

ROBERT J. DOLE
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Interview with
ROBERT J. DOLE

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Smith: To Reagan and the whole supply-side business, because you were clearly not a supply-sider. How did you reconcile... I mean, you're a good soldier, and now all of a sudden, because of Ronald Reagan, you're chairman of the Finance Committee. Were there any tensions, though, between—

Dole: I remember him coming to visit me at Walter Reed Hospital and they brought me a book by, who, George Gilder, wasn't it?

Smith: Yes.

Dole: Sort of a little hint, you know, "Get with it."

Smith: How sick were you, by the way? How sick were you at that point?

Dole: I wasn't that—I had kidney stones in the only kidney I had left, and it took them a long time to find it, so I was weak, but it wasn't life-threatening. But I was sick. But I know, boy, they loved that visit. The nurses and everybody got pictures with President Reagan. And I appreciated it too.

But, yes, I never was much of a Laffer curve man. L-a-u-g-h-t-e-r is how we looked at it, the real Laffer. He's still around. I see him on business shows. Here's Art [Arthur] Laffer talking about—he doesn't talk much about the Laffer Curve anymore. But he sold the president, sold somebody at the White House, and then I guess [Jack] Kemp was the big booster for the—well, on the Senate side it was [William] Roth-Kemp. On the House side it was Kemp-Roth. But Jack was more vocal about it, but Bill Roth

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really pushed hard on—first it was 10-10-10, ended up 10-10-5. Tax cuts were fine with me, but I didn't understand all this, how by cutting taxes you were going to get all these revenues back. And then part of the program was you're going to cut spending, which never happened, and Reagan blamed the—well, the administration blamed the Congress. I'm sure Reagan had—I'm not so certain. We tried hard, got dumped, to cut spending.

Smith: But also there was a sort of race that developed. I mean, there were all sorts of Christmas tree ornaments that got put on. Wasn't there a contest with the House or the Democrats? How did that—

Dole: Let's see now. The Democrats had the House, didn't they? Yes.

Smith: Yes, yes.

Dole: Had to deal with Dan Rostenkowski. He's quite a guy.

Smith: Tell us about Rostenkowski.

Dole: Well, I liked him. I mean, again, he's another one, he's about like me; he didn't know anything about taxes. He got elected to Congress, ended up chairman of the tax-writing committee. Here I end up chairman of the Finance Committee. So we weren't accountants or tax experts, but we'd been around long enough to know how you get things done. But he was a pretty tough guy and pretty party line, but I got along with him pretty well. I'd go over there and visit with him.

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I remember, was it '81—yes, I think it was '81 when Reagan was trying to get some Enterprise Zones, this another idea of Kemp and these guys, which probably made some sense, and I remember he called “Rosty,” as we called him, two or three times on the phone. I’m not certain he ever got any. I think he maybe gave him ten or something instead of seventy-five. He wanted seventy-five. So he was a very—I liked him. He was a big, pleasant guy, and tough Chicago. I thought what he did was petty, anyway. I mean, punishment much too severe.

Smith: Was he a tough negotiator?

Dole: Well, his way to negotiate was his way or no way. That was his negotiation position. So we had to work from there.

Smith: Were the Democrats—

Dole: Boy, he had them in line. Nobody ever wavered on his side.

Smith: I wonder whether they were caught sleeping because Reagan was able really to go over the heads of the leadership. I mean, it’s almost a textbook example of a president using the media to, in effect—

Dole: And the people. I don’t think it’s happened since, has it?

Smith: I don’t think so.

Dole: Where the people actually got the tax cut. Was it three hundred—I don't know how many votes against it in the Senate. A handful. Probably twenty-five or thirty in the House. I don't remember the numbers. But there were a lot of goodies attached to it, some we had to take care of later, and then I got accused of being the tax collector for the welfare state by [Newt] Gingrich, because we tried to close some of the loopholes. Some of these corporations were making out like bandits under this—what program was it? It was some crazy program where they got big, big tax writeoffs. Some lease program of some kind. So we closed some of those loopholes, and that's probably where Rod [Roderick DeArment] could fill you in on all that, TEFRA and DEFRA and all that stuff.

Smith: What was it about Reagan that allowed him to do what he did, I mean to get on TV and tell people to "Call your congressman," and they would call?

Dole: Yes, well, I think he came in with this big, big victory and had a Republican Senate, finally had a Republican chamber, and he had a lot of clout with the people. People liked Ronald Reagan. If Reagan said it—I can remember getting critical letters from home when I said something that wasn't 100 percent following what Reagan said we ought to do. If I had any question about him, I'd get letters. He had this magic with the people, and they weren't all Republicans; they were Independents, Democrats, you know.

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Smith: I think part of it was, I mean, remember, along about at the end of March comes the assassination attempt, and I think that really defined Reagan for people who were still kind of on the fence. I mean, all of a sudden here's this larger-than-life figure.

Dole: Oh, yes, like God was saving this man. A lot of people really believed that, that it's a plan. And the way he handled it, you know, the jokes and, "I hope my doctor's a Republican," all that played well with the people, whether Democrats or Republicans. Just an average guy, and he really nearly died, so it wasn't a scratch.

Smith: One other thing, remember, about this time was the PATCO strike and the fact that I've always thought that Reagan's legend was [unclear] the assassination attempt and then when he fired those air traffic controllers. All of a sudden, after years of presidents who seemed to be overwhelmed by the job, here you had a guy who did what he said he was going to do and did it in a way that everyone could understand, and seemed to be willing to take whatever consequences—I mean,....

Dole: He had a big break coming in with the hostage release, too. That catapulted him. A lot of people thought it happened because of Reagan, [Jimmy] Carter was never going to do anything, but Reagan was tough and he'd take action. Might have been the case, but that certainly gave him a pretty good start. It happened, when?, the day after he was sworn in, I think.

Smith: Yes. The day of the inauguration.

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Dole: Yes. And poor President Carter, I think he said recently, “What would you do over again?”, he said, well, he’d send one more helicopter. [laughs] A backup. Which is probably a good thing to do. But I don’t know. Reagan just had that star quality, you know. Couldn’t tell you how the watch was made, but he knew what time it was.

Smith: Bud McFarlane had a great line. He was just sort of scratching his head. He said, “He knows so little, yet he accomplishes so much.”

Dole: Yes.

Smith: I mean, did it baffle professional politicians to see Reagan in action?

