multiplier at Army National Guard Field Artillery battalion, brigade and division levels; and

WHEREAS, The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is the objective fire support command and control system for the future, and the Army National Guard is not scheduled to receive AFATDS until the late 1990s; and

WHEREAS, The Digital Data Set, AN/PSG-7 (Forward Entry Device) is scheduled for fielding to replace the Digital Message Device and will be a key digital input device for AFATDS, but will be fielded only to Army National Guard Roundout Field Artillery units; and

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard, in conjunction with the Army Field Artillery School and Program Executive Office Command and Control Systems, has decided to field a digital interim fire support system that will provide near-term capability while posturing the Army National Guard for the fielding of AFATDS with or ahead of the Active Army; and

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard target acquisition batteries have been issued the Fire-finder Radar System, a state-of-the-art counter-battery/mortar radar, but the capability of the Fire-finder Radar System has been severely limited by the lack of the Position Azimuth Determining System (PADS); and

WHEREAS, The enormous electromagnetic signature of the Fire-finder Radar System makes moves necessary to provide survivability of the system and its personnel; and

WHEREAS, The massing of artillery fires is totally dependent on accurate survey and the PADS is 10 to 20 times faster than conventional survey; and

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WHEREAS, The Army's Howitzer Improvement Program (HIP) has culminated in authorizing the production start-up of the M109A6, improved howitzer, a decision that paves the way for the introduction of major production improvements in the combat proven M109, 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer, highly regarded as the backbone of field artillery capability; and

WHEREAS, The new M109A6 configuration will introduce dramatic upgrades in several key areas including its Automatic Fire Control System, an on-board navigation system which will allow field artillery crews to move quickly from road march status to target engagement in less than 60 seconds, and a new cannon assembly will provide a 25 percent increase in the system's firepower; and

WHEREAS, The M992 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle (FAASV) is being acquired for each of the Army's self-propelled M109 155mm self-propelled howitzer system, but to date no FAASVs have been issued to the Army National Guard; and

WHEREAS, The Army's older fleet of ammunition support vehicles (M548) performed poorly during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm significantly delaying operations significantly because of their lack of carrying capability, mobility, speed and reliability; and

WHEREAS, Every self-propelled howitzer system must be provided a self-propelled ammunition supply vehicle; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army and the Congress of the United States to continue to support initiatives to modernize the Army National Guard Field Artillery force structure fully.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That NGAUS urges the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States to support:

- equipping the Army National Guard divisions and corps artillery battalions with the Multiple Launch Rocket System, to include all appropriate associated support and mission essential equipment items, and to maintain sufficient MLRS rocket production; and

- an interim fire support automation system, that includes the Forward Entry Device, at the field artillery battalion, brigade and division levels; and

- funding for the interim fire support system in FY 1995 on an accelerated basis to meet the urgent C3 requirement of the Army National Guard for combat readiness; and

- providing the Position Azimuth Determining System to Army National Guard artillery units; and

- the upgrading of all existing M109 chassis including those of the Army National Guard; and

- issuing one M992 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle for each self-propelled howitzer system in the active Army and the Army National Guard.

January 25, 1993



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. N

RELATING TO A WARM TANK PRODUCTION BASE AND UPGRADE OF THE M1/IPM1 TANK

WHEREAS, Modernization of Army National Guard tank assets to meet future projected threats is lagging, with approximately one third of the Guard's armor force being equipped with older M1/IPM1s; and

WHEREAS, All older M1/IPM1s have a 105mm main gun, inferior armor, and no nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) overpressure system; and

WHEREAS, In Operation Desert Storm, the Army opted not to use M1/IPM1s but equipped all U.S. armor units with the more modern M1A1; and

WHEREAS, The conversion program to upgrade M1/IPM1s to M1A2 configuration provides revolutionary new tank capabilities at affordable evolutionary prices; and

WHEREAS, The Congress in the FY 1991 Defense Appropriations Act directed the Army to submit a plan for implementing the conversion of 120 M1 and IPM1s per year and authorized the production of 62 M1A2 tanks; and

WHEREAS, The Congress again in the FY 1992 Appropriations Act authorized the production of an additional 60 M1A2 tanks and provided \$225 million for an M1A2 upgrade program; and

WHEREAS, In January 1992 the Office of the Secretary of Defense placed M1A2 production funding, as well as the upgrade program, on the rescission list thus, in effect, terminating U.S. tank production in April 1993; and

WHEREAS, The rationale of Congress for advocating the upgrade program focused on the need to maintain the essential elements of the tank industrial base while transitioning to newer versions of the main battle tank; and

WHEREAS, A break in production makes restarting prohibitively expensive (\$3 billion) and loses critical skilled workers and suppliers while at the same time adversely impacting our national defense posture; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to continue funding the M1/IPM1 upgrade program with approval of the conversion rate of at least 120 tanks per year as soon as practical to maintain the tank industrial base, protect the national defense posture and continue modernization of the Army tank fleet.

January 25, 1993

AR 93-06

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115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. 0

RELATING TO THE NEED FOR MODERN UTILITY AND CARGO HELICOPTERS IN THE  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard has a shortage of modern utility, cargo and special operations helicopters required to meet wartime deployment requirements; and

WHEREAS, Since 1978 the Department of the Army has been procuring the UH-60 Blackhawk to replace the aging UH-1 Huey; and

WHEREAS, The UH-60 offers quantum improvements in hot day/night altitude performance, speed, maneuverability, agility, lift capacity, maintainability, reliability, safety, survivability and the ability to fly in icing conditions; and

WHEREAS, The Department of the Army continues to carry hundreds of UH-1s in front-line tactical organizations, in lieu of UH-60s; and

WHEREAS, The optimum solution for modernization of the Army National Guard UH-1 fleet is acquisition of the UH-60, however in the last eight years, the Department of the Army has delivered just 125 UH-60s to the Army National Guard, a modernization rate that will take at least 50 years to complete; and

WHEREAS, There are two alternative approaches to augment the optimum solution and achieve cost effective modernization; and

WHEREAS, One alternative is procurement of an off-the-shelf Non-Developmental Item (NDI) light utility helicopter, at a cost less than one-half the overall procurement and operating costs of the UH-60; and

WHEREAS, This approach could provide the Army National Guard with more than two NDI helicopters for the cost of one UH-60; and

