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THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, AUGUST 20, 1976

Delegates Voice Doubts On Ford-Dole Prospects

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON

KANSAS CITY, Mo., Aug. 19—Their contest ended, President Ford and Ronald Reagan joined today in a traditional attempt to set the tone for a strong and united Republican campaign this fall.

But many of the delegates asked to approve a ticket of Mr. Ford and Senator Robert J. Dole of Kansas spoke gravely of its prospects in November, while staunch partisans of the defeated California challenger threatened to sit back and watch the ticket lose in the South and the West.

"I'm afraid Ford is going to have to write off a large part of the South," said Guy Hunt, chairman of the pro-Reagan delegation from Alabama.

"The President is not extremely popular in Arizona," said Donna Carlson, a state representative, expressing concern that the national ticket would act as a drag on the candidacies of Arizona Republicans. "I've had calls from home this morning," she said, "and people are very disappointed and may not vote."

The designation of Senator Dole, a conservative but not regarded as a dogmatist, appeased some of Mr. Reagan's dejected lieutenants and produced relief among Ford allies in the industrial Northeast and the agricultural Middle West.

But the problems posed to the party by the narrow defeat of the Reagan candidacy for the Presidential nomination were reflected in the blunt outburst of Tom Ellis at the choice of the Kansas Senator to run for Vice President.

"What's a dole?" asked Mr. Ellis, the chairman of the North Carolina delegation. "A pineapple?"

Even among the senior aides

to Mr. Reagan, there was a superficiality to their requisite expressions of support for the winner.

Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada, the Reagan campaign chairman, appeared with Mr. Ford and Vice President Rockefeller when the selection of Mr. Dole was formally announced this noon.

"We've worked for months to have a harmonious convention," Mr. Laxalt said, smiling graciously. "I think we've achieved that."

Yet, minutes later, he told a reporter that Reagan aides had made a choice but to unite behind the Ford ticket, adding that "it's a matter of survival for the party."

Display of Solidarity

No one doubted but that Mr. Ford and Mr. Reagan, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, meant to set a pattern for the party, when they appeared together to proclaim mutual admiration at the loser's headquarters hotel early this morning and when they arranged a display of solidarity in Kemper Arena tonight.

"To some extent, their message was repeated elsewhere among the delegates and Republican leaders who decided the outcome of the Presidential contest."

"A Ford-Dole ticket 'can win' in Pennsylvania," said Richard C. Frame, the party chairman in that state.

"Unity shouldn't be any problem," said New York, said Louis J. Lefkowitz, the state Attorney General.

And Mike Curb, the young vice chairman of Mr. Reagan's home state delegation, said he had decided at a caucus to ignore the former Governor's promise to support the ticket.

But the most dramatic symbols of the closing hours of the Republican National Convention did not all reflect the proclaimed mood of the party's leaders. The following incidents occurred.

"Mr. Reagan and his wife Nancy burst into tears at a farewell meeting with their campaign staff, where the Californian spoke of continuing his conservative cause but made no mention of the President or of the unity theme meant to prevail through November."

"Vice President Rockefeller, who agreed to remove himself from the 1976 ticket last year in a fruitless effort to head off a Reagan challenge to Mr. Ford, paid eloquent court at the announcement ceremony for the Ford-Dole ticket. Yet, he did not mention the names of either President Ford or his running mate."

"Mr. Dole, the ultimate choice of a President who would be forced by the convention to disclose the name of his running mate before winning the nomination, seemed to recognize the inherent significance of the Reagan camp's concern over the second spotters were likely to limit their on a Ford ticket by stressing activities to state and local candidates if the ticket was not born in the South."

The Real Point

For all that, there was a sense that many of the unity lines being expressed here today had come from the script of a drama not certain to survive a tryout in Philadelphia.

"Yes, we'll support Ford," said Twyla Humpleby, a Reagan

delegate from Iowa. "That's not the real point."

Mrs. Humpleby added, "The real point is, will his ticket be able to capture the independent and conservative Democratic vote in Iowa?"

The answer to her question appeared to depend on the Reagan delegates, rather than the Reagan strategists.

"We've just got to leave Ron alone for a while," a senior Presidential aide said of Mr. Reagan. "He'll be all right. The majority of his support will come to us."

