

REMARKS OF BOB DOLE  
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL - ANCHORAGE, ALASKA  
JUNE 3, 1983

"ARMS CONTROL AND OUR NATIONAL SECURITY"

THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTRODUCTION, AND FOR YOUR WARM WELCOME  
HERE TODAY. THIS AFTERNOON I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU OUR  
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND SPECIFICALLY, THE DETAILS OF AN ARMS  
CONTROL PLAN THAT I INTEND TO INTRODUCE SOON.

THE DEBATE OVER OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS CONCERNED US ALL  
DEEPLY. LAST WEEK CONGRESS DEBATED A FUNDING AUTHORIZATION FOR  
THE MX MISSILE. MANY OF YOU PROBABLY FOLLOWED THAT DEBATE  
CLOSELY. NONE OF US IMAGINE THAT THE MX OFFERS A PERFECT  
SOLUTION TO OUR NUCLEAR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. BUT MANY OF US -  
ON A BIPARTISAN BASIS - JOINED THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION IN  
BELIEVING THAT WE MUST HAVE A RATIONAL BALANCE BETWEEN OUR  
NATIONAL DEFENSE NEEDS AND OUR ARMS CONTROL POLICY.

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WHAT DID THAT DEBATE REVEAL? OUR NUCLEAR ARMS ARE MORE AND MORE COSTLY, EATING UP RESOURCES THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SPEND FOR OTHER NEEDS, OR NOT HAVE TO SPEND AT ALL. AND WE LEARNED THAT DURING THE PAST DOZEN YEARS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ENGAGED IN AN UNPRECEDENTED BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT WE CANNOT IGNORE IF WE WANT TO KEEP A NATIONAL DEFENSE THAT REMAINS SECOND TO NONE. OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEREFORE NEED MODERNIZING TO MATCH THAT RUSSIAN BUILDUP, AND TO ADD FURTHER STABILITY TO OUR DEFENSE POSTURE. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ARE SIMPLY TOO MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WARHEADS - SOME 9500 ON OUR SIDE, AND AT LEAST 8500 ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE. WHEN WILL THAT SPIRAL END? WILL WE JUST KEEP MODERIZING OUR WEAPONS AND MATCHING THE RUSSIANS, WHILE THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES KEEP MOUNTING? OR, SHOULD WE JUST STOP BUILDING ANY SUCH WEAPONS NOW?

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THE DOLE PROPOSAL

I BELIEVE THAT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES ARE AT AN UNACCEPTABLY HIGH LEVEL. WHILE I SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL AT BOTH THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AND STRATEGIC ARMS (START) TALKS AT GENEVA, I THINK THAT MORE MUST BE DONE. I THEREFORE PROPOSE THAT THE PRESIDENT PROPOSE FORCE LIMITS ON EACH OF THE THREE PARTS OF THE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC TRIAD. THESE LIMITS SHOULD BE CONSIDERABLY BELOW TODAY'S OVERALL DEPLOYMENT FIGURES, FOR BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES.

THEY SHOULD BE BALANCED, TO MAKE SURE THAT WE RETAIN THE BENEFITS THAT HAVING A NUCLEAR DEFENSE THAT DEPENDS UPON THREE SEPARATE STRATEGIC ELEMENTS AFFORDS US. BUT ALL THREE ELEMENTS (THE LAND-BASED ICBMs, MANNED BOMBERS, AND SUBMARINE NUCLEAR FORCES) MUST BE INCLUDED. IN ADDITION, I WOULD INCLUDE IN THESE REDUCTIONS INTERMEDIATE RANGE THEATER WEAPONS, SUCH AS THE RUSSIAN SS20s THAT THREATEN EUROPE, AND THE WEAPONS OF COMPARABLE RANGE THAT WE ARE DEVELOPING.



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I DO NOT WANT TO SET SPECIFIC WARHEAD AND WEAPONS LIMITATIONS AT THIS TIME. THAT SHOULD BE DONE BY THE PRESIDENT IN CONSULTATION WITH HIS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS. BUT I BELIEVE THAT ALL STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTION OF LIMITATIONS.