Dole: Oh, you’d go down there and I was seated on his left as the Republican Leader, and you’d glance over and he had these little cards, and it would start off, “Good morning, Bob,” you know. I mean, everything was scripted. That’s not because he didn’t know my name; I think it was for historical purposes too. They wanted this just right. But he had this—I don’t know what you call it—common sense. I think he had a feel for what people really wanted, and he didn’t profess to know all the details. He never got up and said he knew all the—he’d call on X, Y, and Z. I can’t remember when it was when Gingrich was giving him a little lecture, as Newt liked to do at these meetings, and say, “Mr. President, you ought to do—,” and of course he had a blank legal pad there, Newt did. “You ought to do the following.” Then he started to write one, two, three, four. And [Paul] Laxalt finally had it, “Newt, shut up,” you know. One of the best moments that I can remember. The president listened to all this stuff.

Smith: Did you ever see him lose his temper?

Dole: Oh, yeah, over the bankers. Remember, the president wanted to withhold income tax on interest and dividends. We were losing, I don't know, four or five billion a year. People said, "I don't have to pay taxes on my income or on my interest." Well, they just didn't pay it. So we're trying to figure out how to close some of these loopholes, but then the bankers took him on, the American Banking Association and savings and loans. I remember one morning the issue came up and he took off his glasses and he said, "I'm up to my keyster with those bankers," and threw his glasses on the table. Real tough guy. Boy, that's tough stuff. But later the thing kind of fizzled and it was repealed by an amendment with Robert Kasten from Wisconsin, and the White House, "That was one of Bob Dole's crazy ideas." That's how they got shed of it. So I got blamed for it. We even had withholding on tips, you know. I remember going to Topeka, Kansas, a little Ramada Inn, a little restaurant there, and this nice little waitress, they all wore these little buttons, said "Bob Dole's lady for the evening." They were really rubbing it in. [laughs] And I'm just the chairman. I don't dream up all these things.

Smith: Did you know in '81 that this thing was getting out of hand? I mean, in terms of the budgetary consequences. Did it take on a life of its own? In other words, "We've got to win no matter what the cost and then maybe later on we can recoup some?"

Dole: Yes, because Reagan, his strength was going to be to balance the budget, cut spending, cut taxes, but cut spending, and he did do a lot of spending—we did a lot of

spending cuts in the first budget resolution, but a lot of it was really not—it was David Stockman budget cuts where you cut SSI that affected low-income people. You don't do those things, and that was repealed the next chance we had. And remember Reagan had to get all this done pretty quickly because you came in in January and had to get it all done because—I don't know if he had a hundred-day plan or not, I can't remember. So they had to put a lot of this stuff together, and when you do that, you get a lot of garbage in with some of the good stuff. We had to eat crow on a lot of that stuff, which we probably should have on, like, SSI and I can't remember the other things.

Smith: What was Stockman's role?

Dole: I don't want to say mesmerize, but Reagan had a lot of confidence in Stockman. He was a brilliant guy, let's face it. Let's see, when did he join Reagan? It wasn't immediate.

Smith: Actually, I think it was. I think he—

Dole: Did he leave Congress right away?

Smith: Yes.

Dole: But he was a big influence and he was tough with, if you want to go down and say, "Wait a minute, Dave. We shouldn't do this," he was hard to budge. I mean, you could get him to come around a little bit, but he thought he had a mandate to change the federal

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spending policies, and it worked for a while because Reagan had this power. It wasn't because people agreed with him, particularly Democrats, but they voted for it because, who's going to run against Ronald Reagan, particularly House members of two years? They weren't going to walk into that buzz saw.

Smith: And Jim [James] Baker's role, the troika with Baker and Meese and Deaver?

Dole: Well, first, of course you had Deaver was sort of the key guy. When did Baker come into the picture?

Smith: Well, he was chief of staff from the beginning and then, of course, later on –

Dole: And then he switched with Don Regan.

Smith: But in terms of that first year or two, was Baker significantly involved in the negotiations or planning?

Dole: Yes, in a different way. Baker had a different approach to everything. He was open and accessible and listened, willing to compromise. But there were people around the White House, I can't remember precisely anymore, but people like [Lyn] Nofziger and others who didn't trust Baker. They thought the guy was a liberal interloper, a [George H.W.] Bush man, doesn't belong in here. They had a few people sniping at him, but I don't think it bothered Baker any.

But, yes, we used to meet with him a lot on the budget. I forget all those things. Used to meet at his home in Fox Hall. I remember being there one night and he said, "I've got some news for you."

I said, "What is it?"

He said, "The president's going to nominate Elizabeth [Dole] to be Secretary of Transportation." I think it was the first I heard of it, and she hadn't heard of it yet. So he was in the know and he was a good guy and I liked him.

Smith: He's supposed to be the most skillful leaker in Washington.

Dole: He had a great way with the press and always cultivated the press, key people. What's the old story where you put poison upstream then run into town and ask what's happening? That was Mel Laird's role, really. He was the best at that. Baker just had a good relationship, and still does. You know, the press likes Jim Baker. A lot of Republicans have fallen by the wayside, but he still has a lot of credibility.

Smith: Just generally speaking, how did the Reagan White House compare with others that you've worked with?

Dole: I had a good relationship. I didn't see the president that often, but he was always very nice, and you know how he is, he's always very friendly.

Smith: Was he as much of a storyteller as everyone says?

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Dole: Yes. Now and then you'd get invited upstairs and sit around and have a Coca-Cola or whatever you wanted. I'm certain it was probably painstaking for him to have all of us hanging around there, but we'd go up there, he'd have special maintenance, a lot of high-maintenance people up there in Congress, and Reagan understood that. That's one thing Reagan understood too, about how you've got to stroke the Democrats and the Republicans, which I think is something [William J.] Clinton never learned and [George W.] Bush never learned. But I think Reagan intuitively and maybe, I think, in California he probably had a Republican legislature way back then.

Smith: Well, actually, I think for part of his governorship, but for most of it he actually had a Democratic.

Dole: But he knew how to work. And he and Tip [Thomas P.] O'Neill had this great relationship where after six they were friends. I think Tip really liked Reagan and I think the same was true. I remember in the Social Security in '83 with Pat [Daniel Patrick] Moynihan and [Alan] Greenspan was chairman of the commission, was able to satisfy both Reagan and O'Neill, it's got to mean that they had some relationship where there was some trust there, because nobody was trying to gain any partisan advantage; they were just trying to fix Social Security. And it's easy to play politics if you're a Democrat with Social Security since Republicans opposed it when FDR [Franklin D. Roosevelt] proposed it.