That confidence was not echoed in the Sunbelt states, where Mr. Reagan derived his strongest support, nor in Florida, one of the areas of the "peripheral South" that Mr. Ford's managers have identified as a target of opportunity for the campaign this fall.

A Ford-Dole ticket "is not exactly what we had in mind, not as strong as a Ford-Reagan

ticket," said one Reagan aide.

There was talk of disaffection. David Manion of Indiana said conservatives there "need somebody who can articulate our philosophy. Reagan could. Ford doesn't have that ability."

Problem in Missouri

Thomas E. Curtis, the Missouri delegation leader, warned of a "real problem" in the convention's host state. "I'll do what I can for Ford," he said. "The nomination fight isn't a little fairer than it started out to be. But there are still scars."

The President's strategists said they could afford to lose the most right wing of the Reagan partisans. As a consolation to Mr. Ford put it: The party never had them anyway. They just came in "for the Reagan thing."

But the President's political advisers were counting on the gradual dissipation of the disillusion in the Reagan camp and hoping, they said, that Mr. Dole's rough and tumble style of campaigning might even generate some enthusiasm among conservatives.

Nothing so vividly summed up that optimism than the description by Paul Haerle, the pro-Ford California party chairman, of the attitude he thought he detected in the California delegation, which gave Mr. Reagan his largest block of votes.

"If you ask if 167 people are leaving here disappointed, I say, 'Hell, yes, they are,'" he said. "But if you ask if 167 people are going home to sit on their hands, I say, 'Hell, no.' Nobody is mad at Gerald Ford. They may be mad at Paul Haerle, but that's as deep as it goes."

A White House official preferred to focus on the reaction to Mr. Reagan's defeat last night by one of his most vocal supporters in the boisterous Texas delegation, and hoped it could be translated into grudging help by November.

The aide said that a woman who had shouted all night in behalf of Mr. Reagan and bawled Mr. Ford stood at the end of the Presidential roll-call, tears in her eyes, and she proceeded to tear her hair out.

placed in half. Then she turned, held it up for Mr. Ford's family to see in a V.I.P. box just above her, and managed just a hint of a conciliatory smile.

Ray Barnhart, chairman of the ardently pro-Reagan delegation from Texas, said a minority "absolutely would not vote or work for Ford," and that his own support of the ticket was dependent on how enthusiastically the President and his running mate embraced the party platform. He also said the Ford-Dole ticket would have to espouse a foreign policy plank that "has rejected Henry Kissinger's approach to foreign policy," before winning him over.

W. Kleon Skousen, a Utah candidate, said Reagan supporters were likely to limit their activities to state and local candidates if the ticket was not vigorously conservative.

"Senator Dole is not going to be very strong out our way," he said, meeting the litmus test of ideological purity, Mr. Skousen added.

Even in the Middle West, which is the base of both Mr. Ford and his running mate,

ticket. Both the single nominating ballot and the test vote on Rule 16-C at this convention showed Mr. Ford's strength to be concentrated already in the Midwest and the East. Mr. Carter, moreover, also has a Midwestern running mate and one probably better versed in agricultural and grain-trade matters than Mr. Dole.

Like Bill Miller before him, Mr. Dole has no known record in foreign or domestic affairs that could be relied upon to transcend them, or even that a President should.

That choice unfortunately confirms, as well, what most of his Presidency and all of his campaign has suggested—that Gerald Ford is basically a wheel-horse Republican, so steeped in that breed's orthodoxies and so limited by his perceptions that he has no idea how to transcend them, or even that a President should.

Mr. Ford, in the end, went with No. 4, and with Robert Dole. It made no sense in sectional politics—both of them coming from the Middle West. It had no appeal to the liberal Republicans, but it was a power play to put Dole against Carter.

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"Dole could attack the anti-Kissinger Republican foreign policy platform, but Ford had to look the other way."

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Doleful Nomination

President Ford's choice of Senator Robert J. Dole of Kansas reflects a politics of despair, if not of desperation.

It is impossible to believe that in selecting Mr. Dole yesterday for the Republican Vice-Presidential nomination, Mr. Ford could have thought first of the supreme and only truly valid qualification for that office: Is this man (or woman) the best suited of all the party's available candidates to assume the Presidency of the United States should the office for any reason become vacant?

