

News from Senator

# BOB DOLE



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## STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB DOLE INF AND NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES

### MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

THIS MORNING, THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MET WITH THE PRESIDENT, TO DISCUSS THE BUDGET AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. I WANT TO SAY JUST A FEW WORDS NOW ABOUT THE ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF OUR MEETING -- AND SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE ISSUES OF AN INF AGREEMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTING.

### CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL ON INF

ON THE INF ISSUE, MY VIEW -- AND I THINK THE PRESIDENT'S -- IS ONE OF VERY CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS. BUT I'VE LEARNED ONE THING WATCHING THE SOVIETS: LET'S NOT COUNT OUR CHICKENS UNTIL THEY'RE HATCHED. AND EVEN THEN, LET'S MAKE SURE WE LOOK THOSE LITTLE BIRDS OVER VERY CAREFULLY -- TO SEE IF THEY'RE THE KIND WE REALLY WANT TO PUT ON THE DINING ROOM TABLE.

EVEN IN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, WE'RE GOING TO HAVE MORE MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE WE SIGN ANYTHING. SO LET'S KEEP OUR FEET ON THE GROUND; AND LET'S NOT PUT PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT TO "BUY" A DEAL PREMATURELY.

### THE FIRST PRIORITY: VERIFICATION

BUT WE CAN, AND SHOULD, ASK RIGHT NOW: WHAT KIND OF AGREEMENT DO WE WANT? WE DISCUSSED THAT WITH THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING, AND WILL BE DISCUSSING IT WITH OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS IN THE COMING DAYS.

THE FIRST PRIORITY, IN MY MIND, IS GOOD VERIFICATION. THE PEOPLE IN THE KREMLIN WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND ANGOLA; WHO TRASH THE HELSINKI ACCORDS, AND TROOP OUT PROSTITUTES AS MODERN-DAY MATA HARI'S; WHO HAVE VIOLATED EVERY ARMS CONTROL TREATY THEY'VE EVER SIGNED -- THOSE ARE NOT THE KIND OF PEOPLE WHOSE WORD I TAKE FOR ANYTHING.

### AGREEMENT MUST BE "0-0"

AND, IT SEEMS TO ME AND TO THE EXPERTS I'VE TALKED TO: ON INF SYSTEMS, IT'S MUCH EASIER TO VERIFY AN AGREEMENT WITH "ZERO-ZERO" LIMITS THAN ONE THAT SETS A HIGHER LIMIT FOR EACH SIDE. RIGHT NOW, THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO ELIMINATE ALL LONGER RANGE INF MISSILES IN EUROPE. BUT THEY WANT TO KEEP 100 IN ASIA. I DON'T THINK THAT'S THE WAY TO GO.

A FLAT 0-0 WORLDWIDE ON THESE LONGER-RANGE SYSTEMS MAKES VERIFICATION MUCH SIMPLER. IT MAKES MUCH MORE SENSE IN TERMS OF THE SECURITY OF OUR NON-EUROPEAN ALLIES. AND, FINALLY, 0-0 AVOIDS THE TROUBLING ISSUE OF WHERE IN THE U.S. TO STATION OUR MISSILES. SO, VERIFICATION, FIRST AND FOREMOST.

### THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE

THEN, SECOND, WHAT DOES THE AGREEMENT DO TO THE OVERALL MILITARY BALANCE? ONE THING IS CLEAR TO ME: IF WE ELIMINATE ALL OF OUR INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS -- OUR PERSHING II MISSILES AND OUR GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES -- ALL SOVIET INF FORCES HAVE TO GO, TOO. THEY NOW HAVE MORE INF SYSTEMS THAN WE DO. THEY ALONE HAVE SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES. BUT THE END RESULT MUST BE 0-0, ON ALL INF SYSTEMS.

AND LET ME EMPHASIZE: WHEN I SAY 0-0, I'M TALKING ABOUT 0-0 GLOBAL -- IN EUROPE, AND IN THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL. OTHERWISE, THERE SHOULD BE NO DEAL, PERIOD.



