

REMARKS OF SENATOR DOLE
FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION

Saturday, March 4, 1984--9:30 a.m.--Boca Raton Hotel

Why worry about the deficit--What
does it mean to the average American?

- If nothing is done to reduce deficit spending over the next five years, the total Federal debt will nearly double to over \$10,000 for every man, woman and child in America.
- At this level, by 1989 it will take one-half of all Americans' personal income tax payments just to pay the Federal Government's interest bill.
- By 1989 the annual Federal interest cost will amount to \$250 billion--about \$1,100 for every American.
- That \$1,100 per person interest cost is equal to 40% of each person's annual expenditure for food.
- Virtually all economists agree that the sustained enormous deficits that we are facing will be economically harmful.
- Many Americans will find home-buying more difficult with higher deficits. Consider a family purchasing a home at today's current interest rate, averaging about 12-1/2%, with a \$55,000 mortgage. If the deficits push interest rates up, total interest costs over the 30 year term will be \$15,500 more for each one percentage point increase.
- All Americans will directly feel the results of high deficits if they lose jobs as a result of a business slowdown resulting from a crowding out of private investment, or if they lose jobs to imported products made more competitive because of an abnormally strong dollar or if they end up paying higher prices because inflation is rekindled.

What is the Federal deficit likely to be?

- The estimates of future Federal deficits are quite sensitive to one's economic assumptions. Yet even under the most optimistic of economic assumptions, the deficit will remain at historically high \$200 billion levels over the foreseeable future, unless drastic action is taken.
- Assuming an extremely strong recovery (4% real growth of GNP) is sustained over the next few years and all of the Administration's

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proposed spending cuts and revenue proposals are enacted, the deficits are still projected to be:

<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>
\$180 billion	\$177 billion	\$180 billion	\$152 billion

- If economic growth is not so strong (3% real GNP growth) and interest rates are slightly higher (9% T-bill rate), and Administration's spending cuts are not enacted, the projected deficits would be:

<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>
\$202.6 billion	\$236.7 billion	\$270 billion	\$290.1 billion

- If we have an economic downturn during this period, we may be facing \$300 plus billion deficits.

What about defense spending

- Over the period FY 1985-1987, the Administration's defense recommendation is about \$65 billion higher than the 5% real growth path that Congress last year set as adequate for a strong defense.
- The Administration's defense recommendation is a first offer that sets its opening bargaining position. I believe that the final defense number for FY 1985 will be close to the \$289 billion figure contained in last year's budget resolution.
- Even at a \$289 billion level, defense spending will have increased 91% since 1981, the first year of the Reagan Presidency.

Why should we act this year on the deficit

- If we fail to deal with the deficit now, the problem will become worse. Current projections showing deficits holding in the range of \$200 billion probably are optimistic, as they are based upon assumption of steady economic growth through 1989. However, postwar experience suggests that the average recovery lasts only 3 years, making a recession in 1985 or 1986 likely.
- If we postpone action until 1985 and we do suffer another recession, the deficits would then hit the \$300-\$400 billion range. At that point, it may be difficult to cut the deficit

without further weakening the economy. Our choices would become very difficult indeed.