Judging from the nature of his choice, it seems unlikely that Mr. Ford thought of this aspect of the task at all. To his credit, Senator Dole himself modestly proclaimed a few moments after the President's announcement: "I am not certain what I can add to the ticket. . . ." It is indeed difficult on the basis of his public record to ascertain just what he can add—except only that tough, aggressive, sometimes witty, always partisan biting style (in contrast to Mr. Ford's) on which Mr. Dole built his reputation as one of former President Nixon's loyal supporters and strongest defenders.

Member of the House for four terms, Mr. Nixon's appointee as chairman of the Republican National Committee and Senator since 1969, Mr. Dole—whose legislative record is based principally on defense of agricultural interests—is distinctly on the conservative side of the Republican spectrum in Congress. In view of that fact, it was revealingly frank for President Ford to announce that "Bob Dole's philosophy and mine coincide identically." No bridging of the party's ideological gap here. In fact, the liberal Republican Ripon Society immediately termed the selection "disappointing," noting that "while it unifies the [already united] conservative elements of the G.O.P., it ignores the moderates in the party who

were responsible for Ford's nomination." In a very real sense, this is Mr. Reagan's ultimate triumph.

Even on a strictly political basis, it is hard to see what President Ford accomplished by his choice except appeasement of the Reaganite wing of his party. But at what cost?

Instead of reaching out to the great mass of independent, moderate and even liberal voters who may be looking for a viable alternative to the still relatively unknown and untied Democratic nominee, President Ford, exactly as Mr. Reagan had done during his unsuccessful fight for the nomination, turned inward to that minority faction within the minority party—seemingly almost deliberately to signal to the vast voting world outside that narrow framework that he does not seek its support. Neither ideologically nor geographically does the Dole nomination add strength to the ticket—except possibly in Kansas and Nebraska where Mr. Ford needs it least, and among extreme Reaganite diehards who might otherwise have stayed home.

If the expectation is that Senator Dole with his characteristic style of campaigning will prove effective on the low road while President Ford remains on the high road, that is pretty thin strategy on which to base a national campaign.

The only chance the Republicans have to break out of their minority status in this election will be to offer ideas, inspiration and the promise of forthright leadership to a country and a people still bemused by the past decade's cataclysmic changes in American society and in the world at large. Can the Ford-Dole ticket inspire the American people with the confidence that it offers this kind of leadership in the next four years?

NY TIMES 8-20-76

Ford's Doleful News

By James Reston

KANSAS CITY, Mo., Aug. 19—The political process has worked its way and produced two Presidential candidates worthy of the respect of the nation.

Neither party is very satisfied with the result of the nominations, but on the question that has troubled the Republic for almost a generation—the character of the men of power—Ford and Carter measure up better than most.

Maybe this is the consolation of this election so far. Compared to Nixon-McGovern in 1972, the choice this time of Ford-Carter is almost reassuring, but the Republican convention here has raised some troubling questions at the end.

For his Vice-Presidential nominee, President Ford has picked Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, a leading apologist for Richard Nixon, and this convention's most vicious critic of Jimmy Carter. If you'll forgive the pun, it's doleful news.

In these last few days in Kansas City, the President has been under severe pressure to select a running mate with (1) experience and conservative credentials (for example Reagan or Connally); (2) appeal to the liberal urban areas of the Northeast and the Middle West (Richardson, Ruckelshaus, Mathias, Percy, etc.); (3) ties to the South and the border states (Baker of Tennessee); and (4) some of all of these qualities but particularly the capacity to attack and provoke Carter into political blunders.

Mr. Ford, in the end, went with No. 4, and with Robert Dole. It made no sense in sectional politics—both of them coming from the Middle West. It had no appeal to the liberal Republicans, but it was a power play to put Dole against Carter.

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This is what got him through this convention against Reagan. This is

also what has enabled him to hold his party and even the opposition together in the last two difficult years. But his choice of Dole is almost a declaration of political war against the Democrats.

It was Mr. Dole who attacked Carter here as a "quick-change artist," and a "mass of contradictions," who misled the voters in the primaries about busing, abortion, taxes and government reorganization.

Mr. Dole made this speech primarily when Governor Rockefeller and others were urging the President to adopt a strategy of provocation against Carter and to pick a Vice-Presidential nominee who could cut up Carter as a vague and inexperienced accident of national politics. Apparently it worked.

