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SATURDAY, JANUARY 28, 1984 SCOTT RICHARDSON 202/224-6521

REMARKS OF SENATOR BOB DOLE

KANSAS VETERANS CLUB

TOPEKA, KANSAS

JANUARY 28, 1984

I AM HONORED TO BE SPEAKING TO YOU TODAY. AS VETERANS WE SHARE A SPECIAL UNDERSTANDING OF COMMITMENT TO OUR NATION'S DEFENSE. WE DO NOT GLAMORIZE WAR; IT IS NOT A GLAMOROUS ENDEAVOR. WE HAVE, FACED OUR RESPONSIBILITIES WHEN OUR NATION WAS FACED WITH THE IMPERATIVE OF WAR BUT WE DID NOT SEEK THOSE WARS. AND WE HAVE LEARNED THE LESSONS OF A STRONG DEFENSE. AS THE PRESID AS THE PRESIDENT SAID LAST WEEK:

"HISTORY TEACHES THAT WARS BEGIN WHEN GOVERNMENTS BELIEVE THE PRICE OF AGGRESSION IS CHEAP. TO KEEP THE PEACE, WE AND OUR ALLIES MUST BE STRONG ENOUGH TO CONVINCE ANY POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR THAT WAR COULD BRING NO BENEFIT, ONLY DISASTER."
REGRETTABLY, FOR MUCH OF THE SEVENTIES WE IGNORED THOSE

LESSONS. OUR DEFENSES, AND OUR ALLIANCES ALL SUFFERED.
TODAY, DEFENSE CANNOT BE CALCULATED IN NARROW NATIONAL OR

EVEN REGIONAL TERMS. NOR CAN IT BE VIEWED IN ONLY STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TERMS. THE TWO SUPERPOWERS - AND OTHER POWERS - HAVE DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES AND DIFFERENT STAKES IN DIFFERENT AREAS REQUIRING DIFFERENT KINDS OF FORCE. NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE RADICALLY ALTERED THE MILITARY CALCULUS AND ARE THE SUPREME POLITICAL SYMBOLS. BUT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE IS NOT IN AND OF ITSELF DECISIVE. OTHER BALANCES ENTER INTO THE PICTURE, OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE BEING THE EUROPEAN BALANCE, THE ASIAN BALANCE AND THE BALANCE OF INTERVENTION AND THIRD WORLD PROXY FORCES. LET'S EXAMINE EACH IN TURN.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE

WE HAVE UNFORTUNATELY LOST FOREVER THE EDGE WE HAD UNTIL THE MID-60'S TO DETER THE SOVIETS ACROSS A BROAD RANGE OF THREATS. WE HAVE LOST OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY AND WE AND THE SOVIETS ARE NOW AT A STANDOFF. NO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WILL NEITHER OF THE TWO MOST FAVORED APPROACHES - THE FREEZE AND THE BUILD-DOWN - WILL CHANGE THIS. A FREEZE OF CURRENT WEAPONS WOULD REWARD THE SOVIET BUILD UP OF ICBMS AND LEAVE US WITH AN UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION IN EUROPE, GIVEN THE SOVIET FOCUS ON THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE. MOST FREEZE FORMULATIONS DO NOT ALLOW FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION, AGAIN TO THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE.

A BUILD-DOWN WOULD HAVE EACH SIDE REMOVE ATLEAST ONE OLD MISSILE IF NOT MORE FOR EACH NEW MODEL DEPLOYED. IF NOT MANAGED CAREFULLY, SUCH AN APPROACH COULD STRIP OUR DEFENSES IN CRITICAL AREAS WITH NO COMPENSATORY COSTS TO THE SOVIETS.

THE MOST WE CAN REASONABLY SEEK, AT LEAST FOR THE MID-TERM, IS TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF THE STANDOFF AND GUARD AGAINST ANY ROPOSAL THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER UNBALANCE OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIETS HAVE CHOSEN TO WALK AWAY FROM BOTH THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) AND THE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE TALKS (INF) IN GENEVA. START ADDRESSES LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES; INF IS FOCUSED ON SHORTER-RANGE, PRIMARILY EUROPEAN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

THE SOVIETS WILL, I AM CONFIDENT, RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ONCE THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THEIR POLITICAL EXTORTIONIST TACTICS WILL NOT WORK. WHEN THEY DO, THEY WILL BETTER UNDERSTAND OUR RESOLVE AND OUR COMMITMENT TO MEANINGFUL NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. SO TOO WILL THEY KNOW, AS DOCUMENTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT

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TO CONGRESS CATHERISWED WILLSTON LONGERS ALL OWNETHER VILLED ATTIONS OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO REMAIN A MATTER OF PRIVATE DEBATE BUT WILL BE MADE A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD.

