ROBERT J. DOLE
ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Interview with

Secretary DAN GLICKMAN

June 22, 2007

Interviewer

Brien R. Williams

Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics
2350 Petefish Drive
Lawrence, KS 66045
Phone: (785) 864-4900
Fax: (785) 864-1414

[Secretary Glickman reviewed this transcript for accuracy of names and dates. Because no changes of substance were made, it is an accurate rendition of the original recording.]

Williams: This is an oral history interview with Secretary Dan Glickman for the Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics at the University of Kansas. We're in the Washington [D.C.] offices of the Motional Picture Association of America, where Secretary Glickman serves as chairman and CEO. Today is Friday, June 22, 2007, and I'm Brien Williams.

Let's start with a little bit of your family background, how the family got to Kansas and so forth.

Glickman: Well, actually it's a funny story. My grandfather was kind of an old shirttail comedian and he used to always tell me that our family were some of the first settlers in Kansas, that we settled for ten cents on the dollar, you know, like a "buh-duh-dum-bum" type of joke. But my family were immigrants, and my grandfather on my father's side came from Ukraine, Poland, Russia. The borders changed all the time. Came into this country, I think in 1908 and came in through New York, Cleveland, and ended up in Kansas. He had a cousin in Kansas City, and then came to Wichita. Basically all of my parents' folks, my grandparents, all had similar destinations in mind, but they came to Kansas largely because there was a relative there, either in Wichita or Kansas City. My mother actually settled in Kansas City, but my dad settled in Wichita. Actually, he was born in Wichita.

Williams: So you grew up in Wichita.

Glickman: I grew up in Wichita. My grandfather was a merchant, like a lot of the immigrants were. He ultimately went into the scrap iron business and then he and my father went in the oil business, and they operated oil and gas properties, recycled metal business, and then after my grandfather died, my dad bought a Triple-A baseball team, which he operated for about twenty years, the Wichita Aeros, which was in Wichita. So my family were long active members of the Wichita business community.

Williams: And politically?

Glickman: I'd say they were like nothing. They voted. They were on the slightly, I guess, more liberal or progressive side of the equation, but they were registered Republicans and they were very much involved with former Senator [James] Pearson, who was in the Senate actually before Bob Dole was. John Anderson was the governor of Kansas at some point in time. But they were never very partisan at all.

Williams: But you picked up a desire early on to go into politics.

Glickman: I always liked politics. I was president of the sixth grade at Fabrique Elementary School in Wichita. Then I was president of the senior class at University of Michigan. So I think I always, for whatever reason, whether it's because of issues or psychological reasons, liked politics. Then when I came back to Kansas after I went to law school here in Washington and then I worked for the government for a while at the Securities and Exchange Commission, I came back to Kansas and I think I always knew one of the reasons I came back was I was going to run for office.

Ironically, I had lived in Kansas for a short time and I was yearning to go back to Washington, and I remember it was either in 1970 or '71, I came up here and I had an interview with Bob Dole, who was then first-term U.S. senator, and I came to see him maybe about going to work for him or whatever. We had a mutual friend, a guy named Sam Marcus in Wichita, who was a good friend of Bob Dole's. So I remember that meeting specifically, because Dole came out and we talked for a while, and he says, "My recommendation to you is you go back to Kansas, get your roots, decide what you want to do, because you've lived here in Washington and you don't need to come back now."

So we used to talk about that, because the irony was that then I went back and became a Democrat. He, of course, is a Republican. On a few occasions I even thought about running against him, which never materialized. But he used to say that, gee, if he had hired me, then he wouldn't have had any problems with me.

Williams: You worked briefly with Senator Peter [H.] Dominick.

Glickman: In law school I basically had a—I wouldn't call it an internship. I got paid, but it was like not a high-level job, but during law school I worked there.

Williams: Would it be right to say you were smitten by Capitol Hill at that point?

Glickman: I actually interned for Senator Pearson of Kansas, but then I worked for basically two and a half years in law school for Senator Dominick, a Republican from Colorado, but I liked him and I used to do kind of flunky work, not highly paid work, but it was very enjoyable.

Williams: Prior to your meeting with Dole that first time, what was your awareness of him and what was your sense of him and so forth?

Glickman: Probably not a lot. He had been in the Senate—well, while he was in the House, I had no knowledge of him whatsoever. I probably knew his name, but that was about it. I knew my friend Sam Marcus, who was actually my dad's friend, was a close friend of his. They were in the meatpacking business, and their company later became Cargill, the meat company, but before then it was in various derivations. But that's it. I didn't really know too much about him.

Williams: Tell me about the [Dr. Bill] Roy campaign.

Glickman: Well, it's interesting. I was going to mention that, because in my political career then, in 1973, I was back in Kansas a couple of years, I ran for political office and won. I became a member of the Wichita school board, and I probably was always thinking about the next steps for myself, being kind of ambitious, so I got involved in the Roy campaign and I had some titular role, regional coordinator or something in the Wichita area. **Error! Bookmark not defined.**So I was fairly active in the Roy campaign, and on occasion I'd see the senator during the campaign, just one place or another. He was always friendly enough. In fact, people used to tell me—I'll never forget, I told Dr. Roy once, I said—they used to fly into this one fixed-based operation where you'd fly the private aircraft into Wichita, and the guy who was—I don't

remember what his job, he handled baggage or something, said that Senator Dole was always friendlier to him than Dr. Roy was. He says, "I'm going to vote for him."

I said, "Well are you a Democrat?"

He says, "Yeah, but Dole is friendly to me." That struck me. I remembered that later on, you know.

Williams: What was the esprit like in the Roy campaign?