WHEREAS, The second alternative is upgrading the UH-1H; and

WHEREAS, The UH-1 airframe has an indefinite life of more than, 30,000 hours and with an engine and other dynamic component upgrades, the Army National Guard will gain significant improvements in mission performance, operational readiness, logistics support and cost of ownership; and

WHEREAS, Continued procurement and modification of UH-1 helicopters to provide for crashworthy auxiliary external fuel tank capability is vital to increasing the effectiveness of sustained aviation operations in support of wartime missions and peacetime federal mission requirements; and

WHEREAS, Special Operations (Aviation) has a requirement for 51 MH-47E helicopters, and the Congress of the United States has provided funds for 26 MH-47E Special Operations helicopters; and

WHEREAS, If only 26 MH-47E helicopters are funded and all go to the Active Component, the Army National Guard will be left with older, less capable CH-47D helicopters for Special Operations requirements precluding without commonality with their Active Army Special Operations (Aviation) counterparts; and

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Whereas, Some heavy cargo helicopter units are still equipped with CH-54s, which are rapidly nearing the end of their service life; and

WHEREAS, The Army has elected to remanufacture 472 existing CH-47A/B/C model helicopters as the lowest cost method to meet the medium/heavy cargo helicopter fleet requirement; and

WHEREAS, The CH-47 fleet's engine life, safety, reliability, performance, and lower cost of operation can be achieved by upgrading the existing engine with ADEC (Full Authority Digital Electronic Fuel Control); and

WHEREAS, In 1990 the Congress of the United States directed the Army to modernize the complete Army National Guard heavy cargo CH-54 fleet with completion in 1993; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to continue to authorize and fund modernization of the Army National Guard utility and cargo helicopter fleets.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That NGAUS urges the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States to support:

- modernization of the Army National Guard utility helicopter fleet through the procurement of at least 30 UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopters each year with appropriate repair parts and ground support equipment designated for issue to the Army National Guard and to accelerate the modernization program by initiating the process to either procure a quantity of non-developmental item (NDI) utility helicopters or upgrading at least 200 of the existing UH-1H fleet with a modern turbine engine and other dynamic component upgrades each year for five years; and

- modernization of the UH-1 helicopter with crashworthy auxiliary external fuel tanks until units are modernized to the required level; and

- procurement of the remainder of the 51 authorized MH-47E helicopters with 17 designated for the Army National Guard; and

- new production of 24 CH-47Ds per year for the Army National Guard until all medium/heavy cargo helicopter units are modernized to the required level; and

- upgrading the CH-47 fleet with the FADEC equipped version of its T55-L-712 engine.

January 25, 1993



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. P

RELATING TO THE NEED FOR MODERN ATTACK AND SCOUT HELICOPTERS IN THE  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard lacks sufficient modern attack and scout helicopters required to meet wartime deployment requirements; and

WHEREAS, The AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, armed with Hellfire missiles and a 30mm Chain Gun, can engage and destroy enemy armor at night and in adverse weather; and

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard has 11 battalions authorized AH-64s, however not all 11 Army National Guard attack helicopter battalions are currently programmed and funded to receive them; and

WHEREAS, Funding for AH-64 Apache helicopter production was terminated in FY 1991 with production ending in FY 1993; and

WHEREAS, AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters are slated to be relocated from the Active Army to the Army National Guard; and

WHEREAS, The Cobra has no night firing capability; and

WHEREAS, No common capability exists in the Army and the Army National Guard that assures an effective rocket firing capability for all Total Army attack helicopters; and

WHEREAS, The Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) has developed a self protection capability called Air-to-Air Stinger (ATAS) for light observation, utility, and attack helicopter fleets to counter helicopter and fixed-wing threats; and

WHEREAS, The ATAS system uses unmodified STINGER missiles, capable of engaging both low-hovering helicopters and high speed aircraft at ranges outside of gun boundaries; and

WHEREAS, The OH-58D was developed by the Army (1) to provide a day/night scout capability, (2) to locate and designate targets for laser guided munitions including the AH-64 fired Hellfire missiles and artillery fired Copperhead projectiles, and (3) to provide an airborne anti-air capability by incorporating the air-to-air Stinger missile; and

WHEREAS, The Army has funded only 243 OH-58D vice a validated requirement of 507 aircraft which makes fielding the OH-58D aircraft to the National Guard highly unlikely, especially in the near term; and

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WHEREAS, No funds have been programmed for procurement of additional aircraft in FY 1993, which may close the production line thereby reducing the opportunity to equip the National Guard with modern scout aircraft; and

WHEREAS, There is no armed scout aircraft in production with the capability of the OH-58D to (1) operate nap-of-the-earth, day or night, (2) see but not be seen by use of the mast mounted sight/sensor package, (3) designate and automatically track targets for laser guided munitions, and (4) autonomously fire Hellfire missiles, Stinger missiles, rockets or 50 caliber machine guns; and

WHEREAS, The Army National Guard is now receiving the Hellfire equipped AH-64, has 155mm artillery battalions capable of firing Copperhead missiles, but continues to operate air cavalry squadrons and other units with outdated scout aircraft; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to authorize and fund the continued production of AH-64 attack helicopters at the minimum rate of 60 per year until all 11 Army National Guard attack helicopter battalions are fully equipped including the Hellfire Optimized Missile System, and to fund production of the LONGBOW Fire Control System; to fund a program to modify all AH-1F Cobra helicopters to the HYDRA-70 configuration and provide a night firing capability; to fund a program to upgrade 30 Army National Guard OH-58 scout helicopters per year to the fully modernized OH-58D configuration to satisfy scout requirements in all AH-64 attack battalions; and to fund modification of selected Army National Guard helicopters to accept the air-to-air Stinger (ATAS) system.

January 25, 1993



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. Q

RELATING TO ACCELERATED MODERNIZATION OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AIR  
DEFENSE ARTILLERY UNITS

WHEREAS, Since the decision to terminate the SGT YORK/DIVAD program, the Total Army air defense program has been undergoing reevaluation and rebuild; and

WHEREAS, While some divisional air defense battalions in the Army National Guard have been upgraded from M42 Duster to corps Chaparral or Stinger, the Army National Guard has five divisions, 14 separate brigades and two armored cavalry regiments that have no air defense units for protection; and

WHEREAS, The termination of the SGT YORK/DIVAD program forced the Army and the Army National Guard to find interim, short-term solutions in order to maintain a credible air defense capability; and

WHEREAS, There are a number of air defense systems and system upgrades currently available, to include the Avenger PMS, Stinger Reprogrammable Micro-Processor (RMP), ADI, JTIDS, JTADS, HAWK Phase III and M1M72G Rosette Scan Seeker, which would provide and sustain the air defense artillery capability in the Army National Guard in the short-term; and

WHEREAS, A comprehensive Total Army air defense plan must be developed to cover the current missions and the future threat; and

WHEREAS, Such a plan must address the Army, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve mission requirements and include an equipment distribution schedule that ensures interoperability between the Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to support actions that ensure the Army National Guard is integrated fully into the planning and fielding of air defense artillery assets necessary to provide modern air defense for the Total Army.