WILL BE MADE A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD.

SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE IS NOT ONLY A MILITARY THREAT TO THE U.S. AND OUR ALLIES BUT SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZES THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE FUNDAMENTAL TO REACHING AGREEMENTS ON SO SERIOUS A MATTER OF LIMITING THE RISK AND CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT NOTES FIVE AREAS OF KNOWN VIOLATIONS AND FOUR OF PROBABLE NON-COMPLIANCE.

- THE SOVIETS, AND WE, ARE SIGNATORS TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL AND THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION. DESPITE THIS, THE SOVIETS HAVE MAINTAINED OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM AND CAPABILITIES AND, HORRIFICALLY, HAVE BEEN A PARTY TO CHEMICAL WARFARE USE IN LAOS, KAMPUCHEA AND AFGHANISTAN.
- -- IN ADDITION TO THEIR WELL-PUBLICIZED VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THE SOVIETS HAVE ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTIFICATION OF A MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISE A VIOLATION OF THE POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO OBSERVE THE SECURITY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES UNDER THE ACT. AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE HELSINKI ACT I INTEND TO FOLLOW WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION SOVIET BEHAVIOR AT THE JUST BEGUN STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.
- -- WHILE SALT II WAS NEVER RATIFIED, BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE PUBLICLY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO ABIDE BY ITS PROVISIONS. DESPITE THIS THE SOVIETS HAVE ENCRYPTED, THAT IS TO SAY ENCODED, MISSILE TEST TELEMETRY (RADIO SIGNALS) THAT, AS THE REPORT STATES, IS AN EXAMPLE OF DELIBERATE IMPEDING OF COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION.
 -- BECAUSE OF THIS ENCRYPTION WE HAVE ONLY AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE
- -- BECAUSE OF THIS ENCRYPTION WE HAVE ONLY AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF SALT II SUCH AS INTRODUCTION OF NEW ICBM SYSTEMS OR CHANGE IN THROW WEIGHT FOR EXISTING SYSTEMS. THERE IS ALSO PROBABLE CAUSE EVIDENCE THAT A FURTHER PROVISION OF SALT II THE BAN ON SS-16 ICBM DEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN BREACHED.
- -- THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY OF 1972 IS IN FORCE AND IS OF INDEFINITE DURATION. YET, THE SOVIETS RECENTLY INSTALLED A LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADAR IN CENTRAL SIBERIA VIOLATING THE OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH LOCATION AND ORIENTATION OF SUCH RADARS.
- -- AND LAST, LIKE SALT II, BOTH THE SOVIETS AND US ARE OBLIGATED TO ADHERE TO THE AS YET UNRATIFIED THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY BUT EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS DO NO BETTER HERE THAN ON OTHER AGREEMENTS.

DO WE, AS ONE NOTED COLUMNIST SUGGESTS, DESERT THE WHOLE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS AS POINTLESS. NO. WHAT WE DO IS CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIETS - PUBLICLY AS WELL AS PRIVATELY - TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR MORAL OBLIGATIONS AS A SUPERPOWER TO WORK FOR ARMS REDUCTION AND ENSURE THAT WE HAVE MEANINGFUL VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE PROVISIONS AND TECHNIQUES. WE MAY BE AT A NUCLEAR STAND-OFF, AND A DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE BUT WE CAN CONTINUE TO PREPARE OURSELVES FOR THE FUTURE.

EUROPE

THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR STAND-OFF BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS HAS HEIGHTENED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE WITHIN EUROPE, BOTH THE NATO-WARSAW PACT NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE BALANCE, AND, THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCE.