- Of course, failure to reduce the deficit in 1984 makes a recession likely to come sooner, as interest rates are forced up by private credit demands clashing with Treasury borrowing needs.
- By postponing action of the deficit, we increase the risk of recession. The average increase in the unemployment rate during a postwar recession is about three points, or three million jobs. By acting to reduce the deficit, we can significantly lower the risk that three million workers will lose their jobs in 1985 and 1986.
- The rise in interest rates will depress auto sales, housing starts, and capital goods orders. It is widely recognized that sustained economic recovery will be impossible unless these key sectors are healthy.
- Alternatively, the Fed could offset the deficits' impact on interest rates by "monetizing" the debt, leading to a resurgence of inflation in 1985. If we do nothing, we will force the Fed to choose between high interest rates and recession, or inflation.
- Failure to reduce the deficits in 1984 may also depress the stock market. A key factor in determining equity and bond prices is investors' confidence that Congress and the Administration can produce a sound fiscal policy. If we send the signal that the deficit problem is secondary to politics, equity and bond prices may fall.
- The exploding cost of servicing the Federal debt will make controlling spending more difficult each year, unless the deficits are reduced soon. Each year that we add \$200 billion in new Federal debt adds about \$15 billion to the next year's interest costs.
- The economy is now on a path where more and more of its resources go just to pay off the debt. According to economist Lawrence Summers, "It's a case where the miracle of compounding (interest) works against you."
- In 1976 net interest accounted for just 7% of total outlays But if we do nothing, by 1988 the total Federal debt will be more than half of total GNP, and the net interest cost of servicing this debt will reach 14% of all spending. Each year that we do nothing, the share of Federal spending that we can control gets smaller.
- Recent studies indicate that current and prospective budget deficits may have helped to overvalue the American dollar. If the

deficits are not reduced, the problem of overvaluation could become worse, weakening the competitive position of American exports and costing the U.S. jobs in such industries as steel, electronics, and agriculture.

Deficit Downpayment in 1984

- The President has taken the lead to begin a deficit-reduction effort in 1984 by calling for bipartisan negotiations on a package to reduce the deficit by \$100 billion over 3 years. As the President suggests, we can work with a variety of modest spending reductions, and tax reforms that raise revenue, to enact a significant deficit "downpayment" in 1984.
- Even though election-year politics makes it difficult to launch the kind of major assault on the deficit that we really need, that is no reason to do nothing. If we set reasonable expectations, we should be able to make a noticeable dent in the deficit that will make our job easier in the years ahead. Even more importantly, it can demonstrate to our citizens and to economic decision-makers in the private sector that we can face up to the deficit problem even in an election year.
- The Finance Committee is considering spending and revenue options just within its jurisdiction that can achieve the \$100 billion "downpayment" goal. To do that we are drawing on a number of proposals that have been on the table for some time, including some already in the legislative "pipeline":
 - Items included in the FY 1984 reconciliation bill, S. 2062, which awaits Senate action
 - Treasury-endorsed proposals on tax shelters and other abuses
 - Administration -proposed spending cuts that were not followed through on last year
 - Administrative savings and other proposals made by the Grace Commission
 - Additional proposals considered in the Finance Committee last fall
- Target. We can aim at \$100 billion in savings--\$21.4 billion in revenue changes pending in S. 2062, \$13.6 billion in spending reduction from Finance Committee and other programs in S. 2062, \$7 billion or so from Grace Commission recommendations, billions in debt service savings, and the remainder from additional spending and tax changes aimed at desirable policy reforms. The goal is a roughly one-for-one balance between spending and revenue changes.

- Feasibility. The key is to follow the President's suggestion and concentrate on relatively non-contentious items, avoiding things like the third-year tax cut and indexing, mean-tested entitlements, social security, and the like. Our effort must be bipartisan and balanced to do the job: Democrats and Republicans alike will benefit by cooperating to take swift action on the deficit. Time is of the essence if we are to make a beginning this year.
- Initial Finance Action: Spending. On February 23, the Finance Committee began action to reduce the deficit. To date, the Committee has agreed to changes in health care programs that save \$10.6 billion between now and 1987, over and above the provisions in S. 2062, plus \$3.2 billion from implementing some of the Grace Commission management reforms and \$900 million from limiting rebates to Puerto Rico on distilled spirits that originate in the U.S. and are shipped to Puerto Rico for redistilling so they be claimed as products of Puerto Rico. Adding in debt service savings of \$7.2 billion, plus the provisions of S. 2062, we have agreed to savings of \$35.6 billion by 1987.
- Initial Finance Action: Revenues. In addition, the Committee agreed to the goal of raising \$50 billion in revenue between now and 1987, provided at least that amount of spending reduction can be achieved. So far the Committee has agreed to \$44.6 billion in revenue-raisers, or \$23.2 billion over and above the revenue items in S. 2062. The House Ways and Means Committee has also completed markup on a \$49 billion revenue package and the bipartisan working group is showing some signs of progress. So we may be on our way.

