

News from Senator

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STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB DOLE

THE TRIAD PLAN FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE ON THE CRUCIAL SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. THERE IS NO MORE IMPORTANT SUBJECT FACING US ALL TODAY. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE ALL HARNESS OUR EFFORTS TO TRY TO SOLVE THESE ISSUES.

I APPEAR BEFORE YOUR COMMITTEE, MR. CHAIRMAN, WITH SOME TREPIDATION. I KNOW THAT FOR MANY, MANY YEARS YOU HAVE TAKEN A KEEN INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT. OTHER COMMITTEE MEMBERS HAVE CLOSELY FOLLOWED THESE MATTERS AS PART OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE. I AM SURE THAT THE ARCANE KNOWLEDGE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATIES THAT YOUR MEMBERS POSSESS COULD NOT BE READILY DUPLICATED ELSEWHERE. AND SO, THE SENATOR FROM KANSAS MUST STATE AT THE OUTSET THAT I COULD NOT MATCH THOSE WHO HAVE CLOSELY STUDIED THESE ISSUES FOR YEARS.

BUT THAT MUST NOT FURNISH AN EXCUSE FOR INACTION, MR. CHAIRMAN. I THINK THAT AS SENATORS WE ALL HAVE SOME OBLIGATION TO STUDY AND TO SPEAK OUT ON THE GREAT ISSUES OF OUR DAY. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ARMS IS SUCH AN ISSUE.

MY OWN BASIC INCLINATION IS NOT TO LOOK TO SOME NUMBERS FORMULA FOR THE SOLUTION TO OUR ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS. INSTEAD, I SUSPECT THAT THE KEY TO ARMS REDUCTIONS MIGHT BE FOUND IN A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE STAGGERING ARRAY OF NUCLEAR FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. LET'S TAKE A LONG LOOK AT THESE WEAPONS, THE SAME WAY THAT ARMS NEGOTIATORS MUST. LET'S SEE HOW THEY COMPARE, AND IN WHAT SPECIFIC AREAS WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS. WHAT WEAPONS ARE MOST DESTABILIZING, AND WHAT ARE THE MOST LOGICAL AREAS FOR REDUCTIONS? WHAT SORTS OF SYSTEMS WOULD BE MOST STABLE FOR FUTURE DEPLOYMENT? AND WHILE WE'RE AT IT, LET'S LOOK AT ALL THE WARHEADS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS, AT BOTH THE THEATER AND STRATEGIC RANGES.

THE NUCLEAR TRIAD

MR. CHAIRMAN, NOBODY KNOWS BETTER THAN THE MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMITTEE THAT OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT HAS RESTED ON A TRIAD OF LAND-BASED ICBMs, MANNED BOMBERS, AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED NUCLEAR FORCES. THE DISPERSAL AND FLEXIBILITY THAT THIS TRIAD PROVIDE HAVE HELPED MAKE OUR DEFENSES CREDIBLE -- FOR NO POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR COULD EVER BE UNDER THE ILLUSION THAT A FIRST STRIKE COULD DEMOLISH THAT TRIAD.

ALSO, MR. CHAIRMAN, WHO AMONG US COULD REALLY DOUBT THAT FOR 38 YEARS, OUR NUCLEAR DEFENSES HAVE IN FACT HELPED PREVENT ANOTHER MAJOR WORLD CONFLICT? WE ALL WISH THAT IT WAS NOT SO -- AND NOBODY MORE THAN A FORMER SOLDIER -- BUT A STRONG DEFENSE REMAINS THE BEST WAY THAT I KNOW TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR DEFENSES WILL NEVER BE TESTED.

AT THE SAME TIME, MR. CHAIRMAN, I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE JUST SIMPLY TOO MANY OF THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WARHEADS. WE HEAR THAT THERE ARE SOME 9500 ON OUR SIDE, AND AT LEAST 8500 ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE. WHATEVER NUMBERS ADVANTAGE WE MAY POSSESS, HOWEVER, ON THE STRATEGIC WEAPONS COUNT HAS TO BE OFFSET BY THE DECIDED SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN THROW-WEIGHT. AND THESE NUMBERS DO NOT EVEN INCLUDE THE THOUSANDS OF SHORTER RANGE THEATER WEAPONS SUCH AS THE CRUISE MISSILES THAT WE ARE DEVELOPING, AND THE SS4s, SS5s AND SS20s THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY DEPLOYED.

