

FOR RELEASE AM'S MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1970

WASHINGTON, D.C. Aug. 10 -- U.S. Senator Bob Dole (R-Kans.), in speaking on the Senate floor today in support of an expanded Safeguard program, said the expansion represents the "minimum response to an urgent need."

"It is unbelievable that the Senate is now trying to handcuff President Nixon in light of what he has achieved in the last 18 months," Dole said.

"1. The President has a plan for peace in Vietnam and it is working.

"2. An Arab-Israeli cease-fire began Friday night as a result of Mid-East peace proposals prepared by the Nixon Administration.

"3. Progress is being made at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks -- begun under the Nixon Administration -- in Vienna.

"In view of these developments, it seems unreal that we now question the President's judgment, motives or wisdom with reference to the Safeguard."

Excerpts from the Senator's prepared text follow.

Last year, by a narrow majority, authorization was granted to begin work on two Safeguard sites. That work has begun and much has been accomplished. Most importantly, the Safeguard program has developed the momentum so necessary for the timely and orderly prosecution of the deployment. It is a stupendous management task that, once interrupted, is extremely difficult, costly and time-consuming to resume.

Just as we have established a momentum with the ABM, so have the Soviets, since 1965, built up a momentum in developing and deploying their strategic offensive force. This momentum is most disturbing as it applies to the installation of the giant SS-9 ICBM.

If this momentum continues, we face the prospect in a very few years of a real threat to our Minuteman ICBM force - the backbone of our deterrent.

The issue revolves around the strategic reality of our defense posture. The time has again come when the Senate of the United States either gives the President the tools to bring peace and security or denies them. Nothing has happened since last year to justify altering the course we established then. The threat has not disappeared - it has increased. We do not have an arms limitation agreement with the Russians and we don't know when we will. We were confident the system would work last year. We are more confident than ever this year of its effectiveness. In short, if there was a valid reason to begin deployment last year, there is certainly a valid reason to continue, uninterrupted, at least the minimum deployment needed to preserve our security.

One of the favorite criticisms is that Safeguard is effective only against a "narrow band of threats." It is true that Soviet forces operational today do not require Safeguard, but their threat continues to grow. It is true also that Safeguard, like any defense system, can be exhausted if the threat grows indefinitely. The Safeguard defense of Minuteman was chosen to cope with neither the extreme of no threat growth nor maximum conceivable threat growth. The Safeguard deployment is aimed at threat growth between these extremes -- and perhaps more important -- is aimed at discouraging the endless proliferation of Soviet hard target killers. Nevertheless, if the threat should grow significantly larger than the level against which the Safeguard Minuteman defense is designed, additional radars could be added to provide even greater leverage in the price charged the offense to penetrate. New, less expensive components dedicated to hard target defense are being developed as a hedge against a massive threat to Minuteman.

In addition to charging that the radars are vulnerable because they are "soft," opponents of the Safeguard system also say

that its radars can be "blacked out" by large precursor warheads detonated at high altitudes specifically for that purpose. They also contend that self-blackout may result from Spartan warheads detonated against the first enemy reentry vehicles.

The truth is that over the past several years extensive analyses have been made of the effect on the ABM of both self-blackout and precursor blackout. On the basis of the studies, it was concluded that the fully deployed Safeguard system would not be seriously limited by self-blackout effects during attacks up to the maximum postulated Chinese Communist threat level as long as proper decisions are made concerning intercept doctrine. The same conclusion is true for the estimated heavier attack against the defended Minuteman force. This is because we would primarily use the low-yield Sprint whose blackout effect on the defense is minimal.

Finally, I would like to discuss an area in which, in my opinion, considerable misunderstanding still exists. That is the role of our ABM in the current talks with the Russians regarding strategic arms limitation. In our past experience in dealing with the Soviets -- both as allies in World War II and as adversaries in the Cold War, one central fact of life has emerged; and that is that they give up nothing without receiving something in return. This is especially true when the defense of Mother Russia is involved. I cannot, for the life of me, understand how so many of us fail to appreciate this. In order to conduct successful negotiations, both parties must have something to negotiate with -- something so important to the other side that he is willing to give up something for it. The Russians are not in Vienna today out of concern for us. They are there for their own advantage, not ours.