Smith: Do you think it made a difference for Reagan that he had been a Democrat for much of his life?

Dole: Oh, well, look at some of the things that he did. He had an abortion bill, he cut welfare costs. A pretty liberal record, I guess, in those days. But he was the kind of guy who could just sort of pass it on and never show up at a rally of pro-life, but get on the phone, a speakerphone from the White House and wish them all well and, “I hope you’re having a great time.” And they were all, “Oh, he’s our guy.” It’s amazing, but he had that—well, he wasn’t called the Great Communicator for nothing. And he was good when he would address the nation. He had that look that people trust that guy. Now, this wasn’t true later on when he had the Iran-Contra stuff; people were a little shaky. But early on he had it.

Smith: It’s interesting. Lyn Nofziger said to me once that it would have been better for the country, he thought, and for Reagan if he’d won in ’76 because just the difference of four years, he thought. The other thing was he thought he got lazy, that in California Nofziger and others insisted that he had regular press conferences, which really kept him on his toes and he was actually very good in that kind of format. But when he got to Washington he was surrounded by people, I assume including Baker, who were afraid of what he might say and wanted to keep him away from the press. And you get rusty. If you look at the contrast between those set speeches and the press conferences, and it’s pretty marked, even going on.

Dole: Yes. Yes, Reagan, I don’t know what he had. He had this, like I said, this special quality about people. I mean, I remember he’d come into the meetings with the Republicans and they’d go wild. Most partisans in either party, if their boss walks in,

you go wild, but really, this is genuine. He'd get up and give them the old one-two-three punch, you know, taxes, spending, regulation, same old stuff we've been using for years, but he made it work.

Smith: In your experience, was there anyone else who had that quality that you can think of?

Dole: I don't think so. I think I've said that I think the fellow who knew more about it than anybody was President [Gerald R.] Ford, but he didn't have that dynamism or whatever it is that Reagan had.

Smith: Charisma.

Dole: Yes. Yes, flat-out charisma. He'd walk around the Cabinet room and not remember the HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development] secretary, but that's all details. And as I told you before, he told me, he said, "Why should I remember all these members of Congress? About only half of them vote with me anyway."

[laughs] So he had a pretty healthy attitude. That's what made him kind of real. All that stuff, "I don't need to know all these guys' names. I'm only going to be here eight years." I remember him saying that too.

Smith: I think that people sensed that he was funny for an actor, that there was kind of an authenticity about the guy.

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Dole: Yes, I think that's it. I think that's the word. And whether he was or not, nobody can prove it. He wasn't that good of an actor. I just saw one of his movies the other night. He was a cowboy or something, I don't know.

Smith: What's your take on Iran-Contra? What do you think, how he handled it? Do you think age was getting to be a factor by that point?

Dole: I think Ollie [Oliver] North had too much authority. I think he was sort of the loose cannon. Of course, now he's a big reporter with a big following. Well, he lost the Senate bid. I don't remember how Reagan really got dragged into that, but I remember he had to testify. And he was on pretty thin ice, I think.

Smith: There is this notion that Reagan became very emotionally involved in the plight of the hostages, which is perfectly understandable, but that that was sort of how he first got almost ensnared in this thing, let his emotions get involved. And that he could convince himself that he was doing what everyone else thought he was doing.

Dole: That's probably true. I was trying to remember other strengths. I can't remember. Was there a space—

Smith: Well, remember there was the *Challenger* explosion.

Dole: And how he spoke when he—the families and the big gathering. I mean, you just couldn't compare him with anybody else. Everybody was impressed. Probably

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somebody wrote it, but he used to play with his speeches. You know, he just didn't get up. He'd make little edits. I've kind of learned to have more respect for him since looking at some of his diaries. I mean, he kind of knew what was going on and he had a pretty good view of what was happening. So I think some of the doubters maybe even—

Smith: Remember he had that sign at his desk that said “There's no limit to what a man can accomplish as long as he doesn't care who gets the credit.”

Dole: Yes.

Smith: And I think that's a revealing —

Dole: Reagan got a lot of credit because he was Reagan, but I don't think he could really—that wasn't his life. He didn't go to bed at night thinking, “How am I going to get credit for something tomorrow?” What was his lowest poll number? It got down there fairly low.

Smith: Yes, he got down in the upper thirties right around the bottom of the '82 recession. And there must have been enormous pressure on him, particularly from within, people like Baker, I would imagine, to change course. Which raises the question, because that's about when you came out with TEFRA. Was there opposition at the White House and particularly from the president? How did you sell this, quote, tax increase through to Reagan?

Dole: Well, I think they knew, this so-called Safe Harbor Leasing program, was—I think either Don Regan or somebody dreamed it up, but it was a big, big bonanza to big corporations. I think Reagan understood that. He didn't know all of his stuff. No president does. I don't know, maybe they really study it, but you got to take somebody's word for it, your Treasury Secretary and the other tax experts that were in your administration. So we had to go back and close some loopholes. We didn't call it a tax increase, but a lot of the conservatives did. But it passed. I remember that Russell Long said, "I hope you're able to put together a good bill, but we won't be seeing you any longer." So all the Democrats left. So there I was with eleven Republicans, including myself, have to put the bill together. Russell wasn't that hostile; he just said, "Sorry I can't help you on this."

Smith: Were you surprised?

Dole: A little, but he was friendly. He didn't hurt me any. He didn't go out kicking me around, but just the Democratic position. "They got into this mess, they cut all these taxes, they went to extreme, now let them fix it. Why should we have to fix it?" That's probably what we would have done.

Smith: But at the same time you had the true believers in the Republican Party, particularly [unclear].

Dole: All the [Trent] Lotts and the [Jack] Kemps and the Newtsies [Newt Gingrich], yes, they thought we were raising taxes. Well, we were. People weren't paying any, so. That

was hard to pass, hard to get out of the committee, too, because we had some pretty tough guys on the committee. I don't remember how we got that done, who we had to take care of. Probably somebody.