### THE U.S. AND EUROPE'S DEFENSE

THIRD, WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT OF ANY AGREEMENT ON THE NATO ALLIANCE? IF WE TAKE OUR INF FORCES OUT OF EUROPE, DO WE "DE-LINK" OUR DEFENSE FROM THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE? AS HARD AS IT MIGHT BE FOR US TO IMAGINE A FULL-SCALE SOVIET ASSAULT IN EUROPE WITHOUT A U.S. RESPONSE, MANY EUROPEANS DO WORRY ABOUT IT. SO UNDER PREVAILING MILITARY CIRCUMSTANCES; AND TO MINIMIZE EVERY POSSIBLE RISK OR MISPERCEPTION, WHETHER BY THE SOVIETS OR OUR ALLIES -- IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SIGN NO AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD COMPROMISE A CREDIBLE U.S. NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE.

A "NUCLEAR-FREE EUROPE" SOUNDS GREAT -- UNTIL YOU REALLY ANALYZE IT. THE FACT IS, WE NEED SOME NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. THOSE WEAPONS DO NOT ENDANGER THE PEACE; THEY KEEP IT.

NOW, EVEN UNDER THE KIND OF AGREEMENT BEING TALKED ABOUT, AT A MINIMUM: THE INDEPENDENT BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD REMAIN. WE WOULD KEEP ABOUT 4500 TACTICAL, BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WARHEADS. WE WOULD HAVE EUROPEAN-BASED BOMBERS. AND, ON THOSE BOMBERS, REMEMBER: AS STEALTH TECHNOLOGY IS INCORPORATED, THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IS LIKELY TO INCREASE DRAMATICALLY. AND, OF COURSE, WE DO HAVE MAJOR NUCLEAR FORCES JUST OFFSHORE IN EUROPE -- AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND OTHER SHIPS, CARRIER-BASED PLANES, AND CRUISE MISSILES.

AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED, AT AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, NONE OF THE FORCES I HAVE JUST LISTED SHOULD BE ON THE BARGAINING TABLE. AND NONE SHOULD BE PUT ON THE TABLE -- UNTIL WE DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE ENORMOUS ADVANTAGE THE SOVIETS NOW HAVE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE.

### PRESERVING SDI

FINALLY, WE SHOULDN'T BE SIGNING ANY AGREEMENT WHICH COMPROMISES OUR RIGHT TO PURSUE THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, SDI. AT ONE TIME, THE SOVIETS WERE CONDITIONING ANY OTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT -- INCLUDING AN INF AGREEMENT -- ON OUR WILLINGNESS TO CLOSE DOWN THE SDI SHOP. BUT WE STUCK TO OUR GUNS.

SDI HAS BEEN CALLED MANY THINGS: FROM SPACE SHIELD TO PIE-IN-THE-SKY; FROM BARGAINING CHIP TO THE "KILLER" OF ARMS CONTROL. BUT IN THE END, SDI BOILS DOWN TO TWO VERY DOWN-TO-EARTH CONCEPTS.

### SDI AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

ONE: IF THE SOVIETS KNOW A FIRST STRIKE WON'T WORK -- BECAUSE SDI IS THERE AND CAPABLE OF PRESERVING OUR ABILITY TO STRIKE BACK -- THEN THERE WILL BE NO FIRST STRIKE. AND WE WILL HAVE ACHIEVED THE BOTTOM LINE GOAL OF OUR WHOLE NUCLEAR STRATEGY.

AND, TWO: IF THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT WE HAVE THE RESOURCES, THE TECHNOLOGY AND THE WILL TO DEVELOP SDI -- THEN THEY SHOULD REALIZE THE FUTILITY OF FURTHER OFFENSIVE ARMS BUILD-UPS. THAT CAN OPEN THE DOOR TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MAJOR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS.

THAT'S WHY WE NEED TO PURSUE SDI. THAT'S WHY WE CAN'T JUST GIVE IT AWAY, OR BARGAIN IT AWAY -- OR LEGISLATE IT AWAY.

### NUCLEAR TESTING

AND LET ME JUST SAY ONE FINAL WORD, ABOUT ANOTHER, RELATED ISSUE DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW -- NUCLEAR TESTING. WE HAVE BEFORE US IN THE SENATE TWO NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES: THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY (PNET). AND WHAT HAPPENED IN MOSCOW, IT SEEMS TO ME, BEARS DIRECTLY ON HOW THE SENATE OUGHT TO ACT ON THOSE TWO TREATIES.