Glickman: That was probably the hottest national Senate election that year. Of course, Senator Dole had been chairman of the Republican National Committee. He was kind of the epitome of the Watergate candidate that year, in that he had been identified with President [Richard M.] Nixon, although as it turns out, he really wasn't very identified with him, and they didn't trust him at all, the Nixon folks. But he had a tough political race, and he only won it by about one percentage point. I think up until maybe two, three weeks before the election, that race was lost for Senator Dole. The Roy campaign felt that they had won.

Williams: What about the dirty tricks that occurred?

Glickman: Oh, today those dirty tricks would be viewed as nothing, you know. Back then, abortion was one of the big issues in '74, and the Dole campaign raised that issue because Dr. Roy was an OB/GYN and I think he had performed a few abortions, but only where there was uterine cancers. I mean, the most extreme cases. I think the campaign made that a big issue. But in today's terms, that campaign would have been viewed as just passive, just nothing. And it was an expensive campaign for the time. But to give you some idea, I think Dole and Roy both spent roughly about a million or million and a quarter dollars, and today that race would cost minimum 10 million, maybe 15 million, who knows.

Williams: There were quite a cadre of you working on that campaign who later went into political life. You were not the only one, as I understand.

Glickman: I think Congressman [Rep. James C.] Slattery from 2nd District of Kansas went in. There may have been others. [Rep.] Dennis Moore, who's a congressman now, from Kansas. It was a last real time that I think that there was a farm team created, certainly on the Democratic side. Maybe Governor [Kathleen] Sebelius—I don't know if she had moved back to Kansas yet or not.

Williams: What do you mean by farm team?

Glickman: Like creating an infrastructure. A Democratic infrastructure was created as a result of the Roy campaign, where it brought in a lot of younger, some talented people, and that was kind of the last campaign where you had that kind of energy in Kansas, I think, certainly a statewide campaign.

Williams: How would you characterize campaigns subsequent to that?

Glickman: Well, you know, obviously my campaign, when I ran in '76, I would characterize it as energetic. There have been a few others. But I'd say it's not just in Kansas, it's elsewhere. The driving thing in campaigns in politics today is money, not issues or substance. It's unfortunate. But I think back then they were more issue-driven than they are now.

Williams: When's the last time you saw Dr. Roy?

Glickman: Actually, I haven't seen him for a while, but I e-mail him periodically because he has a little blog that he does, and I e-mailed him because I went to see this movie the other night called *Sicko*, the movie by Michael Moore, and it's all about healthcare. Dr. Roy was a leading healthcare expert when he was here.

Williams: I had the privilege of interviewing him a few weeks ago.

Glickman: Yes, I'm sure, because that was very profound for him, that whole race.

Williams: Tell me a little bit more about your race for Congress.

Glickman: So when I ran in '76, I ran against an incumbent, a long-term Republican incumbent named [Rep.] Garner [E.] Shriver, who had served in the House for sixteen years, so therefore he and Dole's time in the House were contemporaneous. He was a very decent guy. I wouldn't call him exceptionally popular, low key, would be viewed today as a moderate/progressive. He was one of the first congressmen to vote to end the draft. He was somewhat progressive on social issues. But it was a post-Watergate year, and I ran an aggressive campaign. I think he didn't see me coming, so I won by about four thousand votes.

Williams: Did you use Watergate as an issue?

Glickman: I don't really think so. I think it was more shoe leather than anything else. I kind of glommed onto agriculture and agricultural issues, and I made the point that I would be an advocate for the farmer. He was from Wichita, as was I, but he was perceived as not very friendly to agriculture or attentive to it, kind of lethargic. So I ran as this kind of energetic young guy, and I won.

Williams: Characterize the 4th District for me.

Glickman: It's the state's largest city, Wichita, and it's basically a southern town north of the Mason-Dixon Line. It became a major industrial city during the Second World War because of Boeing, largely, all the airplane production. But it's a big manufacturing town because of Cessna, Beech, Learjet, Boeing, and then collateral industries. It was the most unionized part of Kansas at the time. It's less so now. It was the most Democratic district in the state. Now it's not. The districts have changed to some degree. Wichita is not as Democratic as it used to be.

The anti-abortion movement in Wichita became vibrant by these Operation Rescues back in the nineties. There was an OB/GYN in Kansas named [Dr.] George Tiller, who performed late-term abortions, so they had massive national rallies in Kansas. They were all in Wichita. One rally had 100,000 people in Wichita, and it became a big

factor in local politics. It helped to develop the right wing and the anti-abortion movement in Kansas, which then affected politics in the state. Ultimately when I ran my last term in '94, I lost to a congressman who's still in office, Congressman [Todd] Tiahrt, and he largely rode that wave, I would say.

Williams: What about the balance of urban-rural in that district?

Glickman: District was probably 60-40 urban-rural, and that was very helpful to me when I ran the first time, because I really ran as the farm candidate, even though I was from Wichita, and so what ended up is we basically split Wichita and I won big margins in the rural counties, which was one of the reasons I went on the Agriculture Committee, made agriculture a big part of my life, and then went on to be at USDA [U.S. Department of Agriculture].

Williams: That's surprising to me, because you were so identified with Wichita.

Glickman: I just made a calculated decision. My campaign manager was my old high school debate teacher, and she was also very clever in terms of positioning me as the advocate for rural and agricultural interests.

Williams: She was only a few years older than you, right?

Glickman: Probably. Maybe five years older.

Williams: Interesting. How was the 4th District different from the 1st District, which was Dole's district originally?