Recovery--What progress have we made

Strength of recovery

- A strong recovery is on track and appears to be moderating to a pace that can be sustained in the years ahead. As an indication, look at the expansion of real gross national product. It grew by 9.7% in the second quarter of 1983, 7.9% in the third quarter, and an estimated 4.5% in the fourth quarter. By this measure, the recovery is the strongest since 1961.
- Housing starts are running at a rate of about 1.7 million units a year, and new home sales are up by 91% over the recession low.
- Industrial output in 1983 rose 6.5%, and factory utilization is up to 79.4%--the highest level in two years, and close to the normal capacity of 82%.
- The Commerce Department's survey of business plans for 1984 show that business plans to increase capital investment by 9.4%--this

is a rate about 2% higher than that seen at comparable points in previous postwar recoveries.

Inflation

- The best news about this recovery is that it is noninflationary. In 1983 the producer price index rose just 0.6%--the lowest increase since 1964. The CPI for 1983 was 3.8%, the lowest since 1972. Continued moderation in producer prices indicates low inflation will continue.

Creating Jobs

- People are going back to work, and the pace of job creation has been unusually high for a postwar recovery. On January 6 the Labor Department announced the civilian unemployment rate dropped from 8.4% to 8.2% in December. Overall, this means unemployment has dropped 2.5 percentage points over the past year.
- The continued strength of the recovery shows that recent growth in employment has not just been a statistical fluke, but shows a real turnaround in the labor market. Unemployment fell 230,000 in December, and there have been 4 million jobs created in the last year.
- What is more, the growth in jobs is broad-based. While manufacturing industries showed the most dramatic gains, all industries other than government and agriculture showed dramatic drops in unemployment.

March 1, 1984

ACTION TO DATE BY THE SENATE FINANCE

<u>SPENDING</u>		<u>REVENUES</u>	
	<u>1984-87</u>		<u>1984-87</u>
<u>Reconciliation</u>	13.6	<u>Reconciliation</u>	21.4
<u>Additional Spending</u>	(4.2)	*Tax Reform	10.9)
<u>Reductions</u>		Tax benefit rule	3.3
*Part B Premium	3.3	Tax FHLMC	0.8
*Delay in Initial Eligibility for Medicare	.8	Freeze \$5000 expensing	1.4
Working Aged	1.1	Extend telephone tax	3.2
*Physician Freeze	2.0	Other freeze items	0.5
Hospital MarketBasket	1.1	Electronic funds transfer	0.5
Lab Fee	.8	20' year for non res. real estate	3.5
Medicaid Reduction	1.2	Luxury and Private use autos	0.5
Alcohol Rebate	.9	Individual Minimum Tax	1.2
Revaluation of Assets	.3	Modification of Section 1231	0.4
Grace Commission	3.2	TOTAL	44.6
Debt Service	7.2		
Finance Subtotal	26.2	*in Administration Budget	
TOTAL	35.6		

HIGHLIGHTS OF FINANCE COMMITTEE DEFICIT REDUCTION DECISION (to date)

(Savings estimates are for period 1984-87)

