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86. 1976

ter has set up at his Atlanta headquarters an "ethnic desk" staffed by Terry Sunday, formerly a staffer at the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, and Victoria Mongiardo, a nun who used to work for the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs.

Ford's advisers, meeting with him this week during a working vacation in Vail, Colo., also seem to have settled upon an overall "big state" strategy. Under this plan, Ford would concede the cotton South (Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina), and make a pass at the peripheral South (Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, Florida and Louisiana). He would concentrate on the Midwest, notably six states that would give him a total of 104 electoral votes (needed to win: 270). They are: Michigan (21), Ohio (25), Illinois (26), Indiana (13), Wisconsin (11) and Iowa (8). If he can put those together with California (45), Texas (26) and one or two of the large industrial states of the Northeast, then he might win. That would be something of a political miracle. The President could win Ohio, which has a strong Republican organization. Illinois may be the key state for both Carter and Ford. As Chicago Mayor Richard Daley likes to point out, no presidential candidate since Warren Harding in 1920 has been elected without carrying Illinois. There, as in Iowa and Wisconsin, Ford should be going against the odds. But he might do well in farm states like Kansas and Nebraska.

The West is Carter's weakest region and thus may be a promising target of opportunity for Ford, even though he starts out far behind Carter in states like Texas and California. (The latest Field poll in California shows Carter ahead of Ford, 53% to 33%). In the Northeastern states, Ford prospects are obviously dim to dismal. He might carry Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont. Besides, as Massachusetts Congresswoman Margaret Heckler observes, "Neither party has chosen a ticket that has particular appeal [in the area]." Though states like Pennsylvania and New Jersey have overwhelming Democratic strength, Carter will have some trouble getting hold of the urban ethnic vote because of his Southern Baptist evangelicalism, middle-of-the-road stand on abortion, and appeal for blacks. But it is hard to see now how such Carter weaknesses can be translated into Ford majorities in these states.

CARTER SITTING OUT THE G.O.P.'S BIG WEEK

Still, as Proudhon once said, "The fecundity of the unexpected far exceeds the statesman's prudence." Jimmy Carter is himself part of a trend of political surprise in the U.S. One specter that haunts Carter's campaign strategists is that he could sweep the South by large margins, win a majority of the popular vote nationwide, and lose the election in the Electoral College because of some narrow victories by Ford in some Northern industrial states. Says Carter's campaign manager, Hamilton Jordan: "It's not a farfetched possibility at all."

In Ford's favor now is a variety of factors in the American psychology. On the whole, Americans have a greater sense of well-being than they have had in years. Despite the memories of Watergate and Viet Nam, at least a semblance of trust has returned. Ford can claim credit for restoring openness and candor to the White House. So the campaign may well focus upon the question of whom the voters trust more, Ford or Carter.

The outcome may depend almost entirely on how Carter campaigns and is understood in the next 2½ months. Carter is an unknown quantity, while Jerry Ford is not. Ford's best hope may be the air of stability and predictability that he projects, his sane and reliable image.

Carter succeeded in his astonishing run through the Democratic primaries by defeating a crowded field. Now he is one-on-one with Ford, and the techniques that succeeded for Carter before —the atmospherics of "decency," "love" and "trust" and "I'll never tell a lie" —will undoubtedly have to change. His essential message in the primaries was very nearly spiritual, having much to do with American morale. In TV debate with Ford, he would have to be more specific.

Many voters in the primaries understood Carter to be fairly conservative; yet at the New York convention, he chose a deeply liberal running mate, Mondale, and virtually dictated many parts of a party platform considerably to the left of the Carter image.