....MORE

MR. CHAIRMAN -- THE DANGER IS THAT INSTEAD OF CONTINUING TO BE THE SAFEGUARD AGAINST A NEW HOLOCAUST, THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAY THEMSELVES BECOME A THREAT TO OUR PEACE AND WELL-BEING. THAT IS WHAT WE MUST GUARD AGAINST, TO MAKE SURE THAT ANY WEAPONS REMAIN OUR SERVANTS AND DO NOT BECOME OUR MASTERS.

THE CURRENT ARMS CONTROL SETTING

AS YOU ARE ALL WELL AWARE, WE ARE SEEKING AT THE INF TALKS TO HAVE THE RUSSIANS REMOVE THEIR SS4s, SS5s AND SS20s THAT NOW THREATEN EUROPE, THE FAR EAST AND PARTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CANNOT NEGOTIATE THESE DRAWDOWNS, WE WILL HAVE TO DEPLOY PERSHING IIs AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. THE RECENT ELECTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IN WEST GERMANY GIVE US ALL FURTHER REASON TO BE CONFIDENT THAT THOSE DEPLOYMENTS, IF NECESSARY, WILL PROCEED.

AT START, WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE SOME LIMITS TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, WITH EMPHASIS ON REDUCING THE SOVIET PREPONDERANCE IN LAND-BASED ICBMs. IN MY JUDGMENT THAT IS A PROPER EMPHASIS, GIVEN THE THREE-TO-ONE WARHEAD DISCREPANCY THAT NOW FAVORS THE SOVIET UNION IN THESE DANGEROUS AND DESTABILIZING BALLISTIC MISSILES.

THE SENATOR FROM KANSAS HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTED, AS I AM SURE YOU HAVE BEEN, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE FLEXIBILITY AT BOTH THE INF AND START TALKS HAVE MET WITH STONY REFUSALS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY FROM THE OTHER SIDE. WE MOVED AWAY FROM THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION IN THE INF TALKS -- AND THE SOVIETS DID NOT TAKE THAT OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTION. THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 8 REMARKS SET FORTH NEW FLEXIBILITY IN OUR START POSITION -- AND AGAIN, THE SOVIETS FAILED TO SEIZE THE OCCASION FOR REAL REDUCTIONS ON THE STRATEGIC MISSILE SIDE.

THE DOLE PROPOSAL

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO BUILD ON THE FLEXIBILITY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SHOWN. PERHAPS A NEW APPROACH MIGHT BE PRODUCTIVE. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE ARE MANY DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND THOUSANDS OF WARHEADS ON BOTH SIDES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN DETAIL IN THE INF AND START TALKS. I WOULD LIKE TO INCLUDE THEM ALL, AND THEN GET DOWN TO THE BASIC ISSUES OF FORCE COMPARABILITY AT BOTH INF AND START. FOR REASONS OF ASSURING OUR NATO ALLIES OF THE ESSENTIAL VALUE THAT WE ATTACH TO OUR COMMON DEFENSE, I WOULD KEEP THE INF AND START TALKS SEPARATE, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD OF COURSE BECOME CLOSELY LINKED, PERHAPS THROUGH A NEGOTIATING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

FURTHER, I WOULD PURSUE A NUCLEAR FREEZE OF FORCE LEVELS, AIMING FOR INITIAL REDUCTIONS BELOW OUR CURRENT DEPLOYMENT TOTALS. TO SUMMARIZE, HERE IS MY SIX-POINT PROGRAM THAT ADDRESSES THESE POINTS IN FURTHER DETAIL:

- I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD PROPOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION A MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE FREEZE OF NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED FROM THOSE THAT CURRENTLY EXIST;
- THE PRECISE PROPOSAL MUST NOT LIMIT THE UNITED STATES TO NUCLEAR FORCES INFERIOR TO THOSE PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION;
- THE FREEZE WILL BE OF ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WARHEADS, ALONG THE LINES OF THE NUCLEAR TRIAD ITSELF;
- IF AGREED TO, THE FREEZE WOULD BE A LONG-TERM AGREEMENT WITH PROVISIONS FOR REVIEWS FROM TIME TO TIME, LOOKING TO EVEN LOWER NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS;
- SPECIAL ATTENTION MUST BE PAID TO WEAPONS THAT ARE THE MOST DESTABILIZING, AND TO TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS OF ALL SORTS.
- WE SHOULD ALSO EXPLORE WITH THE RUSSIANS NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, AND THE BEST WAYS TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR BY ACCIDENT.