Glickman: Well, again, Wichita was a big industrial center. Wichita was settled largely as a result of World War II, and lots of factory workers from Arkansas and Texas came up into Wichita and worked at Boeing. During the last two years of the Second World War, more people worked at the Boeing Company than worked at any automobile facility in Michigan or anywhere else. I think there were almost 80,000 people working in the

aircraft factories at one time. The town only had 150,000 people then, so it just sucked up huge numbers of workers, and a lot of them came up from the South.

The 1st District where Dole was in, was all rural and small town, but Wichita was the prime media market for that district as well, so Wichita played west, not east. Kansas was kind of historically divided between Kansas City and Johnson County, the northeast quadrant, and I guess includes Topeka as well, and then Wichita and west was the other part of the state. What's happened in recent years, there's been more population growth up northeast than there has been in Wichita.

Williams: Did you seek the Agriculture Committee?

Glickman: No, I didn't seek the Agriculture Committee. I sought an Appropriations seat or Ways and Means Committee seat, like a lot of people do here, but I got assigned to the Agriculture Committee, also to the Science and Technology Committee. So anyway, I said, "Okay, I got it, I've got to make myself indispensable." So I became kind of a real family farm advocate, and of course Bob Dole was in the Senate then. He was always a family farm advocate. We did a lot of stuff together. Substantively there was not much difference between us on any of the issues, so we did a lot of stuff together.

Williams: This is just going back for a second. Did he play any role during your first campaign in terms of supporting your opponent?

Glickman: He was supporting my opponent, Garner Shriver, but he did not play a material role. I don't think anybody thought I was going to win.

Williams: You say that you and he worked together on a lot of the farm issues. Characterize that relationship.

Glickman: There was a farm bill in 1977. There was a farm bill in 1981. He and I, with substantive issues, amendments. Farm legislation is very intricate and obtuse and arcane, but we worked together on just a lot of substantive issues that affected those bills, not only in Agriculture, but Dole was always very interested in federal nutrition programs.

Since I was an urban congressman—I was the most urban member of the House Agriculture Committee, so I also became very interested in those issues as well. Those were other things we worked on too.

Senator Dole was always known as somebody who built alliances across the aisle. Even in his most partisan times, he still built—whether it was [Sen.] Hubert [H.] Humphrey or [Sen.] George McGovern or just a myriad of other people, so he did not object to work with me on any of those things.

Williams: Were you always together, had a similar view on farm policy?

Glickman: Yes, pretty much on farm policy we had similar views. It tended to be non-ideological and more advocacy for constituent causes, and obviously Kansas had our crops, our particular livestock focus, so we weren't a particularly diverse agricultural state—wheat, corn, soybeans, cattle, and hogs, largely, and that's what it was. So we would work together, and that was actually quite popular at home.

Williams: How did that working together actually take place?

Glickman: He was, of course, on the Senate Agriculture Committee. I was on the House Agriculture Committee. There would be a lot of meetings in connection with farm legislation. Sometimes we'd be on conference committees together. Sometimes it would be not so much legislation, but it would be working for constituency advocacy programs on implementation of farm programs or rural programs. We'd also work together on Wichita stuff, too, on aircraft stuff. I mean, whether it was Beech, Cessna, Lear, Boeing, getting contracts from the government.

There was always a lot of competition between us, though. At least I felt that one of the things I was doing was being a competitive force for him. Dole was always kind of the guy that I think kind of liked that. He liked the competition. He always kind of saw me as the guy lurking behind his shoulder that might run against him as well. But that never really interfered with our ability to work together on issues that affected Kansas. I never found him at all vindictive. He had this kind of harsh personality, some people thought, you know, the biting, cutting-edge humor and everything else, which I

think he did at times have, but I never found him vindictive. He did not believe in the politics of destruction, like politicians do today.

The other thing I had the advantage of during most of that time period was the Democrats were in the majority, so even though I was from a Republican state, my party was still in the majority. Now, the Senate turned Republican during part of that time. He became chairman of the Finance Committee, then he became Senate Majority Leader for some of that time, but still we weren't in one-party government, so that also made it easier for us to work together.

Williams: As I understand it, the farm bill comes up for renewal about every five years.

Glickman: Yes. Then it was four years, but now it's five years.

Williams: And before we get to that, in between times, is the Agriculture Committee in the House still quite active?

Glickman: Yes. I mean, you know, it's mostly administratively involved, overseeing, but there are other pieces of legislation, the Farm Credit System, disaster bills that are happening at all times. We had also disasters during this time period. There was a tornado that came through southeast Wichita, floods and droughts and all those things, so the delegation would tend to be very, very active.

Also we had our other senator, Senator [Nancy L.] Kassebaum, who was the most beloved politician at the time, without question, and it often would be Dole, Kassebaum, and me when we were working on stuff affecting our part of the state.

Williams: Would you telephone one another?

Glickman: Yes. I was personally closer to her because my parents knew her and her first husband very well. His name was Phil Kassebaum, and he was from Wichita. He was a lawyer, and I think he worked for Nancy's dad as well, [Gov.] Alf [Alfred] Landon, when he owned radio stations. My dad and Phil were founders of the Sedgwick County Mental Health Association, so my parents were even socially friends with the Kassebaums, and

Nancy was less partisan than Bob Dole was. She had a lot of friends on the Democratic side. I mean, he wasn't that partisan, but he was more partisan than she was, because he was always a national figure. So I'd work with both of them. I would often tend to be on the phone with her more once she got in and we worked on issues together. She didn't work on agriculture issues very much, though. That was him. She worked a lot on aviation issues.

Williams: Was she on the Agriculture Committee?

Glickman: No, no, no. She was never on the Ag Committee.