FURTHER, BE IT RESOLVED, That NGAUS urges the Congress of the United States and the Department of the Army in the interim to provide sufficient funding to upgrade and modernize existing Army National Guard air defense assets so they remain credible and are interoperable with the Active Army and to provide air defense artillery resources for those Army National Guard corps level units, divisions, separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments that are without protection.

January 25, 1993



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. R

RELATING TO IMPROVEMENTS TO AIR NATIONAL GUARD F-15 AND F-16  
AIRCRAFT

WHEREAS, The Air National Guard currently represents more than one-third of the Total Air Force tactical fighter force and 100 percent of the continental air defense force; and

WHEREAS, Current programs indicate that the Air National Guard will ultimately possess more than 75 percent of the F-16A/B inventory, more than 75 percent of the earlier configurations of the F-16C/D fleet and a total of 153 F-15A/B aircraft; and

WHEREAS, The Air National Guard, will be required to remain a viable, supportable, combat capable and ready force well into the 21st century even though it possesses the earliest models of these fighters; and

WHEREAS, To sustain capability and maintain readiness, improvement programs, including the F-15A/B Multi-Staged Improvement Program, the F-16 Modernization, Survivability and Combat Capability Improvement Program, and the F-15/F-16 engine upgrade program must be completed; and

WHEREAS, The F-15 A/B radar has reached the limits of its capacity to improve and is currently unsupportable and the F-15 A/B Multi-Staged Improvement Program includes a major radar upgrade, as well as other modifications and that help keep the F-15 A/B at state-of-the-art combat capability, and improvements supportable logistically; and

WHEREAS, The F-16 can be upgraded through a modernization, survivability and combat capability improvement program; and

WHEREAS, The Air National Guard F-15s and most of the Air National Guard F-16s are now primarily equipped with the F-100-PW-100/200 turbofan engine, the earliest basic design production configuration engine, which is both expensive and difficult to maintain and which has significant performance and operational limitations, can be improved with an engine retrofit modification upgrade to the F100-PW-220E configuration; and

WHEREAS, The number one safety concern of the Air National Guard is the single engine F-16 with the F-100-PW-200 engine, and the F-100-PW-220E retrofit modification will reduce this safety problem significantly; and

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Defense, and the Congress of the United States to support (1) the F-15A/B Multi-Staged Improvement Program, (2) a phased F-16 improvement program, and (3) retrofit modification of the F-100-PW-100/200 turbofan engine upgrading it to the F-100-PW-220E configuration for all Air National Guard F-15 and F-16 aircraft.

January 25, 1993

AF 93-01

Air



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. S

RELATING TO MODERNIZATION OF C-130 TACTICAL AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT FOR THE  
AIR NATIONAL GUARD

WHEREAS, Air National Guard units now comprise 36 percent of the tactical  
airlift aircraft of the Total Air Force; and

WHEREAS, The Air National Guard tactical airlift inventory includes six  
units of C-130E series aircraft averaging 30 years old of age; and

WHEREAS, The C-130E aircraft are all high-time aircraft having been used  
extensively during the conflict in Southeast Asia; and

WHEREAS, The tactical airlift modernization program initiated by the  
Congress of the United States in 1978 to ensure that Air National Guard tactical  
airlift units maintain the highest possible readiness posture does not include  
a sufficient number of backup aircraft inventory to allow for any attrition; and

WHEREAS, Continued procurement of new C-130H aircraft will allow for  
modernization of the C-130E units as well as providing for backup aircraft  
inventory; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the  
United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th  
day of October 1993, urges the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Defense  
and the Congress of the United States to continue the procurement of C-130H  
aircraft, and their required initial spares and support equipment, at a rate of  
at least 13 per year to continue the modernization of Air National Guard tactical  
airlift units.

January 25, 1993

AF-93-02

AIR



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. T

RELATING TO DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENTS TO C-130 AIRCRAFT

WHEREAS, Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve C-130 equipped tactical airlift units are included in operations and contingency plans which will require employment in a hostile and high-threat environment; and

WHEREAS, With the end of the cold war and changes in concept of military utilization C-130 equipped tactical airlift units are now operating worldwide in peacetime support of missions, which expose the aircraft to a potentially high threat environment; and

WHEREAS, Air National Guard C-130 aircraft are not equipped with any detection, countermeasures, or other defensive systems to reduce their vulnerability to such threats as infrared missiles, radar guided missiles and radar directed guns; and

WHEREAS, Air Force Reserve and Air Force C-130 aircraft are currently being modernized with defensive systems; and

WHEREAS, The Air Force CLOSE LOOK II studies in 1977 and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board reports of 1982 recommended that onboard survivability packages be installed on the C-130 aircraft; and

WHEREAS, The Air National Guard C-130 aircraft will be required to remain a viable, supportable, combat capable and ready force well into the 21st century; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States to support defensive systems improvements for all Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve tactical airlift C-130 aircraft.

January 25, 1993

AF 93-03

AIR



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. U

RELATING TO MODERNIZATION OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD AIR RESCUE UNITS

WHEREAS, The Air National Guard's three air rescue units currently comprise 32 percent of the Total Air Force air rescue forces, and, with the Air Force Reserve, possess all of the HC-130 rescue tanker aircraft available for this essential mission; and

WHEREAS, In FY 1988 and 1991, the Congress of the United States provided funding to modernize Air National Guard air rescue units with new MH-60G rescue helicopters to replace the aging CH/HH-3 aircraft assigned to the California and New York Air National Guard air rescue units and to fully equip the new Alaska Air National Guard air rescue unit fully with a state-of-the-art rotary wing rescue aircraft; and

WHEREAS, The MH-60G aircraft are capable of performing longer range search and rescue missions than the CH/HH-3 helicopters and, therefore, require improved tanker support capability to match the improved performance of the new helicopters; and

WHEREAS, The new Alaska Air National Guard air rescue unit has been provided three new HC-130 aircraft; and

WHEREAS, The California and New York Air National Guard units, are still equipped with 1960s production model C-130s modified for the rescue mission, and must be modernized with replacement HC-130 rescue tanker aircraft possessing the latest state-of-the-art equipment and systems; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States to complete the modernization of the Air National Guard air rescue force through the procurement of new HC-130 aircraft to replace the 1960s production model C-130s inventory.