Spending Restraint

- Medicare Part B Premium. Slow the increase in the premium as a percent of program costs between 1985 and 1990. (\$3.3 billion)
- Delay initial Medicare eligibility until month after an individual's 65th birthday. (\$800 million)
- Working age. Non-working spouses age 65 to 69 could elect primary medical coverage under spouse's employer health plan rather than Medicare regardless of working spouse's age. (\$1.1 billion)
- Physician freeze. Continue through July 1986 a freeze on physician's fees for those unwilling to accept assignment for all services to Medicare patients. (\$2.0 billion)
- Fee schedule for lab services. Payments for clinical lab services would be held at 62 percent of prevailing charge levels through October 1987 (\$800 million)
- Limit on hospital costs. For FY 1985 and FY 1986 increases in hospital cost payments under Medicare would be limited to the hospital wage and price index increase. (\$1.1 billion)
- Grace Commission. Improved cash management technicians (e.g. faster deposits of receipts to the government), improving income verification procedures for benefit programs, and using IRS refund offsets to collect debts owed the government would be implemented. (\$3.2 billion)
- Debt service. \$7.2 billion.

Revenue Increases

- Tax reform. New rules would be applied to limit tax shelters in such areas as partnership allocation of expenses and income interest deductions on discount obligations, transactions between related parties, current deductions for future liabilities, and corporate deductions for extraordinary dividends received. (\$10.9 billion)
- Tax benefits. Where a taxpayer receives a refund or other recovery for State taxes or other situations that previously gave rise to a deduction, the tax benefit portion of the deduction would be brought back into income first. (\$3.3 billion)

- 20-year depreciation. Non-residential real estate would be depreciated over 20 rather than 15 years. (\$3.5 billion)
- Individual minimum tax. Would be strengthened by adding new items to the base (e.g. the foreign earned income exclusion) and including deductions from passive business interests. (\$1.2 billion)
- Freeze. Expensing for small business investment would be frozen at \$5,000, the cost of used property eligible for the ITC would be frozen at \$125,000, and the foreign earned income exclusion would be frozen at \$80,000. (\$1.9 billion)

FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION: BOCA RATON, FLORIDA

SATURDAY, MARCH 3, 1984

BACKGROUND NOTES: AGRICULTURE

- o The futures industry is in an extremely dynamic growth stage, with a continued explosion in contracts traded, new contracts approved, the introduction in 1981 of stock index futures, and the pending approval of options on futures contracts.
- o The industry needs to consolidate recent gains before the next round of reauthorization in 1985. Recent allegations regarding trading above speculative limits and lax self-regulation by the exchanges are fueling the perception that tighter controls may be needed.
- o Audit trail: CFTC is looking at requiring traders to time-stamp their contracts to allow auditors to verify that no early trades or collusion occur in unusual situations. The industry is opposed, arguing that trading would be slowed down. Kalo Hineman may make a strong case for better auditing procedures on Sunday.
- o CBOT dispute: The relatively new stock index futures contracts are still on "probation" after the Federal Reserve allowed their introduction (at your encouragement) in early 1981. The SEC has oversight authority to ensure they do not disrupt the underlying stock market.

CFTC has established non-binding guidelines on these contracts, which will expire in April if not extended. The guidelines require at least 20 stocks with total capitalization of at least \$85 billion.

The Chicago Board of Trade proposed a 10 stock index with insufficient capitalization, and has sued the CFTC for turning it down. Several House Agriculture Committee members, including Reps. English and Glickman, have been supporting the CBOT's position.

- o Futures industry needs to improve its image and maintain a high level of observed integrity. The new agricultural options could be important in converting farmers from critics to supporters of the exchanges, but they must be sold--not just offered.

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- o The role of the futures exchanges in the marketing process needs to be emphasized. Identification with a healthy agriculture is important: many farmers believe the exchanges are concerned only with contract volume, and skim paper profits off their labor. If market prices did not rest on loan rates, there would be more activity and improved profitability for commodity exchanges.

PROPOSED COMPROMISE ON 1984/85 FARM PROGRAMS

The proposal would restore a degree of balance to the announced 1984 farm programs for wheat, feed grains, cotton and rice by exchanging a freeze on target prices at 1983 levels for a paid diversion on part of the reduced acreage requirement. It would also provide for a paid diversion in 1985 if carryover stocks exceed specified levels, with payment at the time of sign-up. Budget savings would be \$4.9 billion over FY-84/87.