If, as has been suggested by some, we cancel, delay or put in "escrow" funds for further ABM deployment in the hope that this will facilitate negotiations we would be guilty of the sheerest folly. Safeguard in escrow is the same as national security in escrow.

Our prime objective in the SALT talks is to constrain the Soviets from achieving a first-strike capability against us. We would accomplish this through negotiated limitations in their strategic offensive weapons -- primarily the SS-9 ICBM.

Our best hope for achieving such limitations is to negotiate Safeguard. Safeguard is the one major ongoing U.S. program that the Russians are interested in restricting. Were we to do this unilaterally for them, we would be voluntarily stripping ourselves of our negotiating capability.

It is relatively easy to stop something like the Safeguard program. It is another thing to start it up again after we have stopped. We cannot turn the program on or off at will like a water faucet. If we interrupt the program, we had best be prepared for a long and costly delay before we can start it up again. We had best be sure the threat has stopped growing. Until then, prudence dictates that we maintain the momentum of the program.

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Another network personality made a remark which some construed as a charge that Vice President Agnew was indirectly responsible for the tragedy at Kent State. Such instances of slanted news reporting merit open criticism.

#### MAINTAINING A FREE PRESS

But it is important to recognize that the central issue in CRITICISM of print and broadcast news reporting is NOT freedom of the press. The media should not raise the First Amendment as a shield against legitimate criticism; nor should they feel intimidated by criticism.

However, should the Federal Government attempt to enforce a blanket rule such as that proposed by the Senator from Arkansas, I believe the media would have just cause to feel intimidation; for it is an established principle in this nation that the ONLY legitimate regulator of a free press must be the press itself. That is a principle that must not be compromised. Therefore, I can join the network and other broadcast executives who testified in opposition to S.J. Res. 209.

#### OJECTIONS TO THE RESOLUTION

My specific objection to the pending resolution is based on three points. FIRST, I do not believe, except in the case of a national emergency, that the Federal Government should require broadcast stations to present ANY particular program -- whether it be a soap opera or a partisan political address. Such a blanket provision would be a step toward removing the discretion and trust the American system has placed in free, commercial broadcasting. It would be similar to the British system in which any ministry of the government can order any program it favors to be broadcast at any time. Admittedly, Senate Joint Resolution 209 is a much narrower requirement, but the basic principle is the same.

SECONDLY, why should there be a REQUIREMENT in the Communications Act for Congressional appearances on every broadcast facility in the nation when there is no such requirement for Presidential appearances? Why does the proposed Joint Resolution not also require, for the sake of legal consistency, that the President be presented at least four times a year? For if such requirements were advisable, it would seem reasonable to require time for the Executive Branch as well.

Granting for a moment its desirability, a THIRD objection to the Joint Resolution is its vagueness. There is no explanation of WHO is an "authorized" representative of the Senate or House of Representatives. Nor does the legislation specify how much time should be made available. There is no reason to believe that any "authorized" representative could present a consensus view of such pluralistic bodies as the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States.

#### CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

There is at least one form of action the Congress can take by itself to make certain the public is cognizant of its thinking on important issues. All Congressional hearings and Senate and House sessions, other than executive sessions, could be open to television coverage. By encouraging the stations and networks to broadcast more of the activities of Congress, the public could become aware of the general feeling of the Members of Congress on issues of public importance.

Such action could prove more valuable -- and it is certainly more in line with the principles of the First Amendment than the pending resolution.

#### WORKABLE DOCTRINE"

For these reasons, I believe the Congress would be well advised to reject Senate Joint Resolution 209. I do not mean to suggest that there may not be some reasonable alternative to the confusion which occasionally exists as a result of demands and counter-demands for comparable time under the Fairness Doctrine.