January 25, 1993

AF 93-04

AIR



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. V

RELATING TO THE PILOT CONTINUATION TRAINERS FOR F-16 AIRCRAFT

WHEREAS, Recent world political changes have had significant impact on the Air National Guard increasing the number of units converting to the F-16 fighter aircraft in the near term; and

WHEREAS, This rapid increase in F-16 aircraft coming to the Air National Guard relates directly to an increased need for pilot continuation training, in addition to specific mission training; and

WHEREAS, The normal process to fund the acquisition of pilot continuation trainers for normal and emergency procedures will significantly delay fielding of such critical training devices significantly ; and

WHEREAS, The normal and emergency pilot continuation training provided by the Air Defense Fighter Cockpit Procedures Trainer (ADF CPT) has proven the viability and importance of home unit continuation training; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to support the continued acquisition and improvement of pilot continuation trainers for all Air National Guard F-16 units.

January 25, 1993

AF 9305  
AIR



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. W

RELATING TO DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF A TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE  
AIRCRAFT

WHEREAS, The Air National Guard currently maintains all tactical reconnaissance squadrons in the Total Air Force and, even though the tactical reconnaissance force structure is expected to undergo significant revision in the near term, the Air National Guard's reconnaissance responsibilities are of significant importance; and

WHEREAS, Manned, penetrating tactical reconnaissance is a unique and essential combat capability which complements overhead, standoff, and unmanned reconnaissance systems; and

WHEREAS, Funding constraints dictate the aging fleet of RF-4C aircraft be replaced because of high operating costs, supportability problems, operational deficiencies, survivability concerns and general obsolescence; and

WHEREAS, The Air Force plans to phase out all tactical F-4s out of the inventory in the near future, which will compound the RF-4 logistical support problems; and

WHEREAS, The Air Force is considering a follow-on tactical RECCE system to replace the RF-4C in Active and Air National Guard units providing the Total Air Force a full multi-role capability which can excel in the face of a more lethal, mobile and deceptive threat; and

WHEREAS, The world situation and potential force draw-downs dictate additional flexibility which can be achieved with a multi role fighter aircraft, a low-cost, low risk option preserving assets for combat commanders in the 1990s and beyond; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States to maintain an adequately sized tactical reconnaissance capability to respond to projected contingency and wartime requirements and for support of the counterdrug mission, to modernize the Air Force and Air National Guard tactical reconnaissance agencies with state-of-the-art platforms equipped with systems designed to accomplish each mission and to support development and procurement of a multi role fighter aircraft to replace the aging RF-4C as the manned reconnaissance aircraft of the future.

January 25, 1993

AF 93-06  
AIR



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. X

RELATING TO PROCUREMENT AND ASSIGNMENT OF C-17 AIRCRAFT

WHEREAS, Major shortfalls continue to exist in Total Force airlift capability especially in the responsive delivery of both heavy and light forces to meet rapid deployment requirements; and

WHEREAS, The need for improved mobility and flexibility, provided by the C-17, is stronger than ever since it will be the only state-of-the-art airlifter with the capability to move forces, to include outsize cargo, for both long range and in-theater missions thereby meeting the demand for U.S. force projection requirements in support of national defense and foreign policy objectives; and

WHEREAS, The Army, Marine Corps and Air Force, along with the theater commanders, support the C-17 as the aircraft that best satisfies total airlift mission requirements and which will provide optimum airlift capability to fulfill the requirements for rapid deployment and resupply of U.S. and allied forces; and

WHEREAS, The original Air Force Airlift Total Force Plan (ATFP), which provided for total procurement of 210 aircraft with the concurrent assignment of C-17s to Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve organic units, has been modified to reduce the total number of aircraft to be procured to 120, with no distribution to the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve organic units; and

WHEREAS, The Air Force's programmed force structure, based upon reduced C-17 production and delivery, may preclude the transfer of additional C-141 and C-5 aircraft to the Air National Guard restricting the Air National Guard's participation in the vital strategic airlift program; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to support fully the final development and procurement efforts for the C-17, and to ensure the concurrent assignment of the aircraft to Air National Guard organic airlift units

January 25, 1993

AF 93-07

AIR



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. Y

RELATING TO MODERNIZATION OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS, ENGINEERING INSTALLATION AND AIR CONTROL SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT

WHEREAS, The effectiveness of the Total Air Force is highly contingent upon the capability of the combat communications, engineering installation, and air control systems units of the Air National Guard; and

WHEREAS, The Air National Guard currently accounts for 65 percent of the total combat communications force, 70 percent of the total engineering installation force, and 54 percent of the tactical control systems force structure; and

WHEREAS, These essential elements of the Total Force continue to be equipped with systems and equipment based on 1960s and 1970s technology which is manpower intensive, has serious operational shortcomings, is logistically unsupportable, and, in many instances is not interoperable when interfacing with other elements of the Total Force; and

WHEREAS, A major requirement exists to upgrade the equipment of these essential units to new state-of-the-art digital technology in order to provide the radar services, command, control and communications necessary to keep pace with technological advances; and

WHEREAS, New lightweight, rapidly deployable satellite terminals precision diagnostic and digital test equipment, tactical satellite support radios, ground-to-air-to-ground secure voice radios, computer-based data communications gateways, secure, modular telephone switching systems, and systems management modernization have become critical equipment problems for Air National Guard combat communications and engineering installation units; and

WHEREAS, New Modular Control Equipment, a transportable and completely automated system capable of total interface with other command and control systems including AWACS, has been developed and purchased to modernize the tactical control system units thus providing the capability for rapid deployment and accurate determination of tactical situations; and

WHEREAS, Forward Air Control Posts of the Air National Guard Tactical Control System have been reduced from their original two operations modules to one operations module which will leave them only partially equipped; and as originally specified in the Air Force Airlift Total Force Plan.