Williams: What percentage of this kind of negotiating talking among the three of you that you did was actually carried on by staff people?

Glickman: A lot, too, but we were personally engaged on almost everything, so we'd see each other all the time, especially in the earlier days. As Dole became Majority Leader, he got to be more engaged in national politics.

Williams: Characterize farm legislation over the period of time that you were on the committee, what changes, what nuances prior to—

Glickman: The irony is, fundamentally it didn't change. Farm legislation was always based on a subsidy system that was relatively unchanged since after the Second World War, and most of the crops that got subsidized were the crops that we grew, that is, heartland agriculture. That drove farm policy. Also southern agriculture, because rice and cotton were also big commodities. But wheat, corn, rice, cotton, soybeans, and then livestock interests, and then, of course, tobacco, which wasn't in our area. It fundamentally did not change during the time that we were there. Same issues came up over and over and over again.

Williams: So would the farm policy during the [Jimmy] Carter administration have been quite similar to farm policy during the [Ronald] Reagan administration?

Glickman: Fundamentally, yes. There was slightly more market orientation during the Reagan years than there was during the Carter years. In a sense, that has continued even to the present time, although the laws have changed. There's more conservation orientation in current farm programs than there was before, but there's not what I'd call a revolutionary change that's occurred in my lifetime.

But as I got into Congress longer and longer, my contacts with Dole became more and more in defense and aviation than they were in agriculture. The reason for that is because agriculture stuff is kind of on autopilot. You do what you have to do, but that wasn't the kind of heart or the excitement of the legislative work, because that became more in terms of what we were doing to promote the aviation industry, which was at the time the dominant industrial force in Kansas—defense, very dominant—and I tended to have more contact with him toward my later years certainly on those issues rather than on agriculture.

Williams: Just a few more questions about agriculture. The food programs that were initiated, and there were several of them during Dole's period in particular, were those as good for the hungry as they were for the farmers?

Glickman: There was a nice coalition that was built between food stamp advocates and food and nutrition advocates and farmers, because the idea was that one would politically buttress the other, so you could get a better Food Stamp Program if it was in a farm program, and vice versa. That was what was called the Dole-McGovern-Humphrey era, where Dole carved a clear role in being a conservative Republican who strongly favored federal food and nutrition programs. McGovern was probably more of a driving force, but Dole was very much there in terms of both domestic and international food programs. I think he did it probably for a couple of reasons. One, it was a good political way to get people to support farm programs. But I think that Dole actually cared about the food programs. It wasn't just a political thing. I think part of it had to do with growing up poor and distressed, and Depression and everything else. So he gave credibility to Republicans to support food and nutrition programs.

[off-tape conversation]

Williams: I was asking you about the food programs being good for farmers and good for the hungry. Let's talk about subsidies just for a moment. Who gets them and what's the effect?

Glickman: Well, I mean, largely the subsidies are based on production, so the more you grow, the more you get. That's always been the case. Although there are what's called payment limitations, which means there is a cap on how much you can get, it's somewhat easy to manipulate that cap. But in Kansas it tended to be your larger family-sized farmers. They were still family farmers, but they weren't the little "forty acres and a mule" size farm. So you tended to get larger family-size farmers that got the dominance of the subsidies. The subsidies basically provided a level of protection that, frankly, no other industry gets in America, at least in a direct way. They get it indirectly through the tax code, other industries, but not directly in terms of payments. But they've probably kept a whole generation of mid-size producers around for longer than would otherwise be. So we fought for them very hard.

Williams: Where does agribusiness fit into all of this?

Glickman: Not really. People used to say agribusiness would get all these subsidies. For the most part, agribusiness didn't get the farm subsidies. They benefited indirectly because farmers could buy more fertilizer, more fuel. To the extent that they sold their goods into a system where their farm commodities were processed into food, I guess they benefited from it. In some crops, like cotton and rice, you tend to get at least corporate interests who are much more involved directly in the subsidy, but in Kansas the row crops there were not.

Williams: Because I've read somewhere that the accusation was made that Senator Dole was just absolutely in the pocket of Archer Daniel Midlands [Company] and various other—

Glickman: Well, he was close to the ADM people. I think he and Duane Andreas were close. But he wasn't any more in their pockets than I was. I think those allegations were part of just the political genre of the time.

Williams: Two groups, the American Corn Growers Association and National Corn Growers Association, one was for the small independent farmers—

Glickman: If ever they're still around, I don't know, but one was more left and one was more kind of center right, I would say.

Williams: And which did you—

Glickman: Well, I kept my bridges open with everybody. I didn't make a lot of enemies in this business until later on in my political life, but certainly not in agriculture I didn't. The American Corn Growers were more from the progressive left side and tended to support Democrats, so I'm sure they gave Dole lots of trouble, but I don't think it bothered him too much.

Williams: Were they major supporters of you?

Glickman: Not major supporters. The whole American agriculture movement, where the American Corn Growers was a little tiny piece of, there was a kind of a movement during the eighties, a populist anti-establishment movement in agriculture. It tended to be progressive economically, but there were tinges of anti-Semitism, and, ironically, because I was Jewish, not in the main part of it, but there tended to be kind of associations with some unsavory people that developed during some periods of time. But generally both Dole and I worked with the mainstream parts of those groups and tried to stay away from some of the more extreme parts of those groups.

My classic thing was there was a group called Posse Comitatus that existed during that time period, a group of more extreme rural agriculturalists, and most of those progressive groups liked me because I tended to be a little bit of a firebrand on agriculture policy. So they had done this campaign about Zionism being the cause of all

of our problems, and so the reporter said, "Don't you know that Glickman's Jewish?" And he said, "Yeah, but he's not a Zionist." Kind of like everybody had their way of kind of making compromises, I guess is what I'd say.

