


BOB DOLE



(R - Kansas)

SH 141 Hart Building, Washington, D.C. 20510

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CONTACT: WALT RIKER,
DALE TATE 202/224-3135

STATEMENT OF SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BOB DOLE SAUDI ARMS SALE

A VOTE WITH RESERVATIONS

I WILL VOTE TODAY AGAINST S.J.RES. 316, BUT I CAST THAT VOTE WITH SOME VERY SIGNIFICANT RESERVATIONS.

I SHARE MANY OF THE CONCERNS OF THOSE WHO SUPPORT THIS RESOLUTION. I AM NOT AT ALL SURE THAT THIS IS THE RIGHT SALE, TO THE RIGHT COUNTRY, AT THE RIGHT TIME.

SAUDI RECORD TROUBLING

I'M TROUBLED BY THE SPOTTY -- AND THAT'S A MILD TERM, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES -- THE SPOTTY RECORD OF THE SAUDIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. I'M DEEPLY DISTURBED THAT, IN THE AFTERMATH OF OUR RETALIATORY AIR RAIDS ON LIBYA, THE SAUDIS CHOSE TO CONDEMN US AND EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR LIBYA -- WHATEVER THE DELICACIES AND SENSITIVITIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL SITUATION, THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR THAT KIND OF ACTION FROM A COUNTRY THAT PROFESSES TO BE OUR FRIEND.

SO I CAST MY VOTE TODAY NOT AS ANY KIND OF SIGN OF APPROBATION FOR SAUDI ARABIA. I WILL VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION FOR THREE OTHER REASONS.

WILL NOT UPSET MILITARY BALANCE

FIRST, I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS SALE WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MORE SPECIFICALLY, IT WILL NOT MATERIALLY INCREASE THE MILITARY THREAT TO ISRAEL. IF IT DID, I WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE SALE.

THE ARMS THE ADMINISTRATION PLANS TO SELL ARE OF TYPES THE SAUDIS ALREADY POSSESS AND WITH WHICH THE ISRAELIS CAN COPE, IN THE VERY UNLIKELY EVENT THEY EVER SHOULD HAVE TO. OUR DEFENSE SPECIALISTS ARE CONVINCED THAT IS THE CASE. MORE TO THE POINT, THE ISRAELIS SEEM COMFORTABLE ON THAT POINT, TOO.

I WOULD ASK UNANIMOUS CONSENT TO PUT INTO THE RECORD AT THIS POINT AN INTERVIEW WITH TOM DINE, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN-ISRAELI PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND ONE OF THE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE AND INFLUENTIAL FIGURES IN WASHINGTON ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS. MR. DINE COMMENTS DIRECTLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE MILITARY IMPACT OF THIS SALE ON ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

OTHER SOURCES FOR ARMS AVAILABLE

SECOND, I WILL VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION BECAUSE -- EVEN SHOULD WE CHOOSE NOT TO PROVIDE THESE ARMAMENTS TO THE SAUDIS -- THEY WILL GET THEM, OR ARMS MUCH LIKE THEM, ELSEWHERE. THAT IS A HARD, PRACTICAL FACT, ABOUT WHICH WE CAN DO NOTHING. AND IN THAT CASE WE WILL HAVE ACCOMPLISHED NOTHING EXCEPT TO HAVE FORFEITED WHAT LEVERAGE WE MAY HAVE OVER SAUDI POLICY AND ACTIONS.

PRESIDENT NEEDS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY

FINALLY, I WILL VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION BECAUSE I THINK WE HAVE TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT, EXCEPT IN THE MOST EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, THE FLEXIBILITY HE NEEDS TO CONDUCT OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN THE WAY HE DEEMS FIT. THAT IS HIS JOB UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. THAT IS HIS RESPONSIBILITY, UNDER OUR POLITICAL SYSTEM.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS EXTRAORDINARILY COMPLEX. THERE ARE NO EASY DECISIONS. I'M SURE THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO PROCEED WITH THIS SALE WAS NOT AN EASY ONE. I KNOW MY OWN DECISION ON THIS VOTE WAS NOT AN EASY ONE.

SENDING THE RIGHT SIGNALS

BUT I WILL VOTE WITH THE PRESIDENT, IN THE HOPE THIS SALE, IF IT FINALLY GOES FORWARD, WILL SEND THE RIGHT SIGNALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; IN THE HOPE IT WILL ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS TO PLAY A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE; IN THE HOPE IT WILL CONVINCe MIDDLE EAST MODERATES THAT THE UNITED STATES STANDS BY ITS FRIENDS AND IS WILLING TO REWARD THOSE WHO DO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE; AND IN THE HOPE IT WILL REDUCE THE CHANCES OF IRANIAN EXPANSIONISM OR ADVENTURISM.

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CLIPPING FROM:

WASHINGTON JEWISH WEEK
April 9, 1986

Tom Dine: Charting AIPAC's Course

Sitting in the eye of the storm over the American Jewish 'lobby's recent decision not to actively oppose the upcoming arms sale to Saudi Arabia, AIPAC executive director Tom Dine remains calm and collected. Below are excerpts from an interview with Dine in his Capitol Hill office, conducted by WJW staff writer Lisa Schneider.