January 25, 1993

AF 93-08  
AVR



DRAFT NO. Y  
Page 2

WHEREAS, It is the recommendation of the Air Force that two operations modules be purchased for each of the 22 Air National Guard Forward Air Control Posts and funding already has been provided to procure approximately 14 of the required Modular Control Equipment modules; and

WHEREAS, A lack of modern interoperable equipment detracts from swift mission support, including support needed to control the movement of illegal drugs; and

WHEREAS, Air National Guard air control radar assets currently lack anti-radiation missile (ARM) decoy systems essential for survivability in a combat environment; and

WHEREAS, The ARM decoy is also part of the Air Force Air Control Systems improvement project that provides MCE to air control units in the Air Force and Air National Guard; and

WHEREAS, No Air National Guard units are funded for ARM decoys; and

WHEREAS, Many Air National Guard combat communication units are equipped with obsolete communications equipment which is not interactive or interoperable with new equipment now in wide use by active duty combat communication units; and

WHEREAS, The active component force structure reductions should result in surplus of some items of modern communication equipment as communications units are disbanded or downsized; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States to support modernization of the Air National Guard communications units through the procurement of state-of-the-art equipment and the modernization and upgrading of Air National Guard air control systems units to include the continuing procurement of Modular Control Equipment and initiating procurement of anti-radiation missile decoy systems.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the NGAUS urges the Department of the Air Force to transfer surplus modern communications equipment to Air National Guard units so that they will be able to provide joint forces with effective and efficient communications whenever and wherever needed.

AF 93-08

January 25, 1993



115TH NGAUS GENERAL CONFERENCE - 12 OCTOBER 1993

CONFERENCE NO. 2

RELATING TO EXPANSION OF THE MONTGOMERY GI BILL

WHEREAS, The Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) for the Selected Reserve (Chapter 106, Title 10 U.S. Code) has proved to be an extremely valuable incentive for National Guard recruitment and retention; and

WHEREAS, The MGIB attracts high-quality, motivated personnel to the National Guard; and

WHEREAS, Graduate level studies are the only area not covered by the Chapter 106 MGIB expansion; and

WHEREAS, Many assignments in the National Guard require graduate level education; and

WHEREAS, National Guard personnel must perform the same missions, meet the same training standards and maintain the same quality leadership as their active component counterparts, and therefore, require assistance to reach the same levels of civilian education; and

WHEREAS, It has been amply demonstrated that education received under previous GI Bills has affected the civilian and military work forces of this nation; positively; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Guard Association of the United States, in General Conference assembled in Biloxi, Mississippi, this 12th day of October 1993, urges the Congress of the United States to support strongly the expansion of the Montgomery GI Bill to include graduate studies for members of the National Guard.

January 25, 1993



## RELATING TO MODERNIZATION OF RC-135 AND KC-135E AIRCRAFT

- WHEREAS: The USAF inventory of aircraft includes RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft and KC-135A/Q/R tanker aircraft in the active component and KC-135E tanker aircraft in the Air National Guard; and
- WHEREAS: Funding for modernizing all KC-135A/Q tankers in the active component is now complete, except for those to be retired; and
- WHEREAS: Both the RC-135 and KC-135E aircraft require modernization to enable them to continue performing their vital missions, and to provide the global reach necessitated by withdrawal of overseas assets; and
- WHEREAS: In FY93, the Congress authorized and appropriated funds to modernize the last four KC-135A/Q aircraft, three RC-135 aircraft and the first 10 Air National Guard KC-135E aircraft; and
- WHEREAS: The most cost-effective means to complete this modernization program is to assure an uninterrupted flow of RC-135 and KC-135E aircraft immediately after the completion of the KC-135A/Q aircraft; and
- WHEREAS: Both RC-135 and KC-135E aircraft, as presently configured with TF-33 engines violate current EPA Stage II noise and emission standards; and
- WHEREAS: More stringent EPA Stage III noise and emissions standards become effective in seven years; and
- WHEREAS: The modern KC-135R and the corresponding RC-135 with their F108 engines fully comply with both Stage II and Stage III EPA noise requirements; and
- WHEREAS: Such modernized RC-135 and KC-135 aircraft operate at greatly reduced cost due to dramatic improvements in design, materials and engine maintenance concepts as well as vastly improved fuel consumption; and
- WHEREAS: These modernized RC-135 and KC-135 aircraft will amortize the initial cost of their upgrade well within their useful life, while providing significantly improved performance and safety; and
- WHEREAS: No replacement aircraft for either the RC-135 or the KC-135 are probable during that useful life; now
- THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED: That the National Guard of Association of State of Pennsylvania, at its Annual Meeting this 23-25 day of April, 1993, urges the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Air Force, the National Guard Association of the United States and the United States Congress to assure that the RC-135 and KC-135E aircraft that are to be retained in the United States Air Force and Air National Guard inventories are modernized at a rate that will assure that both inventories are completed within the period FY94 through FY98.

AF 93-09





## NATIONAL GUARD EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION

P.O. BOX 10045  
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78766-1045

### RESOLUTION Relating to Homosexuals in the Military

WHEREAS, the presence of homosexuals adversely affects the ability of the Armed Forces to maintain good order, discipline and morale, foster mutual trust and confidence among service members, ensure integrity of the system of rank and command, facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of soldiers, recruit and train soldiers, and maintain public acceptance of military service; and

WHEREAS, military service must not be treated as just another job; and


WHEREAS, the impact of a policy change to permit homosexuals in the military would have unpredictable and tragic consequences to soldiers, airmen and units; and

WHEREAS, the current DoD homosexual exclusion policy is sound and has served the military and the nation well; now,

BE IT RESOLVED, that the National Guard Executive Directors Association convened in General Conference in Biloxi, Mississippi, on the 26th day of January 1993, urges the Administration and the Congress of the United States to uphold the current DoD policy of homosexual exclusion; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that a copy of this resolution shall be sent to President Clinton and the members of the United States Congress.