FORCE BALANCE, AND, THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCE.
YEARS OF NEGLECT BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, IN PART A RESULT OF THE ENERVATING EFFECTS OF DETENTE, HAVE GIVEN THE WARSAW PACT A NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE IN VIRTUALLY ALL CATEGORIES OF MILITARY BALANCE AND IN FORCE TRENDS IN EUROPE. FOR EXAMPLE, COMBINED NATO DIVISIONS IN EUROPE TOTAL 101 OF WHICH 27 ARE TANK DIVISIONS; THE WARSAW PACT, INCLUDING SOVIET DIVISIONS - 109, 38 OF WHICH ARE TANK DIVISIONS. IN GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT THERE IS ROUGH PARITY BUT IN CONVENTIONAL ARMED AIRCRAFT AND FIGHTERS, THE PACT HAS SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES IN BOMBERS (OUR 34 TO THEIR 455), FIGHTERS (212/700): INTERCEPTORS (647/4,382) AND RECONNAISSANCE (354/564). ONLY IN GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT AND ARMED HELICOPTERS DOES THE WEST HAVE AN EDGE AND IN NEITHER CASE IS IT OVERWHELMING. IN INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES THE PICTURE IS EQUALLY BLEAK: THERE ARE 599 WARSAW PACT BALLISTIC MISSILES, ALL SOVIET CONTROLLED, TO OUR 162 AND IN AIRCRAFT THE SOVIETS POSSESS 1,615 TO OUR 723.

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTS IN A NUMBER OF NATO COUNTRIES - WEST GERMANY, BRITAIN, FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS - HAS PROMPTED A REVERSAL OF THESE TRENDS AND REDUCED SOMEWHAT

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- MODERNIZED THEIR CONVENTIONAL EQUIPMENT AND THEATER NUCLEAR
- -- REORGANIZED BOTH THEIR THEATER AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND EXPANDED THEIR TROOP STRENGTHS AT ALL LEVELS TO NEARLY FULL STRENGTH
- -- REYISED THEIR STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT TO EXPLOIT NATO'S LACK OF DEFENSIVE DEPTH
- AND, AS WE HAVE SEEN, COMMITTED THEIR PROPAGANDA RESOURCES TO UNDERMINING BOTH U.S. AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO NATO AND TO SPECIFIC WEAPONS IMPROVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE, SUCH AS THE PERSHING IIs.

OBSERVERS FEAR THAT THESE OMINOUS SOVIET TRENDS CANNOT BE CORRECTED FOR THE BALANCE OF THIS DECADE, AT LEAST ON THE TECHNICAL SIDE. WHAT WE CAN DO AND HAVE DONE IS TO WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH LIKE-MINDED WESTERN ALLIES TO CORRECT THE PERCEPTION THAT NATO AS A CONCEPT AND A COMMITMENT IS PERISHABLE WHILE WE COMMIT OUR COMBINED RESOURCES TO REDRESSING THE MILITARY IMBALANCE.

ASIA

GEOGRAPHY FORCES US TO LOOK WEST ACROSS THE PACIFIC AS WELL AS EAST TO OUR ATLANTIC ALLIES. WE PAID DEARLY AT THE START OF WORLD WAR II FOR OUR FAILURE TO DO JUST THAT.

REGRETTABLY, WHILE WE QUESTIONED OUR ASIAN COMMITMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIETNAM, THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING UP THEIR FROM 1971 TO 1981 SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE CARRYING SUBMARINES (SSBNs) DOUBLED, THREATENING NOT ONLY CHINA AND JAPAN BUT THE U.S. AS WELL. NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF THE SOVIET SS-20 FORCE IS DEPLOYED AND TARGETED IN ASIA. SOVIET FAR EAST DIVISION STRENGTH HAS DOUBLED OR TRIPLED IN THE LAST 20 YEARS AND THEIR TACTICAL AND LONG-RANGE AIR FORCES HAVE BEEN MODERNIZED.

THE KOREAN PENINSULA HAS NOT CEASED TO BE THE MAJOR FLASH POINT IN NORTH ASIA AND WILL REMAIN SO DESPITE CHINESE OFFERS FOR QUADRIPARTITE RECONCILIATION TALKS.

THE THIRD WORLD

IN RECENT YEARS SOVIET ABILITY AND PROPENSITY TO THROW ITS MILITARY WEIGHT AROUND IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY BEYOND ARMING ANY NUMBER OF STATES AND PROVIDING LARGE NUMBERS OF ADVISORS, THEY USE PROXY TROOPS TO SPREAD AND CONSOLIDATE THEIR INFLUENCE IN ALL CORNERS OF THE WORLD. IN ETHIOPIA, 17,000 CUBAN TROOPS WERE ENGAGED AT THE HEIGHTH OF THE FIGHTING WITH SOMALIA - UNDER THE COMMAND OF A SOVIET ARMY GENERAL. CUBAN TROOPS ARE HEAVILY INVOLVED IN PROPPING UP THE BELEAGUERED MARXIST REGIME IN ANGOLA. IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE SOVIETS HAVE ADDED AN OMINOUS NEW FACTOR BY TRANSFERRING ADVANCED OFFENSIVE WEAPONRY TO SYRIA, MUCH OF IT UNDER DIRECT SOVIET CONTROL. NEARBY, SOVIET MILITARY TRANSFERS TO BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE FUELED ONE OF THE LONGEST AND POTENTIALLY VOLATILE REGIONAL WARS IN RECENT MEMORY. LIBYAN INTERVENTION IN CHAD AND CHRONIC ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILIZE NEIGHBORS IS SOVIET-BACKED. CUBAN, AND THUS SOVIET ACTIVE ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA HAS CREATED A CRISIS SITUATION ON OUR VERY DOORSTEP AND VIETNAMESE PROXIES IN CAMBODIA HAVE ASSURED SOVIET ACCESS - AND WESTERN VULNERABILITY - IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