Smith: When you confronted them with, call it the old-time religion, but deficits—

Dole: Me and [Pete] Domenici, we thought, boy, we were really going to be in favor at the White House because Reagan is a big budget cutter and we're from the old-fashioned Republicans who believe you ought to watch spending, at least have some control over spending. Reagan always said, well, they made a deal for every dollar in tax cuts, you get a dollar in spending cuts, but the Congress never delivered the cuts. Well, that really isn't the case. We didn't get any help, or little help, from the White House on cuts, so they were willing to cut, but they wanted to cut programs we knew Congress wouldn't cut. So it wasn't all their fault. It was just one of those things where you couldn't have it both ways. But Reagan blamed the Congress and not much we could do but accept it. But we had a—I'm trying to think when we had the budget deal where we finally passed it with one—what year was that? We had to bring Pete Wilson in from the hospital.

Smith: Right. Is that after '84? Is it Reagan's second term?

Dole: I think it was. I think it was '85.

Smith: Yes, I think it's '85 as well.

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Dole: It was Domenici and I and others put together this really tough budget, even increased the age for Social Security and made some other changes to Social Security to keep the thing solvent. A lot of people think we lost a couple of Senate seats because of it. But anyway, we passed it by hook or crook, whatever, bringing old Pete Wilson in, saying, "You're going to get a lot of press if you come in and vote." He got a lot of press, all right. And then lucky for us, a Democrat had gone to the hospital the night before, Senator [James] Exon from Nebraska.

Smith: How did you bring, say, Jesse Helms onboard with something like that?

Dole: Well, let's see now. Jesse Helms and what's his—his colleague in the wheelchair.

Smith: John East?

Dole: John East. They regretted that vote, they said, the rest of their lives. [laughs] But I don't know how we got Jesse, come to think of it. Maybe we didn't touch cigarettes or something. Something had to happen, because we got Ed Zorinsky as the only Democrat and we had to give him half the farm. But then Don Regan had pulled the rug out from under us and cut a deal with Kemp and some House guys and left us—

Smith: How did you find out about that?

Dole: I don't remember precisely, but I remember him coming to my office in the Senate with champagne and ice cream and chocolates, a peace dividend, I guess.

Smith: This was after the rug had been pulled out from under you?

Dole: Yes. Well, a lot of Republicans walked the plank. You know, it was a tough vote. We thought we were demonstrating what the party was all about.

Smith: What was Regan's [unclear]—

Dole: I don't know what President Reagan ever thought about it, but he had to okay it. I don't think Don Regan could have. But some of the Republicans were so carried away with the supply side, they didn't think you had to cut spending because the revenue was just going to just bubble up and just take care of all this stuff. And cutting taxes is easy and cutting spending is hard, so if there's a choice, why—

Smith: That's what intrigues me, is when these folks—it's fine to embrace supply-side theory, but when you can point to red ink—at what point do deficits ever matter? What was their response?

Dole: Some of these House guys thought deficits never mattered. I remember Jack Kemp making that speech, you know, "Deficits don't matter. Good times, bad times, if we cut taxes," da da da. I'm not sure that the tax cutting thing is as strong as it was then, but it was really powerful in the Reagan days. I mean, you had this malaise by [Jimmy] Carter with the, what, 28 percent if you add up unemployment and all this stuff. So, poor

Carter, and Reagan just inherited all this good will from the American people because of the misery index. It was tough for some of these guys who just—

Smith: Do you think presidents sometimes are the victim of circumstances beyond their control? I mean, just bad, bad luck?

Dole: Oh, yes. I think [George W.] Bush every day gets a dose of bad luck, almost. When you think everything's happened to George Bush, you wait twenty-four hours because something else is going to happen. But I think President Ford's win program, which was—I don't know who sold him on that. [Alan] Greenspan? You probably know. I don't know. "Whip inflation now." I remember the—but Reagan, I think, you just sort of—I got a little upset with Reagan in the election in '88 because I thought '88, if you look back, '96 probably I shouldn't have even been running, but '88 I should have won. And I really think Reagan, not maliciously, but gave Bush just what he needed that last week in New Hampshire. Bush flew down for lunch with Reagan. Of course, that had a big press play in New Hampshire. We were furiously trying to find some letters Reagan had written over the years saying what a great job I'd done on this and this and this. But I assume if this guy's my vice president—though he tried to stay fairly neutral. I think he liked me, but I think he probably felt more obligation to Bush.

Smith: Did you ever have a discussion, I mean, before you got into the race in '88, did you ever have a discussion with Reagan? Was that something you could talk about?

Dole: Didn't do, probably should have, yes. But knowing Reagan, he would have said, "Well, good luck. Call me when it's over." [laughs] Because he wasn't going to get involved. The old tenth, eleventh Commandment. But he was pretty popular in New Hampshire and I just couldn't counter all this last-minute praise from Reagan for Bush. Our letters weren't enough. And I think Howard Baker was chief of staff then, and I think Baker was quietly trying to help me, so he was trying to figure out something that Reagan could do that would kind of even it up, but we never could figure it out.

Smith: There's a story—well, actually Jim Cannon told me the story because Jim was working for Howard Baker then in the White House. I've never said this, but Jim said Howard came back one day red-faced, kind of flushed, obviously agitated, and he said out of the blue, "Don't ever let anyone tell you there's never been a female President of the United States."

Dole: [laughs] Yes, I never had much contact with Nancy [Reagan]. I get a birthday letter from her every year.

Smith: Yes?

Dole: Yes, somebody's keeping that up.

Smith: I tell you, she had good instincts about where Don Regan was concerned.

Dole: Yes.

Smith: I mean, she was protecting Ronnie.

Dole: And Don Regan was basically a good guy. You know, he was smart, was great on Wall Street, but I don't think he knew ...about politics and about how to work with some of us who had to carry the ball when we didn't even want to carry the ball. Because we were in leadership, we had to carry the ball. And he wasn't a very good negotiator. I think he understood it better than anybody in the White House, but he couldn't convey it.

Smith: Is that a problem often with businessmen when they come to Washington that—over and over, how many times have we heard that government should be run like a business?

Dole: Oh, yes, well, you get some of these poor businessmen come before you in Congress, they're very able, very smart, very rich, probably, but then you put them in government, something happens. Some of them do a good job, don't misunderstand me, but I think people like Hank [Henry] Paulson, I think he's probably the strong man in the cabinet, he and Bob Gates right now. But he's had a little experience. He was sort of a Republican, one of the few on Wall Street. I'm trying to think in Reagan's cabinet who was sort of the star. Of course, [Caspar] Weinberger, he had a pretty heavy cabinet. [George] Shultz. Attorney general was—

Smith: Well, first it was William French Smith.