FREEZE OR BUILD-DOWN?

TO BE REALISTIC, ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS MUST REFLECT THE SECURITY THAT OUR NUCLEAR TRIAD IS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE. WE HAVE HEARD OF THE FREEZE AND THE BUILD-DOWN, AND BOTH ARE GOOD FAITH ATTEMPTS TO GET CONTROL OVER THE NUCLEAR GENIE.

....MORE

I AM WELL AWARE THAT MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE HAVE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT -- AND IN SEVERAL CASES, THEIR SUPPORT -- TO THESE CONCEPTS. AND YET, A FREEZE OF CURRENT WEAPONS WOULD REWARD THE SOVIET BUILDUP IN ICBMs, AND LEAVE US WITH AN UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION IN EUROPE, GIVEN THE SOVIET FOCUS ON THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE. AS USUALLY PROPOSED, IT WOULD ALSO NOT ALLOW FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION. MY FREEZE PROPOSAL WOULD ALLOW FOR NEEDED MODERNIZATION, WHILE DRIVING DOWN OVERALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TOTALS.

THE BUILD-DOWN IS ALSO A USEFUL NOTION, AND ONE THAT HAS RECEIVED SOME SUPPORT, IN PRINCIPLE, FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. STRICTLY APPLIED, SINCE A NUMBER OF OUR SYSTEMS REPRESENT YESTERDAY'S TECHNOLOGY, WE WOULD HAVE TO BUILD-DOWN TWO WEAPONS FOR EVERY ONE NEWLY DEPLOYED FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF CATCHING UP TO THE RUSSIANS! IN THE AREA OF AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES ALONE, OUR PRESENT TRIAD DEFENSE WOULD HAVE TO BE VIRTUALLY DISMANTLED IN ORDER TO DEPLOY THESE MISSILES. AND THERE WOULD BE NO OBLIGATION ON THE RUSSIAN PART TO BUILD-DOWN ANY WEAPONS UNTIL THEY WANTED TO DEPLOY NEW ONES!

ARMS CONTROL AND THE REAL WORLD

IT IS MORE PRODUCTIVE IN MY VIEW TO PRESERVE OUR NUCLEAR DEFENSES WHILE OFFERING THE SOVIETS SOMETHING THAT BOTH SIDES CAN AGREE TO. WITH AN EYE TO WHAT THESE WEAPONS ARE SUPPOSED TO DO -- RATHER THAN TO A RIGID FORMULA -- WE CAN BEST SEE HOW TO LIMIT THEM. LET'S PUT ARMS CONTROL IN THE REAL WORLD OF NUCLEAR DEFENSES, AND LET'S MAKE IT WORK.

TO SUMMARIZE, I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD PROPOSE THAT ALL STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED BELOW TODAY'S DEPLOYMENT FIGURES FOR BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE PROPOSAL SHOULD PARALLEL OUR PRESENT NUCLEAR TRIAD FORCE STRUCTURE. THEN NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS SHOULD BE FROZEN AT THAT LOWER, REDUCED LEVEL -- WHICH WOULD THEN BECOME THE CEILING FOR A NEW ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO WEAPONS THAT ARE THE MOST DESTABILIZING, TO VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, AND TO NON-NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS THAT COULD AFFECT THE NUCLEAR DEFENSE.

THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE HARD AND LONG -- BUT I KNOW OF NO SUBJECT THAT MORE DESERVES OUR FULL COMMITMENT AND ATTENTION.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO SEND TO YOU FOR INCLUSION WITH THE COMMITTEE REPORT AN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL THAT ILLUSTRATES THESE PRINCIPLES. THE SENATOR FROM KANSAS BELIEVES THAT WE CAN HAMMER OUT AN OVERALL APPROACH THAT WOULD MUTUALLY LOWER OUR ARSENALS OF THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

I AM NOT WEDDED TO ANY SINGLE APPROACH OR SET OF NUMBERS, MR. CHAIRMAN, PROVIDING ONLY THAT AN OVERALL APPROACH WILL SAFEGUARD OUR NATIONAL SECURITY WHILE ADVANCING A PRACTICAL BASIS FOR ARMS CONTROL. BUILDING ON OUR CURRENT INF AND START POSITIONS -- AND THE FLEXIBILITY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SHOWN -- I THINK THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DEBATE HERE.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION AND ATTENTION, MR. CHAIRMAN. I WOULD WELCOME YOUR INTEREST AND QUESTIONS ON MY PROPOSAL.