Williams: Since we're making reference to your own Jewishness, was that a major issue—

Glickman: Was not. Was not. In the last campaign that I lost, where abortion became a big issue—I had mentioned that Wichita had become kind of the center for the national anti-abortion rallies and crusades—I could sense that there was a little more—you kind of pick this up. If you've got good antennae, you can pick it up. I sensed there was a little more of that than my opponent was a "good Christian guy." And who was I? Sliced bread, I guess, or whatever it was. But even then, it wasn't a dominant thing. I did not lose because of my religion. I lost because of the way I conducted my campaign and outside issues.

Williams: Did you and Dole ever discuss your religion?

Glickman: No, no, and he was a very strong supporter of the State of Israel. In fact, one of the times that I had thought about running against Dole—I think it was 1986—and I had made all these rumblings that I was going to run against him, I was visited by some representatives of AIPAC, the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee, who I had also known for years for other reasons, and basically admonishing me not to run against Dole because he had been so helpful to the State of Israel. That's actually been written about in several books. Whether Dole sent them to do that or whether they just did this on their own, I don't know.

Williams: How did it make you feel?

Glickman: I was upset. I was going to say something else, but I was upset. How can these people do this kind of thing? But they did. It was a good lesson, and politics is often based on expediency and not necessarily based upon family.

Williams: I read somewhere that you had been called the key architect of the 1990 farm bill.

Glickman: Well, I worked on all the farm bills. I was involved in lots of it, including creating a conservation title for the first time, and the Organic Standards Act I was involved with, and there are a lot of parts of it. Yes, it's possible. I was an eclectic legislator. I was involved in lots of different things, not just agriculture, so it's possible, but that might have been my own self-promotion, too, than anything you read that's been separately validated.

Williams: I get the impression that the farm bills, as they progressed, got more titles and moved into other areas, like conservation and maybe more research.

Glickman: Research, nutrition, international stuff as well. I developed some expertise in conservation, food and nutrition and international agriculture, so it turned out that when the position became open for Secretary of Agriculture, I had a lot of support from the outside because of all my involvement in these various issues.

Williams: I was curious that you voted against the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)].

Glickman: I remember it, but I don't know why. I don't think there was anything profound or fundamental for it. I voted for NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement]. I voted against the GATT; I'm not sure why now. I wouldn't read anything into it one way or the other.

Williams: I'd like your views on ethanol for a moment. It's coming on strong now as we talk, but it's always been an element of farm policy.

Glickman: Certainly it was a big element in farm policy. Actually, Dole and I were both on the National Alcohol Fuels Commission, which was established in Congress in the

seventies. Another Kansas congressman, [Rep.] Keith Sebelius, was on that, so there were three of us. It was established to try to develop and promote alcohol fuels as part of our national energy policy. Of course, it had an interesting agricultural take to it. So in a sense, being for ethanol was always part of the liturgy in farm country. But it was good. It was popular. And it's taken a long time for it to really become economically viable, but it's much more economically viable today than it was before. Dole was very much involved on the Senate Finance Committee side, the tax side, in providing tax benefits for ethanol.

Williams: There are environmental downsides to ethanol.

Glickman: Well, I mean, there are way more environmental downsides to petroleum, but the biggest issue in ethanol is the amount of energy it takes to produce it, and that's why it has not necessarily been as economically viable. But oil at 60 or 70 dollars a barrel, it becomes more economically viable, and there are also technologies producing new ways to convert biomass into fuel in a much cheaper and more energy-efficient way than used to be.

Williams: Talk a little bit about the connection between farm policy and foreign policy.

Glickman: Generally speaking, agriculture has been more internationalist than other parts of the American economy, and you found lots of farmers and agriculturists, because we had to sell about half of what we produced overseas. So the need to be economically interdependent with the rest of the world was more practically necessary if you were involved in agriculture. It's, curiously why today even in the Republican Party the strongest opponents to this crazy idea of us isolating Cuba, which we've had for a long time, the strongest opponents to that in the Republican Party are farm state congressmen, because they see Cuba as a potential market for their stuff. Agriculture would look at foreign countries' involvement relating to is it a market for us or not. When China came into the WTO [World Trade Organization], it was agriculture that was the strongest U.S. economic force to get that done, because agriculturalists had solved the economic

potential for having trading relationships with China. So that tends to be really what the tie is.

Williams: As congressman, did you have to educate people in your district to the advantages of sales to communist countries and so forth?

Glickman: A little bit. Not really. Certainly not in my home district. No, not really.

Williams: They came along.

Glickman: Yes.

Williams: Are there other farm-related issues that we haven't covered right now?

Glickman: No, I think you've hit most of them. You know, it's funny, because in my life, I've been out of that so long that there's probably a lot more there that I just don't remember. I think the more significant transition is when I became Secretary, rather than when I was congressman. That's when I had way more impact on agriculture than I did as congressman.

One of the interesting things you may want to know is how I became Secretary of Agriculture, because it affects Bob Dole very directly. In 1994 I lost my campaign for Congress, so I was kind of looking for what I was next going to do, but the then-Secretary of Agriculture, whose name was Mike Espy, had announced his resignation, so Bill Clinton had to go out—President Clinton had to go out and fill that job. During that time period, there were several members of the Clinton Cabinet that were under law enforcement investigation. There was Henry Cisneros, there was Ron Brown, there was Mike Espy, and I think there was another one or two.

