

DOLE
Attachment

(TEXT OF LETTER FROM SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE CLARK CLIFFORD TO
CONGRESSMAN BOB DOLE)

DOLE
Attachment (continued)

"I have carefully considered the items contained in your letter regarding the callup of Army National Guardsmen and Reservists from Kansas in May 1968, particularly your question as to why the Reserves were called to active duty at that time. There were several compelling reasons for recalling these Reservists.

"First, I should like to point out that after the seizure of the Pueblo and the Lunar New Year (Communist attacks in South Vietnam), our Armed Forces had to be strengthened. This was necessary to meet the increased threat and assure our capability to meet our other commitments

"This requirement for immediate response could only be met by mobilizing trained units and men, and on 31 March the President announced a limited mobilization, pointing out there was a need to support Marine and Airborne troops deployed to Southeast Asia in February on an emergency basis. To give these forces maximum combat effectiveness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the President that units totalling 13,500 support personnel be sent to Vietnam. This requirement could not be met in a timely fashion by increased draft calls.

"In contrast, the selective recall of Reserves and National Guard units would improve our readiness posture quickly by adding organized units, whose officers and enlisted men had all trained together to our active forces at the earliest practical time. The Army, in selecting reserve units to be mobilized, shows specific numbers and types of units to meet specific requirements for Vietnam and for replacing the STRATEGIC ARMY FORCE, some of the regular units which had been deployed in February. In particular, the Army took the following factors into consideration:

- A. "The most ready units should be called in preference to less ready units.
- B. "The 69th Infantry Brigade was designated as an element in the Selected Reserve Force (SRF), and had been given special priority for personnel, equipment and training. As such, it had become one of the best units in the National Guard.
- C. "Throughout all the planning and decision making concerned with this mobilization, the effect upon the localities from which units were to be taken was considered, but the dominant factor had to be the collective need of the Nation. Our Reserve units are not spread evenly across the length and breadth of the Nation so that a unit callup can be made that impacts uniformly on all states. When a major unit is called, there is bound to be a disproportionate effect on the locality from which it comes.

"For example, the Army National Guardsmen who reported for federal service in May were drawn from 17 states. In 15 cases, this represented 22 percent or less of the National Guard forces in those states. In the other two, Kansas and Hawaii, the total was 47 percent and 76 percent respectively owing to the need for their well-trained and fully-ready brigades (the 69th and 29th).

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CONGRESSMAN BOB DOLE)

"I have carefully considered the items contained in your letter re-
garding the calling of Army National Guardsmen and Reservists from
Kansas in May 1968, particularly your question as to why the Reservists
were called to active duty at that time. There were several compelling

"As for your other questions, there are no plans at the present time
for early release of the Reserve units called in May.. They were needed
then and they are needed today. All of us share your hope that the
Paris negotiations will be fruitful, in which case we will, of course,
re-examine the requirement for continuing Reserve units on active duty.

"As for the probable assignment of the 69th Brigade, after its current
training program ends, it will continue to form a part of the Strategic
Army Force, based in the continental United States and available for
deployment as the national need indicates.

"We are quite appreciative of the contributions being made by the men
of the 69th and the other units affected by the May Reserve call.
Their service is making possible an increase in Armed Forces readiness
which simply could not have been timely achieved in any other way, and
which we believe was necessary if the prospects for a stable peace were
to be enhanced."

/signed/ Clark Clifford
Secretary of Defense

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 - B. "The 69th Infantry Brigade was designated as an element in the Selected Reserve Force (SRF), and had been given special priority for personnel, equipment and training. As such, it had become one of the best units in the National Guard.
 - C. "Throughout all the planning and decision making concerned with this mobilization, the effect upon the localities from which units were to be taken was considered, but the dominant factor had to be the collective need of the Nation. Our Reserve units are not spread evenly across the length and breadth of the Nation so that a unit callup can be made that impacts uniformly on all states. When a major unit is called, there is bound to be a disproportionate effect on the locality from which it comes.
- For example, the Army National Guardsmen who reported for federal service in May were drawn from 17 states. In 15 cases, this represented 25 percent or less of the National Guard forces in those states. In the other two, Kansas and Hawaii, the total was 47 percent and 76 percent respectively owing to the need for their well-trained and fully-ready brigades (the 69th and 29th).