Voters on Nov. 2 can make a very clear ideological choice—at least on the basis of the two parties' platforms. Examples:

THE ECONOMY: The Republicans want a commitment to end deficit spending as a means of reducing unemployment. They reject wage-price controls and "make-work" public employment programs, favoring instead tax incentives for investment and relying on the private sector for new jobs. The Democrats want a strong domestic council to moderate wage and price increases by jawboning, and would link the minimum wage to the cost of living. Their platform also pledges the Government to take on necessary tax and spending measures to reduce adult unemployment to 3% within four years—the intent of the Humphrey-Hawkins bill. It would be inflationary and a nightmare to enforce, but less so than before it was recently revised. Carter supports the bill, but has serious doubts about it; in particular, he is cool to the idea of public employment.

ABORTION: Republicans endorse "a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children." The Democrats oppose any such amendment.

SOCIAL SERVICES: The G.O.P. opposes a compulsory national health insurance program, but supports extending private insurance to cover all Americans for catastrophic illness. The party also opposes a guaranteed annual income. The Democrats favor a federally financed, comprehensive national health insurance program, and a plan for minimum-income guarantees for the poor and aged.

DEFENSE: Republicans want development of new missile-launching submarine forces and the B-1 bomber, and would increase the size of the armed services. The Democrats propose a reduction of from $5 billion to $7 billion in defense spending and would postpone any decision on production of the B-1 bomber until February 1977.

The Republican platform is, to a large extent, a Reagan manifesto to which the Ford forces acquiesced in the interests of party harmony. Still, about the only part of the platform that Ford will have trouble living with is the foreign policy plank's implied rebuke of détente with the Soviet Union. One large question for the Ford campaign now is to what extent the Reagan forces are satisfied and will actively work for the ticket. William Rusher, publisher of the *National Review* and an ideological force behind the idea of a third-party breakaway, admitted last week at the Kansas City convention: "I don't think we're going to find many bolters in this hall."

This week in Chicago, the tiny right-wing American Independent Party will hold its own convention to nominate its choices for President and Vice President. The candidates include former Georgia Governor Lester Maddox and *Conservative Digest* Publisher Richard Viguerie. "It is now time for conservatives to file for divorce," says Viguerie. "Who needs the kind of victory where both parties support socialism—the Democrats by design and the Republicans by default?" The A.I.P. effort will not amount to very much. But it symbolizes the disgust of some Republicans with even the Ford-Dole ticket, which is almost as far to the right as two-party tolerances will bear these days.

Ford may benefit from another splinter movement—the independent candidacy of Eugene McCarthy, whose name on the ballots of 16 states so far (he aims for at least 45 by Election Day) may drain off enough votes from Jimmy Carter to make a decisive difference. Some of Ford's campaign advisers have discussed the possibility of inducing wealthy Republicans to give money to McCarthy's campaign and thus encourage McCarthy's spoiler role. Since Ford intends to finance his campaign with $25 million in federal election funds and can raise no more under the law, some Republican contributors may spend their money elsewhere, indirectly to assist the Ford-Dole ticket.

Now Ford and his advisers plan to move quickly to shake and upgrade the often lax leadership of the President's campaign and to get some of Reagan's sharpest aides on board. For many weeks, Ford's head-hunters have been discreetly inquiring about the abilities of various Reagan workers, and there have been quiet contacts between the two staffs.

At local levels in many states, where wounds from the primaries are still hurting, the switch of loyalties will be difficult—but necessary for Republican success. Reagan's Washington state chairman, Warren McPherson, warns that "west of the Rockies, Ford is going to lose every state if he doesn't set up new structures that incorporate the Reagan organizations in their entirety and on the basis of parity."

In the weeks ahead, Ford will try to persuade tens of millions of people that he is a safer choice than Carter. Hammering again and again at last week's themes of peace, prosperity and personal trust, he will take credit for the restoration of integrity at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue and condemn the follies at the other end. But to prevail in November, the man who heads the minority party will have to win the votes of farmers who are angered by his Administration's grain embargoes, of blue-collar workers who are sore about unemployment and of a lot of big-city dwellers who feel that Ford has not done well enough by them. If Ford can do that, then the most engrossing convention since 1952 may be followed by the biggest political upset since one of Ford's fighting heroes, Harry Truman, turned the trick in 1948.