So the election happens, I lose, the Democrats lose the Congress, both houses of Congress. Clinton has to fill this job of Secretary of Agriculture. Dole is the new Senate Majority Leader. So Bob Dole becomes extremely important to the president. Then Clinton's got all these ethics problems. This is way before Monica Lewinsky. So the chief of staff to President Clinton was Leon Panetta at the time. He and I were elected to

Congress the same year, so we were friends. Of course, the vice president was Al [Albert] Gore [Jr.]. He and I were elected to Congress the same year. We were all part of the same class.

So Panetta called me one day and he said, "The president mentioned you as a possible successor to Mike Espy. Would you be interested?"

And I said yes. I would have actually give up my House seat to become Secretary of Agriculture, but I said, "I've got to check to see how Dole feels about it." Well, they had already checked with Dole. Dole was the Senate Majority Leader. If Dole hadn't supported me, I wouldn't have been Secretary, but Dole not only supported me, he actively supported me and talked to all his colleagues. I had some problems with a couple of Alaska senators because of timber issues when I was a congressman. Everything comes back to haunt you, you know. You've got to go through Senate confirmation.

One funny story was that I asked Dole once during this time period, I said, "Well, are you comfortable supporting me for Secretary?"

And he looked at me and he says, "I am as long as it keeps you out of Kansas forever." You know, the typical Dole humor.

So anyway, ironically, it was the Dole connection, even though we had partisan differences, that I really became Secretary, because Clinton wouldn't have picked me if Dole would have said no.

Williams: You were part of Cabinet meetings and the rest. What was the Clinton administration view on Dole?

Glickman: Well, first, of course, he ran against him in 1996. Bill Clinton always liked Dole very much, still does. I even think that when they ran against each other they didn't really have their heart into it. I think Bill Clinton is to Dole kind of like a son is to a father, in a sense. I think Clinton at times saw Dole as a lot of things he wasn't. He was a war hero, remarkable integrity, stoic figure. And I think Dole saw Clinton as something he was, which is brilliant, glib, handsome, articulate, infectious personality, could talk to anybody about anything. And they both were politically kind of from similar modes; they were both moderates. So it was an interesting kind of dichotomy. They didn't talk

about Dole very much at all. [Rep. Newt] Gingrich was a much more significant factor than Dole was.

Then, of course, Dole quit the Senate fairly shortly thereafter to run for president, and then he ceased to become a factor. So he wasn't there quite a long enough time when I was around to form any opinions. The Clinton people were really never worried about Dole, quite honestly. I think that they felt that when Dole got the nomination, they respected him, but they weren't particularly concerned about him.

Williams: This despite the fact that shortly after the election in '92 and '93, Dole was dead set against letting much of the new administration's program come—

Glickman: Yes, but Dole was basically at heart sent to government to do something, not to stop something. The crew that's in there now [George W. Bush] is there to stop something, but Dole was a doer. "Let's get this done. Let's find a solution." He was never terribly ideological. That's why a lot of people in his own party didn't like him, because he wasn't a guy out there fighting for some cause. Dole's cause was to get it done, not so much a philosophical cause. So he may have been out there trying to stop Clinton a little bit, and he had to put up with his own crew, who were probably pretty difficult. By that I mean the senators and congressmen from the right. But I still don't think that he was ever viewed as an obstructionist.

Williams: You've mentioned both yours and Dole's interest in the aviation industry, for the obvious reason. Was there any major legislation that—

Glickman: Yes. There was a very big piece of legislation, largely fought by Senator Kassebaum, because she was on the Aviation Committee, but it had to do with getting product liability protection for small airplane manufacturers, which was a monumental issue. When a small plane would crash, invariably it would cost the manufacturer millions and millions and millions of dollars, even if there was no negligence proven. So we could see the end of the industry because of this. So I introduced the first bill to provide product liability protection for small airplane manufacturers. Then Senator Kassebaum picked it up on the Senate shortly thereafter, and then we worked for years to

try to get something done. It's tough to do, because when you limit liability, it gets all the trial lawyers engaged, and most of them are on the other side. But we finally just slowly worked this deal. Then out of the blue, Senator Dole parachutes in and is able to move the thing through the Senate, basically. He was Majority Leader. So I was feeling a lot of pressure, and I got it done in the House. I did what I had to do to get it done. But Dole, not just on aviation—but Kassebaum largely pushed this bill, but Dole was always, when it came to Kansas, he was always the guy who could parachute in at the last minute with the goodies in hand, whatever they happened to be. So he was viewed as—and it was accurate—the most powerful political figure in the state, certainly. Probably ever.

Williams: Did the model of the product liability issue with aviation get transferred to other industries?

Glickman: It has in recent years, but at the time, no. It was the first major—there was some immunizing, ironically, liability for vaccine manufacturers, there was some issue there, but, yes, this was the bill of its type, and it was complicated. It was largely written by the airplane manufacturers in Kansas, Beech and Cessna, basically said that if a plane was over eighteen years of age, you couldn't sue the manufacturer for negligence arising out of a crash unless you could prove that it willfully violated FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] rules or something. So it provided much more severe restrictions on lawsuits against manufacturers for old airplanes, and that formula seemed to work in the Congress. Now in recent years there's been comparable legislation in other areas, but back there was nothing.

Williams: Do you recall the Bayh-Dole Act of biotechnology?

Glickman: Yes, the Bayh-Dole Act That created a lot of the infrastructure for the biotech industry. That was after I basically—it started before I left the Congress. I don't remember what year that was.

Williams: It was actually1980.

Glickman: Yes, but I don't think it was really implemented until much later. I don't think it got much money or anything, so I wasn't too involved with it.