WHEN THE PRESIDENT, AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, HAS DETERMINED ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS ON AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARMS, THEN I BELIEVE THAT HE SHOULD PROPOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION A MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE FREEZE OF NUCLEAR FORCES AT THESE REDUCED LEVELS. THIS MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT LIMITED TO NUCLEAR FORCES IN ANY WAY INFERIOR TO THOSE PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION.

LET ME GO INTO FURTHER DETAIL ON OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND MY ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL.

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NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

OUR NUCLEAR DEFENSES DEPEND UPON OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD, OF MANNED BOMBERS, SUBMARINES, AND LAND-BASED ICBMs. OVER THE YEARS CONGRESS HAS EXAMINED CAREFULLY NATIONAL DEFENSE PROPOSALS THAT PRESIDENTS HAVE PUT FORWARD. AND OVER THE YEARS -- OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. THE MX DEBATE UNDERSCORED THE FEELING THAT OUR DEFENSE MUST BE SECURE AND SECOND TO NONE. WE ARE CONSIDERING MEASURES TO UPDATE BOTH THE SUBMARINE AND THE MANNED-BOMBER PARTS OF OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD -- THE SUBMARINE PORTION WITH THE PRODUCTION OF THE TRIDENT CLASS SUBMARINE, AND THE MANNED-BOMBER PORTION WITH THE MODIFICATION OF B-52 G AND H MODEL PLANES TO CARRY AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. DEPLOYMENT OF THE B-1B BOMBER IN 1986 WILL FINALLY PROVIDE US A MODERN AIRPLANE TO CARRY OUT THAT STRATEGIC ROLE.

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THE CRUCIAL THIRD LEG OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD IS THE  
LAND-BASED ICBMs. THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONCENTRATED ITS  
UNPRECEDENTED NUCLEAR BUILDUP IN <sup>THIS AREA</sup> ~~THE ARMY~~ DURING THE PAST DOZEN  
YEARS. WHILE THEY WERE DOING IT, WE LITERALLY STOOD STILL. WHILE  
WE FROZE OUR ICBMs, THE SOVIETS BUILT AND DEPLOYED SYSTEM AFTER  
SYSTEM, IMPROVING CONSTANTLY IN BOTH QUALITY AND SURVIVABILITY.  
WE HAVE THEREFORE HAD TO UPGRADE OUR ICBMs. THE MX AND ITS  
PROPOSED BASING MODE IS CERTAINLY NOT PERFECT, BUT WE DO HAVE A  
VASTLY IMPROVED PROSPECT NOW FOR MODERNIZATION OF OUR ICBM  
DEFENSES.

#### THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION DID NOT REST  
ITS CONCLUSIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MX MISSILE IN  
ISOLATION. THEY ALSO LOOKED TO THE FUTURE, AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT



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OF SMALLER WEAPONS, AND PARTICULARLY TO THE SINGLE WARHEAD MIDGETMAN. THE COMMISSION CONCLUDED THAT IN THE LONG RUN, ARMS CONTROL WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS IN TERMS OF "EQUAL LEVELS OF WARHEADS OF ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT YIELD." THE COMMISSION ALSO STRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR PERMITTING SOME MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WHILE OVERALL WEAPONS LIMITS WERE REACHED.

I SHARE THAT VIEW, AND MY ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL FITS WITHIN THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.

DOLE PROPOSAL - DETAILED SUPPORT FOR GENEVA

FIRST, THE PRESIDENT IS ON THE RIGHT TRACK AT GENEVA, AND MY PROPOSAL WOULD SO INDICATE. I HOPE FOR AGREEMENT TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE BOTH INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES (AT THE INF TALKS) AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS (AT THE START NEGOTIATIONS).

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VITALLY IMPORTANT IN MY VIEW ARE THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TALKS. AS YOU KNOW, THESE TALKS CONCERN THOSE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE WEAPONS WHICH THREATEN OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES DIRECTLY. THE SOVIETS HAVE DEPLOYED HUNDREDS OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE SS4s, SS5s AND SS20s, WHICH THREATEN EUROPE, THE FAR EAST, AND PARTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL.