CONCLUSION

I HAVE PAINTED A SOMEWHAT GLOOMY PICTURE. I HAVE PERHAPS NOTED TOO FREQUENTLY THE SUCCESS AND ADVANCES OF THE SOVIETS AND SLIGHTED THEIR VERY REAL WEAKNESSES AND SETBACKS. MILITARY BUILD-UP HAS BEEN AT AN ENORMOUS EXPENSE TO THEIR DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND TO THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THEIR PEOPLE. WHEN THEY CALCULATE A WORST CASE SCENARIO THEY MUST CALCULATE DEFECTION OR REBELLION AMONG THEIR EAST EUROPEAN CLIENTS. WARINESS OF THE GREAT BEAR ON THEIR BORDER PROVIDES A BUFFER FOR THE U.S. AND JAPAN AND NECESSITATES SOVIET DIVERSION OF RESOURCES AND ATTENTION TO A THEATER FAR FROM MOSCOW. THE THIRD WORLD, THE REALIZATION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY AS A BLUNT INSTRUMENT OF POWER HAS BEGUN TO SUPPLANT ROMANTIC AND NAIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR IDEOLOGICAL EMPATHY. THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT IS ACTIVELY WORKING TO RID ITSELF OF THE CUBAN-INSPIRED CONCEPT OF "NATURAL ALLIANCE" TO THE SOVIET UNION. NATIONS ONCE FELT TO BE IRRETRIEVABLY SOVIET CLIENTS, SUCH AS EGYPT, HAVE UNCEREMONIOUSLY GIVEN THEM THE BOOT. THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS A SOBERING EXPERIENCE FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF LEADERS AROUND THE WORLD AND HAS BECOME A BLOODY QUAGMIRE FOR OVER 100,000 SOVIET TROOPS.

WE ON OUR TORT HAVE BEGUN IN EARNEST TO REBUILD OUR MILITARY TEGORIES. WE HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO REBUILD OUR DEFENSES IN AT

This press release is from the collections at the Robert J. Dole Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas WILL AND POWERHATCH TO GREBUS UDOTHETS ALTERIANCES ON CESSARY FOR THE WEST TO FACE THE SOVIETS MORE UNITED. WE HAVE IN THIS WAY PERHAPS CORRECTED THE GREATEST DANGER TO WAR WE FACE - THE DANGER OF WAR FROM MISCALCULATION BY THE SOVIETS. AS THE PRESIDENT SAID: WE HALTED AMERICA'S DECLINE. ODEFENSES ARE BEING REBUILT. OUR ALLIANCES ARE SOLID AND OUR OUR COMMITMENT TO DEFEND OUR VALUES HAS NEVER BEEN MORE CLEAR. THIS IS NOT SABER RATTLING. IT IS THE RATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION WE FOUND OURSELVES IN AND REALITIES OF THE WE WISH TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS TO END WORLD WE FACE. THE RACE TO MORE AND BIGGER AND MORE DESTRUCTIVE ARMS - NUCLEAR

AND CONVENTIONAL, SUPERPOWERS AND THE THIRD WORLD. BUT WE MUST NEGOTIATE AS EQUALS OR WE RISK FORCED CONCILIATION AND FURTHER IT WAS THE SOVIETS, NOT US, WHO WALKED OUT OF START, WEAKNESS. AND WHO WALKED OUT OF INF. WE HAVE MET WITH THEM IN STOCKHOLM AND WILL DISCUSS THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT CONCEPTS OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND WE WILL LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR THE SOVIETS TO REJOIN US IN GENEVA TO REDUCE THE WORLD'S ARMAMENTS. BUT WE WILL NOW DO IT FROM STRENGTH.

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NOTED TOO FREQUENTLY THE SUCCESS AND ADVANCES OF THE SOVIETS THE THIRD WORLD, THE REALIZATION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY AS A