Attest:

  
LEWIS O. KING, CAE  
Secretary/Treasurer



## POTENTIAL PROCUREMENT OF THE INTEGRATED FAMILY OF TEST EQUIPMENT

WHEREAS, the U.S. Army and the United States Congress have found it appropriate to modernize the Army National guard (ARNG) by providing sophisticated weapon systems; and

WHEREAS, the availability of State-of-the-art weapons and support systems has significantly impacted upon the capability of the Army national Guard's present inventory of Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) to adequately test and maintain those weapon systems; and

WHEREAS, to meet required operational readiness standards for sophisticated systems, state-of-the-art modular, reconfigurable, simple to operate Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) that can satisfy the largest possible test requirements is needed; and

WHEREAS, a requirement exists at the ARNG unit level of maintenance for ATE capable of fault isolating to line replaceable units (LRU) in major weapon systems; further, a requirement exists for maintenance at ARNG Direct Support and above to support complex communications and electronics intensive commodities such as missiles, aircraft, and combat vehicles by repairing LRUs as well as screening printed circuit cards; and

WHEREAS, the Integrated Family of Test Equipment (IFTE) is the equipment designated by the U.S. Army as standard to provide those capabilities and meet those missions in the 1990-2010 timeframe to support specific ARNG weapon systems such as HAWK, MLRS, TOW-Cobra, AHIP and Avenger with the Base Shop Test Facility, Contact Test Set and Commercial Equivalent Equipment elements of IFTE; now

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the National Guard Association of Kansas, in Annual Conference in Wichita, Kansas on 17 April, urges the Congress of the United states to authorize and appropriate funds during Fiscal Year 1995 for the procurement of the Integrated Family of Test Equipment to maintain authorized sophisticated equipment in the Kansas national Guard at the highest possible readiness levels.



# United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7020

April 13, 1993

SENATOR,

HAVING YOU SPEAK IS ONE OF THE GREATEST MOMENTS FOR THE KANSAS GUARD. YOU WILL BE A GREAT HIT.

AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PREPARED TEXT, YOU MAY WISH TO GIVE A FEW GENERAL REMARKS AND TAKE QUESTIONS. THEY ARE MOST INTERESTED IN WHERE THE DEFENSE BUDGET IS GOING AND THE GENERAL STATE OF PLAY OF POLITICS IN WASHINGTON.

SHOULD YOU TAKE QUESTIONS, THEY WILL PROBABLY ASK ABOUT MANPOWER CUTS, GAYS IN THE MILITARY, AND ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE GUARD. STILL, YOU MIGHT GET SOME TECHNICAL QUESTIONS REGARDING NEW EQUIPMENT, ETC.

I'D LOVE TO BE THERE BUT I MUST DO MY NAVY RESERVE DUTY THIS WEEKEND.

DAN

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be the name 'Dan' with a stylized flourish extending to the right.






# EARLY DRAFT

## 39th NGAKS CONFERENCE

Wichita, Kansas



Friday, 16 April 1993

1000 Golf Tournament  
1300 Registration Opens  
1500 Board of Directors Meeting  
1730 President's Reception  
1900 Wichita Greyhound Park

Twin Lakes Golf Course  
Airport Hilton Lobby  
Board Room  
Emerald Ballroom

Saturday, 17 April 1993

0630 Company Grade Breakfast  
0700 Registration Opens

Consulate II  
Airport Hilton Lobby

0815 Opening Business Session

(Spouses Invited)

Call to Order  
Posting of Colors  
National Anthem  
Band Concert  
Invocation  
Necrology Service  
Wichita Welcome  
Station Welcome

LTC Butch Dowse  
184 FG Color Guard  
Mrs. Kathie Rueger/35 ID Band  
35th ID Band  
Chaplain James Reed  
Chaplain James Reed  
Mayor of Wichita  
Col Frank Scoggins

0900 Keynote Address

Honorable Bob Dole  
Senate Minority Leader

115th Conference Report  
Insurance Report

Mrs. Pam O'Toole  
Mrs. Joy Meyer

*you will  
speak upon  
Arrival*

0930 Break

**\*\*Host - Loral Vought Systems\*\***  
Mr. Steve Altman

0945 Second Business Session

Credentials Report  
Museum Update  
Long Range Plan  
Hall of Fame Report  
Audit Committee Report  
Budget Committee Report  
Treasurer's Report

LtCol Russ Axtell  
LTC Dennis Parry  
LtCol Rufus Forrest  
LtCol Rufus Forrest  
LTC Dennis Parry  
LTC Don Johnson  
MAJ Darrell Loyd

1030

Address

Brigadier General Roger G. Thompson  
Director of Operations & Support  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army

Address

Colonel (Ret) Don Wilson  
NGAUS, Director of Army Affairs



<b>1100</b>	<b>Spouse's Luncheon</b>	<b>Consulate I &amp; II</b>
<b>1115</b>	<b>Army and Air Guard Breakouts</b>	
	Air Guard	Salon IV
	Army Guard	Salon I, II, & III
<b>1200</b>	<b>Lunch Break (Lunch on your own)</b>	
<b>1300</b>	<b>Third Business Session</b>	
	<b>Address</b>	<b>Brigadier General Donald W. Shepperd</b>
		<b>Deputy Director, Air National Guard</b>
<b>1330</b>	<b>Address</b>	<b>Major General James Rueger</b>
		<b>The Adjutant General of Kansas</b>
	Resolutions Report	LtCol Larry Dillon
	Legislative Report	LtCol Steve Thomas
	Awards Committee Report	MAJ John Foster
	Membership Report	MAJ Walt Frederick
	President's Report	LTC Butch Dowse
	Nominations Report	BG Joe Crawford
	Election of Officers	
	Induction of Officers	
	Benediction	Chaplain
	Retirement of Colors	184 FG Color Guard
	Adjournment Sine Die	
<b>1830</b>	<b>Social Hour</b>	<b>Prefunction</b>
<b>1930</b>	<b>Banquet</b>	<b>Emerald Ballroom</b>
<b>2100</b>	<b>Dance</b>	

### Sunday, 18 April 1993

<b>0900</b>	<b>Board of Directors Breakfast Meeting</b>	<b>Consulate I</b>
	<b>Incoming/Outgoing Board Members</b>	



APRIL 13, 1993

TO: SENATOR DOLE  
FROM: DAN STANLEY  
SUBJECT: KANSAS NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION CONVENTION

You will be speaking at their annual statewide convention to be attended by about 300 of the Kansas Guard. Officials from the Army and the national office include:

BG Roger Thompson -- HQ Army  
MG Don Shepard -- Deputy for Air -- Army Air Guard  
Don Wilson -- National Guard Association

The host will be Colonel Frank Scoggins, commander of the 184th Tactical Fighter Wing, McConnell (the F-16 Air Guard commander). General Rueger will also be attending and introduce you.

Some of the add-on's you have provided the Kansas Guard:

- Computer simulation center, Ft. Leavenworth
- Various improvements to Guard armories
- A Maintenance Center at Ft. Riley (MATES)
- 4 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters
- A fire arms training system (computerized)
- A new statewide communications network
- A new gate at the 184th at McConnell

The highest priority item the Kansas Guard has for '94 is Milcon funding for the Non Commissioned Officers Academy at Nickell Barracks, Salina. Total funding required is about \$13 million. That will be a tough number this year and I've talked to them about phasing this over two years. We could have gotten the whole thing last year but the Guard did not have the design ready.

