



NEWS from U.S. Senator Bob Dole

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WARNKE RESIGNATION CONFIRMS SALT SHORTCOMINGS, DOLE SAYS

WASHINGTON -- Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.) said today that the current SALT II negotiations "have failed to achieve an acceptable agreement."

He added that the U.S. agreements being worked out have confirmed his concern over the capabilities of chief U.S. negotiator Paul Warnke, who Tuesday announced that he will be returning to private life later this month.

"I voted against Mr. Warnke (in Senate confirmation hearings) because I had high hopes that through a SALT agreement we could obtain a limitation to the Soviet arms race, but felt that Mr. Warnke's inclination toward unilateral U.S. reductions would make an equitable agreement unlikely," Dole said.

Following is the text of Dole's statement:

Mr. President, the White House announced on Tuesday of this week that Paul C. Warnke, chief U.S. negotiator at the SALT II talks and director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, will be returning to private life later this month. This announcement comes on the threshold of the expected completion of the SALT II negotiations.

I became concerned during the confirmation hearings of Mr. Paul Warnke as our SALT negotiator, that he represented an approach of complete unconcern toward the consequences of the Soviet strategic build-up. I voted against Mr. Warnke because I had high hopes that through a SALT agreement we could obtain a limitation to the Soviet arms race, but felt that Mr. Warnke's inclination toward unilateral U.S. reductions would make an equitable agreement unlikely.

His resignation now, coinciding with the virtual conclusion of a SALT II agreement, confirms that those concerns were justified. After the promising beginning made by President Carter in his March 1977 proposals in seeking to stabilize the Soviet strategic build-up, the negotiations have failed to achieve an acceptable agreement.

The current draft agreements would put no serious restraint on the Soviet MIRVed ICBM force (allowing 820 MIRVed ICBMs with as many as 10 warheads each), thus insuring the vulnerability of our land-based deterrent.

The agreements would seriously limit or prohibit our ability to assure the survivability of our ICBM force through mobile-basing options.

The agreements would give up the valuable options of ground-launched and sea-launched intermediate-range cruise missiles.

The agreements would leave the Soviet Backfire intermediate/strategic bomber free of any meaningful restraints.

The agreements would accept a standard of verification that would require an unacceptable amount of trust in Soviet compliance.

I believe the SALT II accords should be judged on their merits, rather than on personalities involved. It is the specific provisions of those accords that give many of us cause for concern, and which will be thoroughly scrutinized in the weeks ahead.