



NEWS from U.S. Senator Bob Dole

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DOLE SOLICITING EUROPEAN VIEWS ON SALT II AGREEMENT

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND -- Senator Bob Dole (R.-Kansas), visiting Geneva as a United States Senate representative to the Law of the Sea Conference, said today that he also expects to solicit European views on the forthcoming SALT II agreement.

Dole, who has been one of the Senate's leaders on SALT, said that he has grown concerned about apparent increased skepticism by Europeans towards the SALT II treaty.

"Over the past four months I have organized a series of breakfast meetings for the purpose of educating members of the United States Senate on strategic matters as they relate to SALT II," said Dole. "We have heard from distinguished experts, people like General Alexander Haig, Lord Chalfont, Fritz Kraemer, Henry Kissinger, and others. One concern that emerged from these meetings, which were attended by anywhere from ten to 18 Senators, was that we were not paying enough attention to the views of our European allies. A number of the distinguished speakers we heard at these meetings specifically noted that our allies views have been little heeded in recent months on this issue. SALT is not a bilateral issue. Indeed, it goes to the heart of our strategic defense capabilities, and could serve as the mechanism which would unbind the cohesion of our alliance system. That is why I have come here to share the views of some of my Senate colleagues on SALT and to listen to Europeans on this vital topic," said Dole.

"Recently I and eleven of my U.S. Senate colleagues issued an open letter to our fellow Senators on SALT. Our concerns included: verification--whether we can monitor what the closed system in the Soviet Union is doing on strategic arms adequately, not according to criteria of those who negotiated the treaty, but according to those who will be charged with its implementation and our ultimate security; treaty ambiguities--even now, provisions are interpreted in one way by the Soviets and another way by the Americans--these must be clarified if SALT is to aid, as it is designed to do, rather than aggravate U.S.-Soviet relations. ICBM survivability--whether the treaty allows the U.S. to redress as promptly as possible a terribly dangerous ICBM vulnerability which will unfold in the 1980's. Backfire--whether the treaty includes all strategic systems capable of striking the U.S. Intermediate range missiles--weapons which bear

upon the Eurostrategic balance, and go to the heart of NATO alliance cohesion; the durability of the protocol—which may be scheduled to last only 3 years but would inevitably lead to a decrease in R & D from which we might never catch up. And the principle of equality of strategic arms in various categories.

"Each of these issues, members of our seminar group soon learned, is extremely complicated. Our statement just mentions a portion of our thoughts and views on these and many other issues.

"Nonetheless, I believe it begins to address the primary question of SALT II: whether the treaty would contribute to American national security or whether it would endanger our national security by further lulling us into complacency. A treaty between competing super powers cannot be based on trust alone. We hope to be able to reason intelligently and in a cooperating spirit with the Russians, but we must be able to reason with them from a posture of strength. The treaty must address the merits of such an agreement itself, and not just the psychological impact of a treaty-signing ceremony. It also must take into account, in a meaningful way, the wishes and needs of our European friends, for it is they who would be likely to suffer should the treaty prove a sad illusion," said Dole.