Other issues of concern are force structure. The Kansas Guard wants to make sure that if troop cuts come (and they will) that Kansas does not take a disproportionate cut relative to other states (sounds legitimate but tough to accomplish).

The Guard is also interested in an add-on for a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). This would go to Marysville. I am trying to work a deal with South Carolina and Colorado to help make this happen.

Of course the final issue is the B-1/F-16 issue. General Rueger has been working with the Air Force and senior Air Guard officials to work out problems with the proposed conversion. By putting the hold on, you have force the Air Force to address Guard concerns. These are just about resolved.



**REMARKS BY**  
**SENATOR BOB DOLE**  
**KANSAS NATIONAL GUARD**

---

**IT IS A REAL PLEASURE TO BE  
HERE TODAY. NO DOUBT ABOUT  
IT, THE KANSAS NATIONAL  
GUARD STANDS AS ONE OF THE  
PREMIER ORGANIZATIONS  
ANYWHERE. I TAKE GREAT  
PRIDE IN YOUR MANY**



**ACCOMPLISHMENTS WHETHER  
IT IS SERVING THE CITIZENS OF  
KANSAS OR PROTECTING  
AMERICAN INTERESTS OVER  
SEAS. NO FINER ORGANIZATION  
EXISTS ANYWHERE AND I  
SALUTE YOU.**

**I KNOW THAT THIS IS A  
NERVOUS TIME FOR OUR MEN  
AND WOMEN IN UNIFORM. OVER**



**FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND  
MORE OF OUR FINEST  
VOLUNTEERS MAY FIND  
THEMSELVES IN THE  
UNEMPLOYMENT LINE AS THE  
NEW BUDGET PLAN WOULD CUT  
OUR FORCES TO LEVELS NOT  
SEEN SINCE BEFORE PEARL  
HARBOR. ON THE GUARD AND  
RESERVE SIDE, MANPOWER**



**LOSSES COULD EXCEED ONE  
HUNDRED THOUSAND.**

**CONCERN AND UNCERTAINTY  
ARE EVERYWHERE IN OUR  
MILITARY. THIS IS A TIME OF  
CHANGE AND TRANSITION.**

**WHILE I BELIEVE THAT OUR  
DEFENSE BUDGET CAN AND  
SHOULD BE REDUCED, I AM  
CONCERNED ABOUT THE WAY IT**



IS BEING DONE. NOT ALL  
CHANGE IS GOOD AND I BELIEVE  
THAT IT IS VITAL THAT WE  
TEMPER THIS ZEAL FOR  
"CHANGE" WITH A CLEAR  
UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY --  
THAT WE PRESERVE THOSE  
THINGS THAT HAVE MADE OUR  
MILITARY THE FINEST FIGHTING  
FORCE IN THE WORLD -- AND



**THAT WE HAVE A REALISTIC  
VIEW OF THE WORLD; THE WAY  
IT REALLY IS. IF WE DO THESE  
THINGS, THEN I THINK WE CAN  
APPROPRIATELY DOWNSIZE OUR  
FORCES WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL  
RISK TO OUR NATIONAL  
SECURITY. BUT IF WE DO THIS  
WRONG, WE WILL, IN GENERAL  
POWELL'S WORDS, "BREAK THE**



**FORCE". AND IN THE PAST, WE  
HAVE DONE IT "WRONG" EVERY  
TIME.**

**I AM MORE THAN A LITTLE  
CONCERNED BY THE WAY SOME  
WOULD GO ABOUT IT THIS TIME.  
IT SEEMS LIKE NATIONAL  
SECURITY IS OFFERED AS THE  
BILL-PAYER FOR A WHOLE HOST  
OF NEW SOCIAL SPENDING.**



**DON'T GET ME WRONG, MANY  
OF THESE IDEAS SOUND GOOD  
AND WOULD BE "NICE TO HAVE".  
BUT NATIONAL SECURITY IS A  
"MUST HAVE". SO I QUESTION  
THESE NEW PRIORITIES. AND IT  
SEEMS TO ME THAT USING THE  
DEFENSE BUDGET AS THE ONLY  
WAY TO CUT THE DEFICIT IS  
BOTH SHORT SIGHTED AND**



**DANGEROUS.**

**CUTTING DEFENSE IS NOTHING  
NEW. THE FACT IS, WE HAVE  
CUT THE DEFENSE BUDGET  
EVERY YEAR FOR THE LAST  
EIGHT YEARS. NOT JUST A TRIM  
HERE AND A SNIP THERE, BUT  
REAL REDUCTIONS. AND  
PRESIDENT BUSH WAS  
COMMITTED TO FURTHER CUTS -**



**- CONSISTENT WITH THE  
CHANGES IN THE WORLD. BUT  
HE WAS MINDFUL THAT THINGS  
ARE PERHAPS MORE  
DANGEROUS AND MORE  
UNSTABLE THAN BEFORE THE  
COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET  
EMPIRE.**

**INSTEAD OF TALKING ABOUT  
TAKING AN ADDITIONAL \$60**



**BILLION DOLLARS OUT OF  
DEFENSE, WE ARE NOW  
CONSIDERING SOMETHING  
RADICALLY DIFFERENT. THE  
PRESIDENT'S PLAN CALLS FOR  
SLASHING ANOTHER \$126  
BILLION THROUGH 1998. AND  
THIS IS OVER AND ABOVE ALL  
THE PREVIOUS CUTS OF THE  
PAST 8 YEARS. THIS WOULD**



**MEAN SACRIFICING FORCE  
STRUCTURE AND  
MODERNIZATION WHILE TRYING  
TO MAINTAIN READINESS.  
MAINTAINING READINESS AT  
ANY BUDGET LEVEL IS ALWAYS  
A CHALLENGE. SO, I'M NOT  
SURE WE CAN ACCOMPLISH  
THAT WITH THESE BIG CUTS.**



**PERHAPS MOST DISTURBING,  
IS THAT THIS PLAN WAS LAID  
OUT EVEN BEFORE DEFENSE  
SECRETARY ASPIN CONDUCTS  
HIS REVIEW TO DETERMINE  
EXACTLY THE KINDS OF FORCES  
WE NEED TO DEFEND OUR VITAL  
INTERESTS IN THIS NEW AND  
VERY DANGEROUS WORLD. IN  
MY VIEW, THIS SEEMS**