I EMPHASIZE THIS BECAUSE MANY OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS WOULD JUST RATIFY EXISTING AND UNACCEPTABLE POSITION OF NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS IN EUROPE. THE PRESENT BALANCE IS NO BALANCE AT ALL, AND WE MUST CORRECT IT OR FACE AN UNACCEPTABLE RUPTURE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE. SO I START BY SUPPORTING WHAT WE HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH AT GENEVA.



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I ALSO SUPPORT THE EMPHASIS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS PLACED AT THE START TALKS IN REDUCING THE SOVIET PREPONDERANCE IN LAND-BASED ICBMs. THESE WEAPONS ARE DANGEROUSLY DESTABLIZING. MY PROPOSAL GENERALLY URGES THAT SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MAKING PROPOSALS FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS IN THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH ARE THE MOST DESTABLIZING. THAT COULD BE BECAUSE OF SHEER NUMBERS, ACCURACY, OR THROW WEIGHT.

OUR PATIENCE IS BEING SORELY TESTED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. I THINK IT IS ALSO FAIR TO SAY THAT THERE MAY BE NO BREAKTHROUGH AT ALL UNTIL THE SOVIETS REALIZE THAT A DETERMINED NATO ALLIANCE WILL IN FACT DEPLOY THE PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES IN LINE WITH THE 1979 ALLIANCE DECISION IF A SUITABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED., AND I ALSO BELIEVE THAT

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THE STRATEGIC WEAPONS TALKS (START) MAY WELL HINGE UPON WHAT HAPPENS IN THESE INTERMEDIATE MISSILE TALKS. BOTH WILL BE TESTING SOVIET GOOD FAITH IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD. I WANT US TO BE READY IF THE SOVIETS BECOME CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO HALT DEPLOYMENTS IS FOR HARDHEADED NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED.

#### THE DOLE FREEZE

SECOND, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST NEGOTIATE A FREEZE OF NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS -- AT LEVELS THAT ARE FAR REDUCED ON BOTH SIDES FROM PRESENT LEVELS. MANY AMERICANS HAVE PUT FORTH A NUCLEAR FREEZE IDEA, AND I RECOGNIZE THEIR SINCERITY AND GOOD INTENTIONS. BUT, IF WE WERE TO FREEZE EVERYTHING NOW, IT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. IT COULD REWARD THE SOVIETS FOR THEIR MASSIVE BUILDUP IN LAND-BASED ICBMs. IT WOULD

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LEAVE US WITH NO INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR DETERRENT IN EUROPE,  
TO FACE THOSE HUNDREDS OF SOVIET MISSILES -- EACH WITH MULTIPLE  
WARHEADS. WE MUST FACE THAT THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY NOW  
- AND WE MUST SET FORCE LEVEL LIMITS THAT WILL STOP THE NUCLEAR  
ARMS RACE ONCE THE SOVIETS REALIZE THAT THEIR BUILDUP HAS NOT  
WORKED.

#### OBJECTIONS TO A FREEZE

WE HEAR MANY OBJECTIONS TO A NUCLEAR FREEZE. COULD  
DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFENSIVE WARFARE BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT? WHAT  
IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS A SOVIET BREAKTHROUGH IN  
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE? COULD THEY MAKE THAT DEVELOPMENT AND  
JUST CANCEL OUT THAT CRUCIAL SUBMARINE PART OF OUR TRIAD? WE  
HAVE TO ALLOW FOR TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS -- AND MY FREEZE  
FORMULATION WOULD DO JUST THAT.