THERE ISN'T MUCH DEBATE THAT THOSE TWO TREATIES, IF FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED, WOULD WELL SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. THE ISSUE IS WHETHER OR NOT WE CAN BE SURE THE SOVIETS WOULD LIVE UP TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS; WHETHER THEY WOULD KEEP THEIR WORD; WHETHER THE TREATIES COULD BE VERIFIED. THAT'S THE ISSUE.

NOW, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WAYS TO "SKIN" THAT PARTICULAR "CAT." IN SUBMITTING THE TREATIES FOR SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT, THE PRESIDENT CAME UP WITH ONE: ANY VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WORKED OUT WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO COME TO THE SENATE FOR APPROVAL BEFORE THE TREATIES' WOULD GO INTO EFFECT. SENATE REPUBLICANS CAME UP WITH AN ACCEPTABLE VARIANT ON THE SAME THEME: LET'S GET THE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES CLEARLY IN PLACE BEFORE WE GIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT IN THE FIRST PLACE.

EITHER FORMULA WAS ACCEPTABLE TO ME, AND -- I BELIEVE -- TO THE PRESIDENT. THE KEY WAS THIS: WE'VE ALL HAD ENOUGH OF BUYING A "PIG IN THE POKE." LET'S GET ALL THE "I'S" DOTTED AND ALL THE "T'S" CROSSED BEFORE SIGNING. THAT'S THE BASIC POINT, AND THE ONE WE OUGHT TO ACT BY.



NOW, THERE WERE SOME AROUND THE SENATE WHO HAD A DIFFERENT IDEA. FOR THEM, THE FACT OF A TREATY -- GETTING IT SIGNED; GETTING IT RATIFIED; AND GETTING IT ALL DONE BY A CERTAIN DATE -- THAT SEEMED TO BE THE PARAMOUNT THING.

NOW, I DON'T QUARREL WITH THE MOTIVES OF THOSE PEOPLE. BUT I DO QUARREL WITH THE RESULT WE WOULD ACHIEVE IF WE APPROVED THOSE TREATIES BEFORE WE KNOW THEY CAN BE VERIFIED.

THE PRESIDENT DID THE RIGHT THING -- AND SENATE REPUBLICANS ARE DOING THE RIGHT THING -- IN INSISTING ON VERIFICATION, NAILED DOWN TIGHT, FIRST. WHEN, AND ONLY WHEN, THAT IS ACCOMPLISHED -- THEN WE CAN PUT THE TREATIES IN EFFECT.

MOSCOW TALKS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON TESTING IN MOSCOW REAFFIRMED THE GOOD SENSE OF THAT APPROACH.

SOME PROGRESS MAY HAVE BEEN MADE. WE'VE BROACHED THE IDEA OF EACH SIDE -- THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION -- CONDUCTING A TEST AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITE -- TO ASSURE THAT WE COULD EFFECTIVELY MONITOR AND EVALUATE EACH OTHER'S TESTS. IF WE COULD REACH THAT AGREEMENT, WE WOULD TAKE A BIG STEP FORWARD TOWARD AN ACCEPTABLE VERIFICATION REGIME.

BUT SO FAR WE DON'T HAVE THAT AGREEMENT. WE HAVE AN IDEA. BOTH SIDES ARE EXPLORING THE IDEA. AND WE HAVE THE SOVIETS -- AS USUAL -- SENDING OUT MIXED SIGNALS. BUT WE DON'T YET HAVE A SIGNED-AND-SEALED AGREEMENT.

UNTIL WE DO -- EITHER ON THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION OF HAVING THESE TESTS; OR ON THE BROADER VERIFICATION QUESTION -- THEN WE HAVE NO AGREEMENT; AT LEAST, NO AGREEMENT THAT I WILL SUPPORT, AND WHICH THE SENATE WILL SUPPORT.

IT'S JUST THIS SIMPLE: WE WANT TO GIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO THE NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES; WE WANT TO DO IT SOON. BUT WE DON'T WANT TO DO IT ANY SOONER THAN IS RIGHT -- FOR THE SENATE, AND FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE PRESIDENT IS TO BE COMMENDED FOR PURSUING THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING SO AGGRESSIVELY WITH THE SOVIETS. WE ALL HOPE THE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS WILL BRING SUCCESS.

BUT WE SERVE NO ONE'S CAUSE, EXCEPT THE SOVIETS', IF WE PUSH FOR ACTUALLY APPROVING TREATIES BEFORE THEY ARE READY FOR FINAL APPROVAL.

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