The Debates Ahead

Not only will Gerald Ford debate Jimmy Carter, but Robert Dole and Walter Mondale are eager to debate each other as well. The Jerry and Jimmy, Bob and Fritz shows should do reasonably well in the ratings against the season's new TV programs; politics is once again becoming a major entertainment form, not to mention a kind of education. While the format has not yet been decided, Carter would prefer cross-examination of the candidates by reporters and an opportunity for each candidate to question the other. The debates will probably be similar to the crucial Nixon-Kennedy encounters in the 1960 presidential campaign, during which the candidates participated in four hour-long debates. Kennedy's performance gave his campaign its biggest boost.



CANDIDATE KENNEDY MAKING POINT DURING THE 1960 NIXON-KENNEDY DEBATES

From his home in Plains, Ga., last week, Carter immediately replied to Ford that he was more than willing to debate. Such encounters are not necessarily to Carter's advantage. At candidates' forums during the primaries, he seemed ill at ease, diffident and at times almost surly. Confined to a studio or auditorium and probed by hard-digging newsmen, he often fails to respond with enough decisiveness and precision, and his message blurs. He wins his votes out on the campaign trail, where he can appeal to people in a more personal way, less through what he says than how he says it. In Ford, he will face an experienced debater whose skills were honed in clashes with Democrats during his years as minority leader in Congress.

Carter says he intends to keep his campaign on a high, issue-oriented level. He will emphasize the broad subjects that he concentrated on during the primaries: integrity, competence, the need for change. But he has also planned a series of speeches on specific issues drawn from a group of task forces under Atlanta Attorney Stuart Eizenstat. Carter will attack the "negativism" of the Ford Administration, especially the "human suffering" that he believes was caused by the President's many vetoes.

But Carter is also prepared to slog along the low road if he has to. He will probably disregard personal attacks unless the ticket seems in jeopardy; then he may well punch back. "He knows how to play that game too," warns a senior aide. Carter has already spoken of the "Nixon-Ford Administration" and criticized the President for not taking sufficient "corrective action" to prevent future scandals. When a reporter suggested that such talk seemed to implicate the Ford Administration in unsavory practices, Carter replied: "So be it. It's not my fault that Nixon's unsavory."

For the most part, Mondale will respond to any attack by Dole. Carter has heard, he says, that Dole "is a very aggressive cage rattler." Is he worried that Dole's cage rattling may lead him to make mistakes during the campaign? Says Carter: "I spent four or five years dealing with Lester Maddox, and he's an expert. I think I can deal with that with equanimity."

Instant Replay: How Ford Won It

For a full 44 minutes, the long plastic horns wailed and moaned in an ear-pounding salute to a doomed candidacy. "Sounds like an old cow who needs milkin' bad," scoffed one Mississippi delegate as Ronald Reagan's snake-dancing, banner-waggling backers gave vent to their frustrations. While one of the longest convention demonstrations in this century roiled about him in Kansas City's Kemper Arena, Minnesota's Bob Forsythe, a floor whip for Gerald Ford, remained unmoved. Said he: "We've got the votes and we're just waiting."

The sustained enthusiasm for Reagan had erupted as his name was placed in nomination at the Republican National Convention. The hundreds of red, green and blue horns wielded on the floor and in the galleries were meant to bellow the resistance of the Reaganites to the continued presidency of Ford. Yet they actually sounded a dirge. In effect if not in fact, the remarkable Reagan challenge had died the night before in a pivotal rules fight on which Reagan had gambled everything—and lost.