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ANOTHER FREEZE OBJECTION IS THAT WE COULDN'T MODERNIZE OUR WEAPONS WHERE NECESSARY. AS I'VE SAID, OUR MANNED BOMBERS ARE NOW THE B-52s. THEY ARE GOOD, BUT WHILE WE WORK ON DEVELOPING THE B-1Bs, THE B-52s ARE AGING. IN A STRICT NUCLEAR FREEZE, IN AREAS WHERE WE NEEDED MODERNIZATION, THE RUSSIANS COULD JUST SIT TIGHT WHILE OUR WEAPONS AGED, AND IN AREAS LIKE OUR PRESENT MANNED Bomber Fleet, THAT WOULD BE CRUCIAL. I WOULD THEREFORE ALLOW FOR MODERNIZATION. BUT MORE IMPORTANT, I WOULD FREEZE FORCE LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS - AND THAT MEANS ALL KINDS. I WELCOME THE ADMINISTRATION'S WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER "EVERYTHING ON THE TABLE" AT THE GENEVA START NEGOTIATIONS. THE TALKS HAVE FOCUSED LARGELY ON BALLISTIC MISSILES. BUT MANNED BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES, SHOULD ALL BE LIMITED, AND MY PROPOSAL WOULD DO JUST THAT.

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BUT WE SHOULD NOT STOP THERE. A NEGOTIATED FREEZE AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE THE PRELUDE FOR OTHER AGREEMENTS,, LOOKING TO EVEN LOWER FORCE LEVELS. WE SHOULDN'T QUIT WITH ONE AGREEMENT IF WE CAN GET IT. WE OUGHT TO LOOK - IF THE SOVIET UNION WILL IN FACT NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH US - TO LOWER AND LOWER NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS.

THIRD, THERE IS ANOTHER AREA OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL THAT MUST CONCERN US DEEPLY. AS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUE IS ADDRESSED, WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER QUESTIONS OF ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION, AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. OUR CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THIS MOST CRITICAL AREA MUST BE THE VERY BEST THAT WE CAN MAKE IT. WE OWE IT TO OUR COUNTRY AND TO THE SECURITY OF

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MANKIND IN GENERAL TO MAINTAIN AND UPGRADE ALL MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE ANY RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. THAT IS WHY MY RESOLUTION THEREFORE ADDRESSES THESE CONCERNS AS WELL.

FREEZE OR BUILD-DOWN?

I PUT FORWARD MY RESOLUTION AS OTHERS HAVE DONE, TO FURTHER THE DEBATE, IN EFFECT TO ACHIEVE REAL ARMS CONTROL. I BELIEVE THAT A FREEZE OF CURRENT NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD JUST RATIFY THE STRATEGIC IMBALANCES THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BUILT UP IN RECENT YEARS. WE NEED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE SOVIET BUILDUP FIRST.

ANOTHER CONCEPT IS THE BUILD-DOWN, WHICH HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD BY SENATORS COHEN AND NUNN. THIS IS A USEFUL NOTION, AND ONE THAT HAS RECEIVED SOME SUPPORT, IN PRINCIPAL, FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. STRICTLY APPLIED, SINCE A NUMBER OF OUR SYSTEMS



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REPRESENT YESTERDAY'S TECHNOLOGY, WE WOULD HAVE TO DRAW DOWN TWO WEAPONS FOR EVERY ONE DEPLOYED FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF CATCHING UP TO THE RUSSIANS! THE IDEA HAS EVOLVED BEYOND THE ORIGINAL TWO-FOR-ONE CONCEPT, AND IT IS A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO OUR DEBATE. OBVIOUSLY I WILL WELCOME COMMENTS ON MY PROPOSAL. OUR ARMS CONTROL POLICY IS ONE AREA THAT CONCERNS US ALL VITALLY - AND A MIX OF VIEWS SHOULD BE HEARD.

SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL

LET ME SUMMARIZE MY FREEZE PROPOSAL FOR YOU BRIEFLY. I WILL CALL FOR:

..... THE PRESIDENT TO PROPOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION A MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE FREEZE OF NUCLEAR FORCES AT LEVELS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED FROM THOSE THAT CURRENTLY EXIST;

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..... THE PRECISE PROPOSAL MUST NOT LIMIT THE UNITED STATES  
TO NUCLEAR FORCES INFERIOR TO THOSE PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION;

..... THE FREEZE WILL BE OF ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC AND  
THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WARHEADS;

..... IF AGREED TO, THE FREEZE WOULD BE A LONG-TERM AGREEMENT  
WITH PROVISIONS FOR REVIEWS FROM TIME TO TIME, LOOKING TO EVEN  
LOWER NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS;

AT THE SAME TIME,

..... I WANT SPECIAL ATTENTION PAID TO WEAPONS THAT ARE THE  
MOST DESTABILIZING, AND ..... I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD  
EXPLORE WITH THE RUSSIANS THE BEST WAY TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF  
NUCLEAR WAR BY ACCIDENT.