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Dole: Oh, yes, and he was kind of a zero. Nice guy.

Smith: And then Ed Meese.

Dole: Oh, Ed, sure.

Smith: And, of course, Malcolm Baldrige was at Commerce. Well, gosh, how could we forget?

Dole: The Labor secretary, the one, “Where do I get my reputation back?” He was there, Donovan. Ray Donovan.

Smith: Yes, Ray Donovan and James Watt.

Dole: Good old James Watt. Now there’s a mistake.

Smith: You had a little bit of a relationship with him, didn’t you?

Dole: Yes, I can’t remember what it was. I think initially it was a pretty good relationship and then something happened. I don’t remember what it was anymore. He was kind of a screwball, though.

Smith: Remember that he told a “cripple” joke, and you said something to the effect of, “Haven’t heard that language, whatever, in thirty years,” forty years, or something.

Dole: I think you're right, yes. He came out of the White House one day and did something strange on the little—where the press gathers there. I can't remember what it was. Made some stupid statement. Oh, boy. But, again, he had the hard rock following, you know. James Watt. You know, I'd forgotten about him.

Smith: Well, and Anne Burford, remember at EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]? She was another—and the dentist from South Carolina.

Dole: Oh, yes, nice guy. Now, where was he?

Smith: [James B.] Edwards, wasn't that his name?

Dole: Edwards, name was Edwards. Governor Edwards, very nice guy. He was a dentist, but what cabinet [unclear]—

Smith: Secretary of Energy.

Dole: Oh, yes, here was a dentist doing Energy. Yes, well, I'm trying to get them to pick a right person for VA [Veterans Administration] secretary now, and it's a tough job, personnel. I wouldn't want the job.

But I think you have to sort of summarize Reagan as just came along at the right time, the climate was right, the people were ready for somebody like him. I think Ford would have done a great job had he been reelected. You know, people loved him in the

Congress; Democrats and Republicans. He could, based on friendship, get about anything done. Reagan didn't have that relationship, but he understood that there are Democrats up there that need attention. As I remember, I think he paid pretty good attention to people like Robert [C.] Byrd and other key players. And Reagan, I don't recall ever going around saying anything bad about anybody.

Smith: Well, remember the grace notes? Remember on the anniversary of the Kennedy assassination he spoke at the event and he had the family into the White House.

Dole: Yes.

Smith: And then he did something for the Roosevelt Library. He had this amazing capacity to be bipartisan when he wanted to and still rev up the troops.

Sensitive question, and you're not a doctor; none of us are. Was he diminished? I mean, at the end of his term, did you notice any significant diminishment?

Dole: I think a little. I think people were wondering, "Is he really—should he be doing this?" It's like the guy that you see in the ad with the doctor setting up, the guy that's standing there with a knife at the bar and he's said, "Now I'll make the incision." And the guy said, "Shouldn't you be doing this?" Yes, I don't think he was quite as sharp as he had been and maybe—I don't know, maybe again, you probably know, I don't know if it was the beginning of Alzheimer's before he left or not. Maybe there was an onset, I don't know how you'd tell.

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Smith: Or just plain aging.

Dole: Yes. He'd always bounce into the cabinet room, though, you know, come bouncing in there like a sixteen-, twenty-year-old, say hello to everybody and sit down and follow the script, call on people. Sometimes he'd take notes too, he'd take some notes. But I think Reagan was one who relied heavily on staff, as opposed to Carter, I think. Somebody like Carter, he kind of knew what he wanted to do and he had staff, but I think he got into more details. Clinton probably relied on staff. I think this president [George W. Bush] is sort of a self-starter, as was—I don't know about '41. But Reagan, I think, had a good staff, trusted them. I thought the switch, though, when he made the switch from Baker and Regan, I thought that was kind of dumb, but they both wanted it. Baker wanted to get out of the White House and be Treasury secretary and Don Regan wanted to get in the White House so bad he could taste it, which I never could understand. Here's this powerful guy, he's got everything in the world, Treasury secretary, and he wants to go work in the White House.

Smith: As a staff guy.

Dole: Yes. "What am I missing?" Well, I guess missing is—he thought he could run the place. But I don't think President Reagan, he wasn't going to let him run the place either. Nancy may have been a good backup, but I think President Reagan probably knew when somebody was overreaching.

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Smith: That's interesting, because you wonder whether that kind of geniality, which was real, whether is masked steel, whether there was a—

Dole: Yes, well, I think when he left the room you'd say, "I wonder what that guy, I wonder if he pulled a fast one on me there." [laughs]

Smith: Social Security. How close did that come to falling apart? And, of course, the Democrats have really milked the issue in the '82 off-year elections.

Dole: Oh, yes.

Smith: You lost twenty-six House seats, managed to retain the Senate, but did that give a sense of urgency to dealing with the issue?

Dole: Well, it's just like right now. This week Social Security's in the news again about how every year \$600 billion—it's not going to get fixed because it doesn't run out of money for, what, fifteen years and you're not going to get anybody in Congress to fix it till they have to. I may be wrong, I hope I'm wrong, but we were in the same boat. Suddenly somebody had to fix it or we weren't going to be able to make the payments on time. So if you delay the payments five days this month and five days next month, pretty soon you're getting a cut, you know. So, we knew we were under the gun, which I think probably helped. And then this commission idea, I don't know whose idea it was, whether it was Howard Baker's or somebody on the Democrat side, but that's always a good thing. "Oh, I'll get a commission and we don't have to make the hard choices in

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Congress. Let them recommend something and then we can say, ‘Well, I didn’t really like it, but that’s what they recommended.’” But it started off strong. Alan Greenspan, very bright guy, of course, and people like Claude Pepper, head of the AFL-CIO.

Smith: Lane Kirkland.

Dole: Lane Kirkland, great guy. I really liked Lane. John Heinz. Bill Armstrong never liked anything we did on the commission. Very conservative, good guy from Colorado. And of course Pat Moynihan, myself, and then the head of—Bob—Metropolitan Life CEO, very bright guy, probably the smartest guy on the commission. Anyway, we had the hearing, did all that kind of stuff.