Williams: I wanted to ask you a few questions about your time on the Committee on Intelligence. One thing that kind of mystifies me is how Grenada came about and disappeared so quickly.

Glickman: Actually, I can't really tell you much about that. That was, I think, a [Ronald] Reagan event to flex our muscles in this hemisphere, probably more geared to the Soviets than it was to us, but I don't remember too much about why.

Williams: What about Iran Contra?

Glickman: Most of that action took place before I was on the Intelligence Committee, so that occurred in the 1980s, and that was kind of the way immigration or abortion were issues now, then you were either on one side or the other of aiding the Contras in Nicaragua, and of course they deceptively pulled money out of Iran in order to pay for some of the stuff. Again, that was pre my work on the Intelligence Committee.

Williams: But as a member of the House, were you pretty outraged by it?

Glickman: Outraged is probably—I mean, I was always on the side of not providing assistance to the Contras. I thought the Reagan administration was trumping this up, that the communists were ready to cross the border into Texas, and if we didn't stop them in Nicaragua, they were moving up to the Rio Grande. And ultimately it just kind of dissipated. I think Iran Contra got people to realize that it was probably not as serious as they said it was.

Williams: Then you initiated the Aldrich Ames—

Glickman: When I was chairman of the committee, they found Ames at the time was the biggest spy, so we basically oversaw the entire investigation, watched over the CIA and

made some reforms there. It was very interesting. In fact, I interviewed Ames. I met him out at a federal holding area and spent six hours with him, going over—he was in his orange jumpsuit and talking about why did he do it and how could he do it, and all this kind of stuff. That case was the biggest spy case in history until the Robert Hanssen case, which actually was much bigger. Did you see the movie *Breach*, by any chance? It's all about the Hanssen case.

Williams: It's kind of amazing that these things happen.

Glickman: Yes, and most of the time they happen just because the people who are supposed to be watching it happen are just pure negligent. They just let it go. They're friends and they don't say anything about it, or they don't let their instincts govern them very much. In the Ames case, everybody knew that the guy was spending money like water and was always coming in drunk, and nobody does anything. It's extraordinary.

Williams: So did you shake your fists at the CIA?

Glickman: We all did that during the hearing process.

Williams: Another question, and this is when you were in the Cabinet, what was the Clinton's administration's take on Al-Qaeda?

Glickman: I don't have any idea about that. Again, that was certainly not in my portfolio, nor was there any Cabinet discussion I remember about it.

Williams: Just in general, what was it like to serve on the Intelligence Committee? What kind of assignment was it?

Glickman: It was prestigious. I'll never forget that there was a big queue to try to get on the committee, and I had heard a little rumor that somebody who was on the committee was getting off for one reason or another, so I walked by—the Speaker then was Jim Wright. I walked into his office one day and I said, "Mr. Speaker, if there's ever an

opening on the committee, I'd like to go on." And in his office at the time was [Rep.]Jack Brooks, who was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, on which I also served. They were buddies, both Texas guys.

So the Speaker looks at me, says, "Can you keep a secret?"

I said, "Yes."

He says, "Okay." And he went to the floor fifteen minutes later and added me as a member of the committee. What he said was, he said there were twenty-five members that wanted on, and he did not want to go through that kind of political jockeying. He said it's just a classic example of being at the right place at the right time. And he liked me. But I was there, and he said, "Let's do it."

An interesting thing. What I found in life is these things add up. They accumulate into your total experience level, so in some sense just being at Wright's office made me chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Then I was able to get Clinton's attention for two years when I was chairman of the committee on other things. So then when I lost my election, I had been on the Agricultural Committee, but Clinton knew who I was because I'd been on the Intelligence Committee, so he felt more comfortable appointing me. It's a curious thing about how life just—everything interrelates to each other. Nothing's in isolation.

Williams: You're lucky, because a lot of people don't have that life experience.

Glickman: Well, you have to take advantage of it, too. You can't just wait around for it. My dad used to say that when one door closes, the other door opens, but you've got to be next to the door. You know, that's just the way it is.

Williams: Over the years that you were in Congress, how did you feel about the Republican agendas and the Democratic agendas?

Glickman: First eight years, the Democrats had huge majorities, eight or ten years. We ran the show. But the Republicans, I think, were, by and large, rather docile, but they went along with most everything, and there was a fair amount of bipartisanship, not gigantic, but fair amount. As the Gingrich crew on the Republican side and [Rep.]Tony

Coelho crew on the Democratic side began to move into positions of leadership, it began to change and the partisanship began to grow rather significantly. So the last six years or so I was in Congress was much more partisan.

The other big factor is that the influence of money began to grow exponentially in the mid-eighties. When I first ran for Congress, I spent $100,000 to run a primary and a general election against a sitting incumbent congressman. That race would cost three and a half million dollars today. Members of Congress today, all they do is raise money. It just dwarfs everything else they do. That didn't begin to happen until about the mid- to late 1980s. When you have to spend your life raising money, not only does it take time away from doing your job, but it has you focusing on who the money-raisers are. Generally speaking, the people who have the money don't give you the money because they think you're handsome. They give you the money because they want you to do their bidding. And that has made life a lot tougher to get anything done.

Williams: What was your take on Ronald Reagan?

Glickman: He was kind of a fun guy to be with. In the first place, again, the Democrats had the majority most of the time, in the House the entire time. So Reagan was affable. I think we improperly or falsely thought that he wasn't very smart, and I think it turned out he was a lot smarter than we had thought he was. But in my life back then, the more important thing was the Democrats held the majority in the House, so we still ran the committees, had the chairmanships. Actually, having a Republican president made it easier because you had a Democratic Congress and you could do oversight much better. One of the defects during the Bush administration is that the Republicans have held the Congress up until now, of course, and they didn't do any oversight because you had one-party government. Our system doesn't function very well like that.