**BACKWARDS -- AND RISKY. SO  
FAR, WE HAVE BEEN PRESENTED  
A BUDGET PLAN -- NOT A  
DEFENSE PLAN.**

**ON TOP OF OF THAT, THE  
NUMBERS DON'T ADD UP. IT IS  
ONE THING TO PROMISE A  
SMALLER BUT READY ARMY, BUT  
THE FACT IS, TAKING AN  
ADDITIONAL \$126 BILLION OUT**



**OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET  
WOULD LEAVE US WITH AS FEW  
AS 10 ARMY DIVISIONS. IT  
WOULD FUND ONLY 10 TO 15 AIR  
WINGS AND LESS THAN 250  
SHIPS. THE EXPERTS TELL ME  
THAT THIS FUTURE FORCE  
COULD NOT FIGHT EVEN ONE  
DESERT STORM.**



**YOU CAN BE SURE THAT I WILL  
CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR  
DETAILS OF JUST WHERE THE  
PRESIDENT INTENDS TO TAKE  
OUR DEFENSE. HISTORY  
PROVES THAT IT IS FAR MORE  
COSTLY TO REBUILD A FORCE  
THAN IT IS TO MAINTAIN ONE.  
SADLY, AMERICA HAS HAD TO  
RELEARN THIS LESSON OVER**



**AND OVER AGAIN -- AT  
TREMENDOUS COST IN BOTH  
TREASURE AND BLOOD. YOU  
CAN BE SURE THAT I WILL FIGHT  
TO KEEP AMERICA STRONG.**

**IN MY VIEW, A STRONG  
NATIONAL GUARD MUST <sup>BE</sup> ~~REMAIN~~  
AT THE CORE OF OUR DEFENSE  
POSTURE. ALTHOUGH THE  
LIKELIHOOD OF FULL**



**MOBILIZATION HAS BEEN  
GREATLY DIMINISHED, OUR  
ABILITY TO RESPOND TO EVEN A  
REGIONAL CRISIS DEPENDS ON  
THE READINESS OF OUR GUARD  
AND RESERVE FORCES.**

**PRECIPITOUS CUTS THREATEN  
OUR ROLE AS THE WORLD'S  
ONLY MILITARY SUPERPOWER.**



**JUST ASK SADDAM HUSSEIN  
ABOUT THE 190TH AIR  
REFUELING GROUP, OR THE  
170th MAINTENANCE COMPANY,  
AND THE HUNDREDS OF KANSAS  
NATIONAL GUARD THAT HELPED  
DELIVER ONE OF THE GREATEST  
MILITARY WHIPPINGS IN  
HISTORY. EVEN CUSTER HAD A  
BETTER CHANCE AT LITTLE BIG**



**HORN THAN THE REPUBLICAN  
GUARD HAD AGAINST OUR  
FORCES IN THE GULF.**

**BUT OUR NATIONAL GUARD  
ALSO SERVES THE COMMUNITY.  
JUST ASK THE PEOPLE OF  
CONCORDIA OR WICHITA.  
WITHOUT YOU AND YOUR HARD  
WORK PROVIDING SECURITY,  
CLEARING DEBRIS, AND**



**RESTORING VITAL SERVICES TO  
THE WIND DAMAGED  
COMMUNITIES, CITIZENS OF  
KANSAS MIGHT HAVE SUFFERED  
FAR GREATER LOSSES.**

**JUST ASK THE VICTIMS AND  
FAMILIES OF COUNTLESS  
MEDICAL EMERGENCIES FLOWN  
BY THE KANSAS GUARD TO  
HOSPITALS FOR NEEDED**



**TREATMENT.**

**JUST ASK THE SCHOOLS AND  
THE PARENTS OF STUDENTS  
WHO RECEIVE DRUG  
COUNSELING FROM MEMBERS  
OF THE KANSAS GUARD. THE  
KANSAS GUARD SERVES OUR  
COMMUNITIES, OUR STATE, AND  
OUR NATION IN THESE AND  
MANY OTHER IMPORTANT WAYS.**

**AND THIS IS WHAT BEING A  
CITIZEN SOLDIER IS ALL ABOUT.**

**NEW MISSIONS MAY WELL  
COME YOUR WAY. THE  
MEANING OF "NATIONAL  
SECURITY IS EXPANDING, AND  
WITH THAT COMES NEW AND  
DIFFERENT CHALLENGES.  
WHETHER IT IS PROVIDING A  
SENSE OF PURPOSE AND**



**DISCIPLINE TO INTER CITY  
YOUTH, OR AIR INTERDICTION  
OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, I  
AM CONFIDENT THAT THE  
KANSAS GUARD CAN AND WILL  
ANSWER THE CALL.**

**YOU HAVE ALWAYS PROVEN  
THAT YOU ARE READY. AND  
BEING READY IS WHAT IT IS ALL  
ABOUT.**

Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics  
**REMOVAL NOTICE**

Date: 10/4/13

Removed from: Dole Speeches, April 17, 1993, Kansas National Guard, Wichita,  
Kansas

Accession: 329-94-158 Box Number: Box 24 F.1 (original)

Removed to:	Oversized Photographs	Box	_____
(Circle one)	Oversized Publications	Box	_____
	Campaign Material	Box	_____
	Oversized Newsprint	Box	_____
	Personal Effects	Box	_____
	Memorabilia	Box	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Oversized Flats [Posters, Handbills, etc]	Box	_____
	Political Cartoons	Box	_____
	Textiles	Box	_____
	Photograph Collection	Box	_____

Size: Medal: 1.5" in diameter, ribbon: 14" long

Format: Medal

Description: Bronze medal, front: "National Guard Association of Kansas" around  
Date: 1993 outer edge, 3 stars at bottom, soldier holding a musket at  
Subject Terms (if any): center, airplane on proper right, wheat on proper left,  
reverse: etched "Sen Bob Dole 17 April '93", red,  
white and blue striped ribbon attached with  
two metal rings

Restrictions: none

Remarks:

Ribbon is wrinkled and folded. The medal was not  
attached to anything, just in the folder with  
Senator Dole's Remarks to the National Guard Association  
of Kansas in Wichita, Kansas on April 17, 1993.

Place one copy with removed item  
Place one copy in original folder  
File one copy in file