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THAT IS MY PROPOSAL. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING REACTIONS TO IT AS WE ADDRESS ARMS CONTROL IN THE CONGRESS SPECIFICALLY, LATER THIS SESSION.

CENTRAL AMERICA - WHAT'S AT STAKE?

LET ME TURN FOR A FEW MOMENTS TO ANOTHER AREA THAT HAS BEEN RECEIVING FRONT-PAGE TREATMENT, CENTRAL AMERICA. IT IS SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF THAT REGION DO NOT EXEMPLIFY THE BEST TRADITIONS OF DEMOCRACY. I AM NOT SURPRISED BY THAT.

BUT THE QUESTION IS -- WHAT FUTURE WILL THERE BE FOR THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL AMERICA? SHOULD WE LOOK CRITICALLY AT EACH NATION, DECIDE THAT IT DIDN'T MEET OUR STANDARDS, AND THEN JUST WALK AWAY? DOES ANYBODY REALLY HAVE ANY DOUBTS ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THAT CASE? HAS ANYBODY FORGOTTEN WHAT HAPPENED IN



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EVERY ONCE-FREE COUNTRY, FROM THE BALTIC TO INDOCHINA, ONCE THE COMMUNISTS TOOK OVER? AND WHAT SUPERIOR MORAL STANDARD WOULD WE DECIDE THAT THESE NEIGHBORS HAD NO RIGHT TO TRY TO EVOLVE TOWARDS A BETTER, MORE DEMOCRATIC LIFE -- THE SAME DECISION THAT ALL AMERICAN FAMILIES MADE WHEN THEY LEFT THE OLD COUNTRIES AND SET OUT FOR THIS LAND?

SOME INDICATE WE ARE SUPPORTING MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO COMPLEX PROBLEMS. I CERTAINLY DO NOT ADVOCATE A MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA BUT I AM ARGUING FOR TIME FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEOPLE TO HAVE A GREATER VOICE IN THEIR OWN FUTURES.

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VIETNAM AND CENTRAL AMERICA

THE SPECTER OF VIETNAM HAS ALSO BEEN MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH CENTRAL AMERICA, AND PARTICULARLY IN CONNECTION WITH EL SALVADOR... THE PRESIDENT WAS ROUNDLY APPLAUDED WHEN HE NOTED IN HIS APRIL 27 SPEECH TO THE CONGRESS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VIETNAM IN CENTRAL AMERICA. I FERVENTLY HOPE THAT HE IS RIGHT IN THAT ASSESSMENT. THE HUMAN COSTS IN INDOCHINA WERE STAGGERING. AND SO WERE THE STRATEGIC COSTS -- JUST LOOK AT THAT GIGANTIC RUSSIAN BASE NOW AT CAMH RANH BAY, NICELY PLACED ASTRIDE JAPAN'S OIL LIFE LINE TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT MUST NOT BE REPEATED IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE PANAMA CANAL MUST REMAIN A STRATEGIC WATERWAY OF DEMOCRACY, SECURING THE REGIONAL TRANSIT OF SO MANY OF OUR SHIPMENTS OF STRATEGIC MATERIAL. THAT IS OUR

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STRATEGIC STAKE IN CENTRAL AMERICA - BUT OUR COMMITMENT TO  
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS IN EACH COUNTRY THERE IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT  
PART OF OUR POLICY.

CONCLUSION

WE ARE A GREAT NATION WITH GREAT INTERESTS AND WITH EVERY  
NATIONAL DEBATE - WHETHER ON NATIONAL DEFENSE, ARMS CONTROL,  
CENTRAL AMERICA OR OTHER FOREIGN POLICY -- WE REAFFIRM OUR  
COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM AND TO THE AMERICAN DREAM OF OPPORTUNITY  
FOR EVERYBODY.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.