Williams: I want to ask you just a few more questions.

Glickman: Okay, because I'm going to have to leave in about ten minutes.

Williams: Okay. I need to stop this tape and put in another tape.

[Begin Tape 2.]

Williams: You say you contemplated running against Dole, but really seriously?

Glickman: Actually, a couple of times really seriously. The first time was in 1980. I'd only been in the House four years. I put together a committee and decided not to, which was smart because that was the year Reagan won. I would have gotten killed. Carter was not very popular. Then the most seriously was in 1986, and this is in the mid-year of Reagan's second term. The Republicans were weaker then. If I would have had any chance to have won, it would have been in '86, mid-year in a president's second term, as we just saw, is a tough time for an incumbent president and his party. But I still had this instinct that Dole was strong. He reeked of Kansas. He was all these things—war hero, bringing home the bacon or the pork, and a solid legislator. So I decided, no, I wouldn't do it, and I disappointed a lot of people, because I had people believing I was going to do it. I was always kind of the Great White Hope for the Democratic Party in that sense. Great Hope. White Hope is probably not the way to say it anymore.

Then I thought about it again in '92 and didn't. I think I gradually became more comfortable in the House. I was committee chairman of Intelligence and other kinds of things. I always kind of dreamed about being a senator. Nancy Kassebaum would have been totally unbeatable. She was invincible. And Dole was not invincible, but still very, very difficult, so I never did it.

Williams: How do you rate him as a presidential candidate?

Glickman: Pretty bad. I thought he was a great senator. I'll never forget they had this slogan, "I'm a Dole man," to the tune "I'm a soul man." I thought, boy, he just doesn't get it, or somebody doesn't get it. I mean, Bob Dole is a legislator. He's a deal maker. He's not a visionary. It's hard to get him to convey a vision, not that he doesn't have vision. The irony is, he would have been a very good president, once in place. I think he would have been a president like Lyndon [B.] Johnson. He would have been a doer, an actor. But he really just didn't have the natural political skills to get there. He had the

political skills to get things done, but he didn't have the political skills to get the votes among the people, I don't think.

Williams: How was it that he was so successful in Kansas but not nationally?

Glickman: Well, first of all, running in a much more confined geographical area is easier, and he had a lot of great attributes, I mean war hero and had all of the skills, had been in state legislature, been in Congress, a handsome man. But running for president is a different story. I mean, you know, it requires an extraordinary organization, which he did not have. And running against the Clintons is like running against the American Army. I mean, the Clintons, both of them, are just—they live and breathe electoral politics. I mean, it's just like it's part of their very fabric and existence. I don't think it was Dole's. It's also very hard to unseat a sitting president, no matter what you do.

Williams: Twenty years from now when young people will scratch their head and say, "Bob Dole? That sounds vaguely familiar," what would you say to let them know—

Glickman: Well, he's certainly for Kansans, historically one of the great Kansans of Kansas history, just in terms of his political service to his country. But I think you've got to look back at those things that he's had his finger on—certainly feeding the hungry. It's a little bit odd that a conservative Republican would be involved with those issues, but he had a dramatic impact on expanding the Food Stamp Program and food and nutrition programs. Kansans are always interested in that kind of thing. I think that'd be a big part of it. I mean, his impact on traditional agricultural policy is there, but that's going to be harder to pinpoint, because it's hard to pick out what thing he actually did, other than maybe keep commodity prices higher, which is important, but I think his role is what I call a conciliator and a compromiser in terms of getting Congress to work well, will also be something that he will be known for. As we look back at how you build bridges in politics, he's a very good example for building bridges.

He was involved in Americans with Disabilities Act. Legislatively he was very eclectic. He was involved in a lot of things that don't relate to any of the committee assignments and everything else. But my guess is he is remembered more for the role he

played in making our government work better and the role he played in improving food and nutrition programs both domestically and internationally.

Williams: I think someone called you—maybe you called yourself one of the funniest men in Congress.

Glickman: I probably called myself that, yes.

Williams: I won't ask you to tell some of your favorite jokes, but what about Dole?

Glickman: He's very funny, but he's not a joke teller. He's self-deprecating. I remember one of the funniest lines he did, I think it was, he had been chairman of the Republican National Committee and Nixon basically fired him because he wouldn't cooperate, so he says, "Well, I was just fired by the crew in the White House, [H.R.] Haldeman, [John] Erlichman, and Nixon: hear no evil, see no evil, and evil." That was one of his classic lines.

I'll never forget, he ran against Dr. Roy. His name was Dr. Bill Roy, and they had this debate in Hutchinson, Kansas, at the State Fair, and Dole got up there and he says, "I tell ya, folks, there are a lot of things that you don't like, a lot of things that bug people. One of the things that really bugs you are doctor bills. So here's one Dr. Bill you can not send to Washington." So he was clever, but he was not what you call a storyteller.

Williams: Anything else you'd like to say?

Glickman: It's interesting, his influence on my life has never really ended, because even coming into this job at the Motion Picture Association, which of course he wasn't involved with at all, but when I was nominated for the job, they wanted to know if I could find any good solid Republicans who would help vouch for my bipartisan skills, so the first call I made was to Bob Dole.

Williams: And he cooperated.

Glickman: That's right.

Williams: Congratulations on this new post.

Glickman: Okay.

Williams: Thank you very much.

Glickman: You're welcome.

[End of interview]

Index