Then we got into the decision part and that’s where we started having disagreements. Then the White House got involved and then the Speaker got involved and it got a little, as I remember, a little tense, a little partisan, which we didn’t intend it to be. It sort of unraveled at the end of the year in ’82 and that’s when Pat and I got together, was it January 12th of ’83, something like that? And almost at the same time said, “We’ve got to do something.” And I don’t say that other things weren’t happening, but at least we thought, “We’re in the Senate, we’re on the commission, we need to do something.” And that’s when we started working, I think with Greenspan and somebody else and somebody else.

Smith: I was going to ask you what was Greenspan’s role.

Dole: He was the chairman. And he knew the stuff. The guy knew the numbers. You could understand him in those days too. You can buy his tape version of his book for half price because nobody can understand it, but in those days you could understand him. But, you know, he did a good job.

Smith: Did he have political instincts?

Dole: I think so. I don't think Alan was ever particularly partisan, but that's probably why he was there, because somebody on both sides agreed to that the guy's fair, honest, decent guy. He really thought we were going to fix it. He had a very positive—we had some great staff people that I don't remember, but I think one of them you're going to talk to.

Unidentified Speaker: Carolyn Weaver?

Dole: Yes. Carolyn, she's good.

But, anyway, we finally got it all patched together and they got Reagan to sign off, or Tip. I don't know whether they met or whether staff got together and recommended they sign off. And then we met down in the Blair House in the final days. I don't know how many days we met. One night before dark, I remember it was kind of chilly out, we finally got a deal, and I had this wonderful letter from Claude Pepper thanking me for whatever, and, of course, he was very—he was Mr. Senior. If he said no, it wasn't going to pass. I later used that letter in my campaign and his brother complained about it in Florida. [laughs] But anyway, the end result is it's still okay.

Smith: Now, were there leaks from these meetings?

Dole: Oh, yes. It was sort of—nothing was confidential. As you say in your speech, the original one you've been working with, if the founders had to put up with C-SPAN and all this, I'm not sure that the Constitution would be written yet. I'd take my stuff back and tell Senator Baker or whoever what we were doing and how we were making headway. So it was pretty open.

Smith: You must have, obviously, been aware of heat from the right. I assume there were folks for whom compromise equaled surrender.

Dole: Oh, yes. When you raise the taxes a little bit, that sent shivers up the spines of the no-tax group. But we had to fix it. And it was Reagan who always said, "Give me 80 percent, or 90, or maybe even 70. I'll take it." Well, we figured, if they're willing to extend the age limit, we've got to be willing to accept the tax increase, and that became the big, big "Republican's are down there increasing your taxes." I think President Reagan or somebody around him, maybe it was Jim Baker, understood you've got to fix it. If you don't fix it, I think it was the middle of that year when the checks could have been delayed a few days. You know, there wouldn't have been enough money to get them all out on time. So they had to wait for more money to come in. So we were near the buzz saw. There wasn't any profile in courage. [laughs] I think we knew if we didn't do it, somebody was going to get skewered and we knew Congress would never do it. You just couldn't bring up a Social Security bill in Congress.

Smith: What does that tell you about the political process of this town?

Dole: There are a lot of cowards up there. [laughs] They make great speeches, but when it comes to voting, where are they? "I'm for it except for that one thing. If you change that, I'll vote for it." "Yeah," I said, "okay, sure. If we change it all, we won't have anything." But people do get a little comfort in a commission if they have confidence in the people who are on it, for the most part. I'm talking about the leaders like the president, like Tip and Senator Baker and others. So, once you get the leadership behind it, then you've really got something because then it isn't blame Bob Dole or John Heinz or Pat Moynihan. This is the president and the Speaker's compromise.

Smith: Did you find Tip was a man of his word?

Dole: Yes. I used to go over and visit Tip a lot. I'd sneak in the back hallway and go over and sit around his office. He'd take his cigar out, roll it around. I don't think he ever lighted it. But, yes, he was a good guy. I can't think of the guy, his assistant, had a pretty bad disability. Leo somebody. But he was always very nice. And then he later, of course, stayed at the Sea View [Hotel] a lot, bought a place at the Sea View where we have a place, and he'd play poker till he just wore everybody out, everyday. This is after he retired and he'd play poker all day long. He and Millie and the kids would—they've sold the place now, nobody—but he's just a regular old guy. None of us, I think—well, except for Moynihan. I mean, he was—belonged to the intelligentsia. That's something Tip and I never worried about. We weren't in that group.

Smith: But you got along fine with Moynihan, didn't you?

Dole: Yes, with Pat?

Smith: Yes.

Dole: Oh, yes. I never knew what he was talking about. He'd use these long words like this. But no, we were good friends. I think we endorsed each other for Senate. We had a little press conference on the Social Security bill, and I said he did it and he said I did it.

Smith: And what was your reward for having saved Social Security?

Dole: I think we got a plaque. [laughs] And a lot of mixed feelings.

Smith: Yes. Tell me about those.

Dole: Well, the tax increase was not well accepted, and raising the age limit, which I'm not even sure it's kicked in yet. It's kicking in, I guess. For years down the road. We didn't bother anybody's present benefits, but you started even touching, even mentioning Social Security, and then to think you actually fixed it? It's sort of like this veterans' stuff. All the people out there, I think there were thirty-some-million then getting Social Security, thirty-one-million. But I thought after a while people would accept it, particularly when you've got—that's the good part, when you got like President Reagan

and Tip O'Neill agreeing on something, who's going to fight with you? Who's going to argue with you? Got a few nutcakes on both sides, but...

Smith: What do you think is the long-term consequence of the Republican Party, really during the Reagan years? At first blurring and then I think eliminating the distinction between the parties when it comes to balanced budgets. Does it have almost a religion? I mean, the notion of fiscal responsibility and deficits matter and fiscal restraint. Didn't it begin to erode during the Reagan years?

Dole: I think early on Reagan was onboard, you know. And that's when I said, we probably cut some program that shouldn't have been cut, went into food stamps and you can save money in food stamps. There's a lot of hanky-panky in that program. But those are last-resort cuts. You cut some other things first. But then you hang around this place a while and the special interests move in and they've got friends in the White House and they've got friends in the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, and pretty soon this is sacred, you can't touch this and you can't touch this. Well, then you get down to discretionary spending, which is what, about 30 percent of the budget, and you can't get there that way. I don't know whether Reagan ever lost interest or decided, "What the heck?"

Smith: Well, there is a school of thought that says Reagan wanted two or three things, really, to focus on, and one was the arms buildup, which then led into ending the Cold War, and the other was just generally reversing the flow of power and money to Washington, and he set in motion both.