Both before and after the outcome had been determined, the exuberant, boisterous Republicans turned topsy-turvy their reputation for staidness. Through four noisy nights, partisans of the two candidates yelled approval, howled in dismay, even sobbed with the varying fortunes of their favorites. They hurled confetti, tossed Frisbees, bounced multicolored beach balls in the brightly illuminated hall. Despite their intense divisions, personal hostilities were minimized. It was one of the liveliest and noisiest of political conventions—a sharp contrast to the Democrats' cozy picnic in New York City's Madison Square Garden.

The hoopla in the hall—a two-year-old $23.2 million arena that looked like a giant white Styrofoam shoebox with Erector set scaffolding on the outside but had a clean, comfortable feeling on the inside—amounted to an exercise in psychological warfare. Augmented by the arena's crisp acoustics, Manny Harmon's Bicentennial Convention Orchestra (signaled from the podium by California's former actor and Senator, George Murphy, who resisted the urge to tap along) amplified and accented the roars of the delegates. As officials struggled to shorten the shouting matches, *God Bless America* gained a new distinction from the national anthem: it became a signal to sit down, rather than stand up.

Not even the two candidates' wives were spared in the atmosphere of supercharged competitiveness. The entrance of either Betty Ford or Nancy Reagan became a theatrical event, producing prolonged cheers and setting flashbulbs ablaze.

President Ford's forces, having looked unsure and inept for most of the grinding nine-month campaign, had pulled themselves together at the end. Superbly organized for the four-day convention, they stifled the last all-or-nothing Reagan effort to create emotional tides that might engulf Ford's slim delegate lead. The fight was over an intriguing yet relatively minor matter: the attempt by Reagan and his imaginative strategist, John Sears, to compel Ford to name his vice-presidential choice before the convention delegates voted on the top of the ticket. Once Ford had beaten back rules amendment 16c, the Reaganites had no fallback tactic. Ford's nomination as the Republican presidential candidate was assured.

Until the roll was called on the rules fight Tuesday night, no one could be certain that Ford would prevail. The wily Sears had set up the confrontation cleverly —first, the startling advance selection by Reagan of Pennsylvania's liberal Senator, Richard Schweiker, as his intended running mate; then the seemingly logical eleventh-hour argument: O.K., Mr. President, don't the delegates deserve to know your choice too before they vote? Ford's men dubbed 16c the "misery-loves-company" amendment, arguing that Sears was merely trying to force them into the same tight spot he had created for himself with the naming of Schweiker. In any case, both sides realized that the second spot on the ticket, while unquestionably important, had become an emotion-charged and exaggerated issue. Many of the more zealous Reagan supporters were outraged at the Schweiker move, considering it a betrayal of Reagan's professed conservative principles. Ford's backers knew that the vote on 16c could amount to a test of strength, and that losing it might start a stampede toward Reagan.

Much of the maneuvering by both camps in the first two days of the convention was intended to strengthen their forces for that showdown rules fight. Reagan spent hours wooing delegates in his suite at the Alameda Plaza Hotel and around the city. For his coaxing sessions, Ford enjoyed an incumbent's edge: he set up an office, adjacent to his $350-a-day suite at the Crown Center Hotel, complete with presidential seal, American flag and photo displays showing him with his family and assorted world statesmen.

Despite the high-decibel clash of the partisans, the grim game of the tide-turning rules fight was being plotted in whispered conferences on the convention floor and strategy sessions elsewhere. The Ford forces proved the more ready for the battle.

Michigan Senator Robert Griffin used his expertise as Republican whip in the Senate to set up a remarkably thorough and speedy floor network. From a seat in the Kansas delegation near the podium, he could pick up a white telephone and direct the work of three veteran head counters in the Ford command trailer outside the arena: Jim Baker, Bill Timmons and Cliff White. The same phone would reach Congressman Bob Michel of Illinois, the G.O.P. whip in the House and Griffin's floor deputy for the convention. Michel was seated across the hall in the Tennessee delegation. Both could instantly reach twelve regional whips, wearing distinctive red caps—and all the regional whips could join in a conference call with Griffin and Michel at any moment. These whips, in turn, supervised state whips in the delegations. The entire phone system, like Reagan's, was "swept" daily by technicians to prevent bugging.