Maybe President Ford had this in mind all along, but it seems doubtful. He has always said he would run a

KANSAS CITY

"positive and responsible" campaign, and pick a Vice-Presidential nominee who was the best possible "potential President."

But what he picked under pressure was the most aggressive and combative anti-Carter speaker he could find, and this is bound to have its political consequences.

First, it minimizes Mr. Ford's reputation as an objective, decent, "Presidential figure," and second, it dramatizes the desperation of the Republicans as they go into the campaign, with Ford running one to two against Carter.

Ford has had his worries here, but he won. He has many advantages facing Carter—the Presidency, his long experience in Washington, his amiable personality and the fact that not many people are really mad at him.

But his choice of Dole has bothered even many of his most fervent supporters, particularly those on the abandoned liberal left. For his choice of Dole seems put of character, a desperate move to win by attacking and destroying the opposition rather than concentrating on his own strengths.

The President has not acted here as a confident man with a vision of the future, but as a man of the opposition. He has opposed Reagan and had just barely squeaked through, and is now opposing and trying to destroy Carter indirectly through Dole. It is a surprising strategy, especially since it hurts Ford's own major strengths as a Presidential character who has in the last two years won the respect of his political opponents.

NY TIMES 8-20-76

The Dole-Miller Parallel and Gerald Ford

IN THE NATION

By Tom Wicker

KANSAS CITY, Mo., Aug. 19—President Ford has chosen the most distinguished Republican Vice-Presidential nominee since William E. Miller (Spiro T. Agnew being one of two official Republican non-persons). In fact, the Dole-Miller parallel is striking, and this nomination may well produce about the same result as the other.

Bob Dole! The mind boggles at the lack of inspiration required of Gerald Ford in making such a choice. Such embryonic respect for Mr. Ford's capacities as had been engendered by his plodding victory here over Ronald Reagan's razzle-dazzle attack disappeared like a plate of Arthur Bryant's barbecued ribs in the moment of his Vice-Presidential announcement.

Perhaps no amount of persuasion or proselytizing could have bagged Mr. Reagan as Mr. Ford's running mate, despite the fact that the two candidates divided the Republican convention virtually 50-50. Not everyone would agree that a Ford-Reagan ticket would have been a good one, anyway—although to the extent Mr. Ford needs to carry California, Texas and Florida, Mr. Reagan would have been most useful.

But Mr. Ford had at least two alternatives, either of which could at one stroke have demolished his reputation as an unimaginative and bumbling campaigner without a helmet. He could have named Anne Armstrong, his own ambassador to Great Britain and a Texan with political clout, ample

ability and international experience. That would have put Jimmy Carter at once and finally in the shade as an innovator, and opened the Republican Party to new faces and new generations in a way that no one has done since Dwight Eisenhower.

Failing that, Mr. Ford could have left the choice to the convention, again putting Mr. Carter in the position of having done the traditional political thing against Gerald Ford's openness and originality. The result probably would have been a Reagan draft, which would have given Mr. Reagan an honorable way to accept despite previous disclaimers and would have given Mr. Ford party unity as well as an exciting running mate.

Even in a more conventional sense, Mr. Ford had excellent alternatives to the Dole selection—and without going too far left for any but the most conservative Republicans. William D. Ruckelshaus of Indiana would have been a young, vigorous and able running mate, providing instant disassociation from Watergate. Senator Howard Baker, always a bridesmaid, has strength in the South that might have helped counter Mr. Carter in Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia and Florida. Governors Robert Ray of Iowa or Christopher Bond of Missouri could have given a Ford ticket the youth, vigor and intelligence it needs, while offering practically no one.

The choice of Mr. Dole—an undistinguished Senator from Kansas as Bill Miller was an undistinguished Representative from New York—is reported to have assured the support of the Reagan high command. But at what a price! Mr. Dole does not even add regional balance to the Republican

ticket. Both the single nominating ballot and the test vote on Rule 16-C at this convention showed Mr. Ford's strength to be concentrated already in the Midwest and the East. Mr. Carter, moreover, also has a Midwestern running mate and one probably better versed in agricultural and grain-trade matters than Mr. Dole.

Like Bill Miller before him, Mr. Dole has no known record in foreign or domestic affairs that could be relied upon to transcend them, or even that a President should.

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