Dole: I don't know whether I'd blame Reagan for the—I didn't like when he always blamed Congress because I was in Congress, that we didn't cut spending. Well, we tried, without much help from the White House. They were always, "Well, we were willing to cut it, but the Congress wanted to do these crazy things." So you can't win them when he's got one megaphone, we've got five hundred and thirty-five.

So, yes, I don't know when we're going to find our way again, because you know we lost the Congress partly—mostly because of Iraq. Now, Ford was a pretty good one. He vetoed, what, fifty-some bills? I don't know how many Reagan vetoed. But again, Reagan, I remember him pleading with Steve Symms, when he came to the Capitol trying to sustain a veto on a highway bill that was loaded up with stuff, and, of course, Steve was the ranking, or chairman, I guess, of the subcommittee and he took pretty good care of Idaho, and so he wouldn't help us. I told the White House, I said, "Well, the president can come up here, but I'll bet you the building you're not going to change Steve Symms' mind, because he's a good friend of mine, I've told him about the president's concern." But Reagan came up and practically begged the guy to help. "Steve, you're a conservative. You can't- go." So Reagan, I think, always—he always wanted to do it.

Smith: Does that illustrate the limits of power that even a popular president—

Dole: Yes, there was a guy, just one senator, and Reagan lost. The veto was overridden.

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Smith: Was there ever any awkwardness at all that you were in your role, particularly once you became Majority Leader, and Mrs. Dole was in the cabinet? How did you handle that? Because it was a unique situation.

Dole: I don't know. I'd always tried to avoid where she was directly involved, try to get somebody else to take care of that so I wouldn't.

Smith: Were there subjects you avoided discussing?

Dole: Yes, well, she had a lot of deals in Congress, had to testify a lot, and I never paid much attention to it. I figured she was a big girl and she had to do her job and I had to do mine. I don't remember ever having any time when I thought I had to sort of recuse myself or vote present or something on a labor bill or something. And Elizabeth was pretty much down-the-line administration. The president was her boss. "If you don't want to do it, we'll get somebody else." So, yes, I don't recall any—I recall introducing her to the committee. I think you may have helped me write that stuff. "I have but one wife to give to my infrastructure," or something like that.

Smith: Very good. [laughs]

When did you decide to run for Majority Leader? Did you know Howard Baker was going to be retiring?

Dole: No. We were having lunch at the old Watergate one Sunday. John Warner lived in the same building. We never saw John, but he happened to show up that Sunday—I'm

not sure he lived at the Watergate then. Anyway, I think it was the Watergate. He happened to show up for brunch. We were there for brunch. He was there with some other people. He said to me, “You ought to be thinking about the leadership. You ought to be thinking about running for Leader.”

I said, “Oh, yeah, come on, John.” I may have thought about it before, but no other senator ever told me I ought to think about it. [laughs] I said, “Well, maybe I’ve got one supporter.” And there were five of us that ran, as you remember. And Ted Stevens thought he had it, still thinks—he’s never gotten over it.

Smith: How do you run? I mean, how do you run in an election like that?

Dole: Well, you go around and see everyone and you keep score, but you know some people don’t want to—they want to be your friend and they want to say, “You know I’m with you,” or, “You can count on me.” How long, that’s the question. Can I count to ten or five?

Smith: Was Alan Simpson helpful in that race?

Dole: I think so. It’s kind of ironic that...he was defeated-- I think I told you this before. I reminded him when he was here last week, because Mitch McConnell is now the Leader and Trent Lott is assistant Leader. But I was on *Meet the Press* one Sunday right before the election of the Leaders and I mentioned that maybe we ought to take a look at campaign finance reform. And McConnell was listening, and he went off into—he called

me on Monday. He said, "I'm going to vote for you, but I'm not going to vote for Alan Simpson because you mentioned that on *Meet the Press*."

I said, "What?" I said, "It was an issue we had to deal with." So, he voted for Lott over McConnell. I mean McConnell voted for Lott. It's kind of strange. Now McConnell is the Leader and Lott's number two. But in any event, that's how—

Smith: And he's still fighting campaign finances.

Dole: Yes. He may be right, I don't know. But that's how Alan got defeated. But I had people like Dave Durenberger and Jack Danforth and others who thought I had a little higher profile and sort of came from the middle part of the country. [Ted] Stevens had kind of an edge to him. I remember he used to say, "I never lose my temper, I use my temper." Domenici, great guy. [James A.] McClure. There were five of us, I think.

Unidentified Speaker: Lugar.

Dole: Dick Lugar was another great guy. Jiminy. So many nice, good friends in there.

Smith: Did the White House keep hands-off?

Dole: I think so, yes. I don't now how we got twenty—was it twenty-five votes? Or twenty-three to twenty? I know Stevens lost by three votes and he was obviously upset because people had promised him. Here he was on the Appropriations Committee, and he probably said, "If you want a dam in your place or another highway, you know I can

take care of that.” I didn’t have anything to give anybody. But it was a great experience and we got along, never had any problems afterwards, and Ted became a big helper and Simpson was great to work with. I’d send him on all the ugly stuff. I’d say, “Send Simpson over there.” As he probably repeated.

Smith: [laughs] That’s consistent with what we were told. The two of you, though, just your sense of humor, you must have had a great time working together.

Dole: Yes, well, we’re different. I’m sort of a quipster and he’s a storyteller. You know, he’d tell these stories that would take—you’d be sitting and waiting and, “Okay, get to the punch line.” And he tells them over and over again. But they’re good, so—and he probably told you every joke he knew, right?

Smith: Well, he told a few. But the point is to have a sense of humor and a sense of the ridiculous. And in this town, you really—

Dole: But he had a lot of courage. He took on the veterans’ groups. He really took on the—and AARP. They didn’t have a Republican within a hundred yards of the building. I think now they’ve got a little more balance. But Al gets something in his mind. And he was a pro-choice Republican, trial lawyer, I think trial lawyer, moderate conservative, I would say. But, yes, we got along. Some of the conservatives thought he was a little like his colleague Malcolm Wallop.

Smith: Yes.