Wheat

- o Target price of \$4.30 per bushel for 1984 and 1985 crops (same as 1983).
- o Loan rate of \$3.30 per bushel for 1985 (same as 1984).
- o Acreage reduction of 20% for both 1984 and 1985 crops (announced program is for 30% reduction for 1984 only).
- o Paid land diversion of 10% for both 1984 and 1985 crops with a payment rate of \$2.70 per bushel (same rate as 1983).
- o Payment-in-Kind (PIK) of 10-20% for 1984 crop only, with 75% payment rate (as announced).

Corn

- o Target price of \$2.86 per bushel for 1984 and 1985 crops (same as 1983).
- o Loan rate of \$2.55 per bushel for 1985 (same as 1984).
- o Acreage reduction of 5% for 1984, and not less than 5% for 1985 if carryover stocks exceed 1.2 billion bushels (announced program is for 10% reduction for 1984).
- o Paid land diversion of 5% for 1984, and not less than 5% for 1985, as above, with a payment rate of \$1.50 per bushel (same rate as 1983).

Upland Cotton

- o Target price of 76¢ per pound for 1984 and 1985 crops (same as 1983).
- o Loan rate of 55¢ per pound for 1985 (same as 1984).

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- o Acreage reduction of 20% for 1984, and 20% for 1985 if carryover stocks exceed 4.5 million bales (announced program is for 25% reduction for 1984).
- o Paid land diversion of 5% for 1984, and 5% for 1985, as above, with a payment rate of 25¢ per pound (same as last program).

Rice

- o Target price of \$11.40 per hundredweight for 1984 and 1985 crops (same as 1983).
- o Loan rate of \$8.00 per hundredweight for 1985 (same as 1984).
- o Acreage reduction of 20% for 1984, and 20% for 1985 if carryover stocks exceed 25 million hundredweight (announced program is for 25% reduction in 1984).
- o Paid land diversion of 5% for 1984, and 5% for 1985, as above, with a payment rate of \$2.70 per hundredweight (same as last program).

Note: Producers would have the option to sign up for either the 1984 program only, or for both the 1984 and 1985 programs. If signing up for both programs, producers would be eligible to receive both diversion payments at that time. There would be no penalty for producers who defer sign-up for the 1985 program.

Possible Farm Program Compromise

- o Basic tradeoff: Strengthen farm prices through reduced supply and carryovers in return for freeze of budget-increasing target prices.
- o Revise 1984 crop programs to incorporate paid diversion.
- o Paid wheat diversion in 1985 -- with similar offer for other crops if carryover exceeds trigger levels.
- o Optional early sign-up and announcement dates for 1985 program -- with diversion payment at time of sign-up.
- o Achieve budget savings of \$4.9 billion over FY 1984-87 from current law through lower target prices.
- o Program features for major commodities as below:

	(Crop year, by crop)							
	Wheat		Corn		Cotton		Rice	
	84	85	84	85	84	85	84	85
	(\$/bushel)		(\$/bushel)		(cents/lb.)		(\$/cwt)	
Target Price	4.30	4.30	2.86	2.86	76.0	76.0	11.40	11.40
Loan Rate	3.30	3.30	2.55	2.55	55.0	55.0	8.00	8.00
ARP	20%	20%	5%	0-10% ¹	20%	20% ²	20%	20% ³
LDP	10%	10%	5%	0-10% ¹	5%	5% ²	5%	5% ³
payment rate	2.70	2.70	1.50	1.50	25.0	25.0	2.70	2.70
PIK	10-20	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
payment rate	75%	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

¹ ARP and paid diversion for corn of not less than 5% if carryover is greater than 1.2 billion bushels; Secretary would have discretion to increase ARP and LDP in equal proportions.

² Paid diversion for 1985 cotton program would be same as 1984 if carryover exceeded 4.5 million bales.

³ Paid diversion for 1985 rice program if carryover exceeds 25 million hundredweight.