WJW: Please explain for our readers why AIPAC chose not to fight the Saudi arms sale now, after opposing the administration's proposed sale last year.

Dine: The first reason is because the original package of January 1985 contained 40 F-15s, M-1 tanks, armored personnel carriers—the new one, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle—and Blackhawk helicopters. The F-15s particularly, carry the Sidewinders. We know that Saudi Arabia has a lot of Sidewinders already—getting more, and not more planes, does not make them more militarily capable. The same with the Harpoons.

Second point. Stingers obviously, should never be in the hands of terrorists. Of course, we're against them going out there, but again, the administration had delivered 400 of them around Memorial Day...with 100 launchers. This package is 800 with 200 launchers.

I knew ahead of time that we were going to arm [Angolan rebel] Savimbi and the Afghan anti-Soviets with Stingers. Once the U.S. starts transferring this highly sophisticated weapon to organizations that cannot secure them, that argument dissipates. I think it's wrong to arm Savimbi [...and] the Afghans as well because they're going to fall into the hands of anybody who pays the bigger price. They're going to be bought on the black market.

Third point why not to fight: Every defense analyst that we have gone to—American and Israeli, governmental and non-governmental—has analyzed this missile sale as not affecting significantly the balance of military power in the region. And you have to be honest about that.

Four, any organization must have priorities. No organization can be totally reflexive. Once having looked at the military content of the sale, and its effect on the military balance in the region, once having seen it become a different package, knowing that you can't fight everything—you must pick your fights—we decided this was



Thomas Dine

not the one to fight.

WJW: Does that undermine your credibility in future arms sale battles?

Dine: I don't think so. Each sale will be looked at individually. And we have done that.

We don't fight every sale. We oppose them, but we don't mount a challenge to every single sale to so-called "moderate" Arabs. We only mount challenges, we only call for a full-scale, wall to wall oppositional force on a select few arms sales to Arab countries still at war with Israel.

You cannot just be a fighting machine. You have to be beyond that, and that's the message I'm trying to give. Is it new? Yes. But I'm saying, though, that I'm not going to head just a reflexive organization.

We can fight, and the president of the United States and secretary of state know we can fight... So I would argue that our credibility has increased, from that perspective. I also have to be honest with reality. There are several friends, good friends, on Capitol Hill who wish we had decided not to do what we decided to do.

WJW: Where does this leave staunch friends of Israel?

Dine: They're going to continue to fight it. [Sen. Alan] Cranston has said so, [Rep.] Mel Levine has said he will continue to fight it.

WJW: Do they feel out there by themselves now?

Dine: They think we've made a mistake. They wish that we had not decided what we decided, and that's reality.

Hopefully, they'll understand our side—and I certainly understand their side. Part of the anger is that I told Shultz before I told them. But

I told Shultz, by the way, 22 minutes after the House of Representatives had voted down the \$100 million for the contras, and I walked in and I said, "I have some good news for you." And it was good news.

So you win points and you lose points.

WJW: But these are key people you can't afford to lose down the stretch.

Dine: Absolutely. I don't think we've lost them.

WJW: Is this a major split between AIPAC and friends?

Dine: That's a good question. I don't think so.

WJW: Is it true that the Israelis put out the word that this was not a sale that they thought was particularly threatening?

Dine: Yes, but they've done that before. That has an effect, but doesn't have as great an effect sometimes as I think we think it does.

But I will say this—the opposition to the Jordan arms sale and the opposition to the Saudi missile sale are different. There was never the enthusiasm on the Hill to oppose the Saudi arm sale the way there was for Jordan....

And this is the key: the missile sale is not linked to the peace process...and that [linkage] should be American foreign policy. If Jordan and Saudi Arabia would deal directly with Israel, then they're going to get arms the way Egypt does.

WJW: One of the reasons AIPAC is not actively fighting the sale is because of the excellent U.S.-Israel relations at the present.

Dine: That would be the fourth reason. People engaged in business

of the diplomacy between two nations like each other. That's one level. Secondly, each nation is getting something from the other.

What is the U.S. getting? The idea of pre-positioning materiel on Israeli soil. We've been unable to do it in Egypt, or Jordan or Saudi Arabia or Lebanon. The idea that Sixth Fleet naval aviators, the same ones that bombed Libyan boats, can practice their bombings in the Negev on Shabbat, because the fields are open, is an advantage to the U.S.; and on and on it goes. And the institutional arrangement—there are real meaningful talks on a regular, ongoing basis between political and military people of each side.

WJW: What will AIPAC's role be in the movement afoot to reverse the scheduled delivery of AWACS?

Dine: Members of Congress are going to probe the administration during congressional hearings on the current missile sale. Several members have raised the question surrounding the fulfillment of the letter of Oct. 28, 1981. We will be raising those questions as well.

Secondly, we have to look into what are the other countries who can buy those AWACS? The Nimrod, which is the British so-called sequel, isn't being built now. We understand the British and maybe others want to buy AWACS. The key will be: are there other takers to the four or five that are being built by Boeing for Saudi Arabia?

We have to be very careful about this....

WJW: Will aid to Israel ever increase again?

Dine: I don't see it. All the more reason for Israel to increase its export economy, to continue to cut its own budget, for pro-Israel supporters in this country to think about investing in Israel.