Dole: And I think I've told you that story where we were having a meeting one day, a conference where all the Republicans come together and we had some tough decision, had to do with something on the floor, and I was trying to get them to support me. And Wallop got up and said something I thought was kind of out of place, and I said, "Do you want to be Leader? Let's have the election right now. We're all here and we'll have the election now." Well, he backed away. We didn't have the election. [laughs] It was too bad, because I probably went too far, because Malcolm—but they used to have this little group that would go to the White House now and then, led by McClure and Wallop, and they would sort of—this was particularly true when [John] Sununu was there—"I don't know about this Bob Dole. He's a good guy, but he spends too much time talking to Mitchell." That I wasn't being conservative enough for these—

Smith: Let me ask you, what happens when you've got—that's a great example. I mean, Simpson and Wallop—when you've got—in some ways maybe it's easier if you've got one member from each party.

Dole: Each party, yes.

Smith: What happens when you've got two Republicans or two Democrats, for that matter, from a state?

Dole: The thing you've got to watch is your staff, because you know the staff there. "I've got to do my work for Dole, I've want to get ahead of [Nancy L.] Kassebaum."

And so they're out there pushing around each other. Nancy and I, we just had an agreement. We weren't going to do anything unless we did it together and the staff—anybody that caught our staff trying to, one-up-manship. But sometimes it gets pretty brutal, particularly when they don't agree. And Malcolm and Alan were friends, but there was never any real—how can I say they're friends and there's no friendship? But they weren't close, put it that way. I think they respected each other. And Wallop was a very bright guy in many areas, very smart guy, and was good to work with when you were working with him.

Smith: You know, someone else—it's funny—Senator Simpson spoke very highly of was Slade Gorton, that he was extremely bright. Had some problems with the voters.

Dole: I wasn't as big a Slade Gorton fan. He's the guy that sort of led to these term limits on how long you can—and maybe it's a good thing. You can only be chairman so long. The Democrats don't do it, but we do it. But they've got to figure it out now, "If I'm not chairman of this committee, I've been on this committee long enough to be chairman of that committee." But that was sort of Slade's—but he exempted the Leader. But he was very smart.

The guy that was very good is the senator from Georgia who died suddenly.

Smith: Mattingly? Mac?

Dole: Not Mac, but—he was head of the Peace Corps for a while.

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Unidentified Speaker: Coverdale.

Smith: Oh, that's right. Paul Coverdale.

Dole: Now, he would come to your office. Slade would come in and just give you fits about four or five things. "You're not doing this right. You ought to do this, you ought to do this, this, this."

Paul would come in and say, "God, I don't know how you do this job. What can I do to help you?"

So you'd walk out, "Yeah, I'll take care of that, I'll call this guy up, I'll go see him. Don't worry about it." And he was always that way, even though he didn't agree with you. But Slade was more of a critic. Now, he and, I think, Al were good buddies, which was fine. And Slade generally voted with us, but sometimes I thought he knew more than he knew. Is that right?

Smith: Yes. [laughs] And talk about two people sort of culturally different, Al D'Amato, I mean, Al D'Amato's got to be on another planet from Russell, Kansas.

Dole: He wouldn't take yes for an answer. You'd tell him yes. He and [Arlen] Specter, I always said the two wouldn't take yes for an answer. Al's supporting [Eliot] Spitzer and leading the charge against [Rudolph] Giuliani. What it's all based on is economics. But surprisingly, he got elected and got reelected. He was a wheeler-dealer. I mean, he did a lot of things for New York. He worked hard at it. I remember he talked one night, all night, trying to keep some plant open that they were going to close and lose some

jobs. It wasn't successful. I got along with Al fine. He was a big buddy. He went on a trip to Italy with me, and I thought surely this guy, now, is Italian, he can help me out on language. I knew more Italian than he did.

Smith: He probably knew a few curse words in Italian, though.

Dole: He probably knew a few of those. But he and Domenici were big buddies, the two Italian boys.

Smith: But what a contrast between Jack Javits and Al D'Amato.

Dole: Oh, yes. Oh, Javits was a genius. I remember him telling me on the bail-out of New York, he said, "Just vote for cloture. You don't have to vote for the bill, just help me out on cloture," which I did. Then we worked together on the War Powers Resolution. That was Javits. This guy always had something cooking. His mind was always working. But health finally got the best of him. And that's what beat him, I think. It wasn't his philosophy. He was a liberal.

Smith: You saw, clearly, really the demise of the liberal caucus. When you came to the Senate, there was a significant number of Republican moderates to liberals.

Dole: Oh, yes. Senator [John] Cooper from Kentucky. You had [Mark] Hatfield, Ed Brook. Well, we had the New Jersey senator—

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Smith: Cliff [Clifford P.] Case.

Dole: Cliff Case. I don't know, we had ten or twelve.

Smith: Hugh Scott.

Dole: Hugh Scott, yes. And we only had, what, thirty-eight or forty Republicans. Jack Javits, the other senator from New York.

Smith: Charlie Goodell.

Dole: Charles Goodell. He was a moderate conservative in the House, a dairy farmer, but when he got to the Senate he had to represent New York. And Pennsylvania, I guess the other senator was a Democrat.

Smith: Joe Clark.

Dole: Yes, Clark, I think.

Smith: Are those gone for good? Is that wing of the party—

Dole: Well, I hope not. I hope we get more people like the senior [John] Chafee. Junior [Lincoln] Chafee I never thought—well, never thought—but his father was great. He was a true moderate, get-something-done Republican. I never just knew Lincoln that

well. John would fight for what he—boy, he'd take you to the mat. I remember on health care, the year that [George] Mitchell kept us here during the August recess, was going to get health care, one of his big allies was Chafee. Never happened. But if you really needed him, if you say, "John, this is really, really important," I bet eight out of ten times he'd say, "Okay." But a lot if it's friendship, how do you treat people and do they respect you and you keep your word. You don't have to play favorites out there, you're not playing games, because they're all equal. There are some you may not have the warmest feelings for, but when you count them all up, they still make a majority. And, of course, the Hatfield experience of the balanced budget amendment was—

Smith: He was serious about—

Dole: I don't know. I've often wondered. But I remember Elizabeth even called and prayed with him over the phone, trying to get him to vote for the balanced budget. That didn't work and then he said he'd resign from the Senate, then I would have ninety-nine-and-two-thirds would be sixty-six. Well, I think we've already covered, but I think Connie Mack thought it was a great idea that, "Get that guy out of here."

Smith: Anything to win? [laughs]

Dole: You always have to think about the next vote. Maybe Hatfield will be with you and you won't be able to find Mack, you know.

Smith: That's an excellent place to end for the day, because it's right about noon.

[End of interview]

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