JACK & SUSAN FORD CHEER FOR DAD

WEST VIRGINIA GOVERNOR ARCH MOORE

ROCKEFELLER BRANDISHING HIS REPLACEMENT PHONE

FORD STRATEGIST HARRY DENT TALKING WITH DELEGATE COUNTER JAMES BAKER

In the command trailer, the three key Ford men had six deputies; each was assigned to monitor two of the regions into which the floor had been divided. Also available for troubleshooting on the floor were seven "floaters" wearing yellow caps. If the phone system failed, the floaters and the men in the trailer had walkie-talkies to use. Since it was possible for each camp to eavesdrop on the other's radio channel, Griffin's men used code names. Ford was Tarzan; Betty was referred to as Jane, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as Superman, Campaign Chairman Rogers Morton as Batman, Texas Senator John Tower as Cowboy.

In a "sky suite" overlooking the hall, which was similar to the elaborate network-television booths, John Tower supervised the delegate watching of three other political pros: Harry Dent, Bryce Harlow and Dean Burch. The sky suite was stocked with TV sets, sandwiches, fruit, cheese and drinks, soft and hard. Wavering delegates could instantly be invited into the suite for sales pitches, soft and hard—including phone calls from the President. Before long the Ford and Reagan sky suites were being referred to as "the massage parlors."

The aim of the Griffin operation was to be able to canvass 2,259 delegates within ten minutes on any issue that might arise. Before the showdown on 16c, the Reagan staff tended to belittle the need for such an elaborate floor system. In delegate watching, scoffed Floor Whip David Keene, "it's not how many are doing the counting, but what they have to count." Although the Reagan men had their own command trailer, sky suite and regional whip system, the overworked John Sears not only was in charge of the entire floor operation but also kept close track of five key delegations from his command trailer: Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Maryland and Delaware. Some of the Reaganites had walkie-talkies too, but saw little need for them. Declared Reagan Deputy Keene about the Ford floaters: "All they're doing with those walkie-talkies most of the time is talking to one another just to see if they're still there." And for other purposes too. One TIME correspondent overheard California Republican Chairman Paul Haerle cooing into his walkie-talkie: "Papa Bear to Mama Bear." When Haerle's wife Nola, also a Ford floater, responded from another part of the floor, he added: "Mama Bear, you're lookin' awful nice tonight."

Ford's preparations paid off. His partisans had the edge in the 30 minutes of debate allotted for 16c. Wisconsin's Dorann Gunderson pointed to the hypocrisy of the Reagan orators' contention that the delegates deserved 16c so they could participate in the Veep decision. "Not one delegate participated in Reagan's choice of Schweiker," she charged. Yet the Ford camp was guilty of deception in letting its 16c advocates argue that the rule would prevent Ford from asking Reagan to be his running mate. Ford had agreed earlier to meet with Reagan after the nomination, on Reagan's condition that the No. 2 spot not be offered to him.

As the momentous roll call was to begin, both camps were nervous about the erratic delegate switching they had seen on the issue in the previous two days. Settling into his front row seat, Griffin had a promising count on how balloting might go: 1,162 votes against the Reagan-backed amendment—32 more than the 1,130 needed to reject it. But his count included all of the unsteady Mississippi delegation's 30 votes, and if Mississippi did not deliver, the tiniest deviations elsewhere could mean that 16c might win approval.

Reagan piled up an early lead for 16c in his congenial Southern and Western territory, but there were a few pleasant surprises for Griffin in the head-of-the-alphabet states—here and there a vote more than expected. As the roll call continued, the long Ford-Reagan struggle in its final moments turned on odd combinations of delegates' personal whimsy, local political loyalties and the effectiveness of last-minute flattery and

MICHIGAN TAKING PRIDE IN FORD'S TRIUMPH

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